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ABSTRACT
This dissertation addresses the problem of determining the effects of 
government funding on non-profit organizational behavior. The definition of a 
non-profit organization is a formal organization, privately incorporated but serving 
a public purpose, self-governing, voluntary to some degree and non-profit 
distributing (Salamon, 1993). The literature review demonstrates the increasing 
role of non-profit organizations as a means o f social service delivery in the 
United States. As a result of policy changes and funding opportunities, 
nonprofit organizations are increasingly providing services that were in the 
purview o f government.
The hypothesis for this study is that government funding positively 
affects the organizational behavior of non-profit organizations in terms of 
advocacy behavior, alliance behavior and program diversification. The principal 
research question for this study is: “What is the direct effect o f government 
funding on nonprofit organizational behavior in terms of (a) advocacy behavior; 
(b) alliance behavior; (c) diversity o f programs?”
This study relies on a data set of 170 cases of nonprofit organizations in 
Louisiana generated by a random mail survey in 1997 and five extensive case 
studies completed in 1999. The results of the study indicate that the organizational 
behavior of non-profits is affected by government funding. The results o f the logit 
and regression models o f the different funding/organizational scenarios are not as 
clear and convincing as one would like to report. However, the results generally 
confirm the premise o f the study.
iv
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The activities of non-profit organizations are affected by governmental 
agencies which act as funders and regulators as well as partners in service 
provision. The increased reliance on government funds may be transforming some 
non-profit organizations into quasi-govemmental entities that do not have the same 
ethos as traditional community-based and community-funded nonprofit 
organizations.
The blurring o f the lines between the for-profit, non-profit and government 
sectors caused by competition for resources may lead to the diminishment of the 
nonprofit sector. The future viability of non-profits may be threatened by the new 
emerging market for government contracted services and the increased competition 
across the sectors to be the vendors for those services.
v
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Feeding the hungry, healing the sick, housing the homeless—these are some of 
the expected functions o f non-profit organizations in the United States. More broadly, 
from the soup kitchen to symphony hall, non-profit organizations are a means of 
connecting communities and building the civic infrastructure of our country. An 
increasing number of organizations are working with government to provide essential 
social, health and human services. The relationship forged between non-profit 
organizations and government has significant public policy implications. As non-profit 
organizations increasingly depend on government funding, they rely less on donations 
and community support and they lose some of their independence, community focus and 
responsiveness to community needs. From 1982-1992, the growth in the non-profit 
sector is attributable to 40% from government sources, 8% from private giving and 52% 
from fees and charges (Salamon, 1997, 5). This shift in funding has implications for the 
organizational behavior o f non-profit organizations.
The interests of the public, the market and the non-profit sector are converging in 
the 21st century. As non-profits increase their contracting with government, the business 
sector is seeing new opportunities for growth. Non-profits are facing challenges from 
government to provide more services and threats from the business sector to compete in 
service areas traditionally in the realm o f the non-profit sector.
In 1999-2000, the State o f Louisiana contracts with non-profit organizations over 
S520 million for social and professional services, and this does not include payments to 
non-profit hospitals for Medicaid. O f the fifty largest contractors with the state for social
1
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services, forty-seven are non-profit organizations. Many of these organizations actively 
pursue state funding through advocacy and alliance activities. Several o f the largest non­
profit contractors are new organizations formed in the last ten years specifically for the 
purpose o f contracting with government.
As non-profit organizations alter their missions to '‘chase the funding,” it is 
apparent that government funding is affecting the non-profit’s organizational behavior. 
One of the concerns in the non-profit sector is how to maintain the trust of the public and 
the traditional expectations of the sector, as the funding and regulatory landscape 
changes.
This dissertation examines the effects of government funding on the 
organizational behavior of non-profit organizations in Louisiana. This introduction 
addresses the historical importance and scope of the non-profit sector, the significance of 
this study, and the conceptual framework and outlines the organization o f the 
dissertation. The study of non-profit organizations is a growth industry because of the 
recognition among scholars and practitioners that non-profit organizations are 
institutions playing vital roles in modem democratic societies by serving as the guardian 
of the public good, providing essential community services, mobilizing community 
responses to problems through advocacy and education, and generally serving as a 
means to build the social capital o f the country (Salamon, 1997, 3).
The scholarly community has increased its interest in non-profit organizations as 
a result of a better appreciation o f the significant economic and programmatic role of 
non-profit organizations. In the last forty years, non-profits have greatly expanded in
i
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number, mission, size, and diversity. Non-profits have become worthy objects of study 
for anyone interested in public policy because it simply makes no sense to define either 
society or the economy in terms of only government or the private sector (Haskell, 1995,
652).
The focus of this study was determined by the concern about the growing role of 
non-profit organizations in delivering public services. Smith and Lipsky (1993) suggest 
that government has established a “contracting regime” in which non-profit 
organizations are “agents o f the state.” The relationship of non-profit organizations and 
government raises important questions about the changing expectations of non-profits as 
government service providers. Salamon (1989) routinely refers to the non-profit sector 
as “third party government” because the state and the non-profit sector are 
complementary in service provision. The responsibility of non-profit organizations is 
dominated by governmental agencies as funders and regulators as well as partners in 
service provision.
The non-profit sector is becoming recognized as a significant part of the 
economy and public welfare delivery system. Indeed, the efforts and activities of non­
profit organizations are now commonly referred to as a ‘third sector’ and increasingly as 
a means of providing services that have been the purview o f government 
(INDEPENDENT SECTOR, 1996, 1997, 1998; Gronbjerg, 1998; Hansmann, 1987; 
DeHoog, 1984).
The terms “non-profit”, “third” and “independent” were first used in 1973 by 
Theodore Levitt and Amitai Etzioni in the Filer Commission Report. The Filer
3
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Commission was appointed by Congress to study philanthropy in the mid-70s. The
commission did not initiate the discussion o f a sectored economy, since according to
Kramer (1998) the concept of a sectored economy was developed in the late 1940s by
the National Income Accounts of the U.S. Department o f Commerce. However, the term
non-profit sector did not come into common usage until the 1980s (Webber and
Wildavsky 1986). In “Patterns of Generosity in America,” (Julian Wolpert) discussed
the emergence of the sectored economy:
America’s three-sector economy divided between public, private and 
non-profit entities is not a rigid and permanent structure. The division of 
activities has evolved over three centuries. The evolution reflects the 
changing conditions and values of our society and the shifting 
comparative advantage of each of the sectors to carry out an agenda that 
is affected by contemporary resources, needs and societal preferences 
(Wolpert 1993, 11).
Wolpert stated that that non-profits raise their own revenues from a variety o f sources in 
including donations, government grants and contracts, fees, and dues and service 
charges. However, the impact of government policy on non-profit organizations is 
generally felt directly as a change in funding.
Salamon (1993) reformulated the definition of the non-profit sector as a 
collection o f formal organizations, privately incorporated but serving a public purpose, 
self-governing, voluntary to some degree and non-profit distributing.1 According to the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS), in the United States there are approximately 1.2 million
1 O f the twenty-five IRS designations for tax exempt organizations, only 501(cX3) organizations are deemed
charitable organizations which are created to serve a public benefit and receive the extra privilege o f  accepting tax 
deductible contributions from individuals and corporations. These organizations must be the Internal Revenue Service
standards o f  religious, charitable, educational, scientific and literary purposes.
4
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tax-exempt non-profit organizations registered as o f 1997. O f these, 654,000 were 
501(c)(3) charitable organizations eligible to receive tax deductible contributions. 
Table 1.1. Tax Exempt Organizations Registered with the IRS, 1989-1995
Tax Exempt Non-profit 
Organizations Registered with 
the IRS
1989 1992 1994 1995
501(c)(3) 464,138 546,100 599,745 626,226
Total # o f non-profits 992,537 1,085,206 1,138,598 1,164,779
Source: State Non-profit Almanac 1997, The Urban Institute Press, 3.
In Louisiana, not all non-profit organizations are required to register with the 
IRS, but they are required to incorporate and file with the Louisiana Secretary of State. 
At the present time, there are nearly 30,000 incorporated non-profits in Louisiana. These 
groups range from the smallest neighborhood group to the largest non-profit hospital. 
There are more than 15,000 Louisiana non-profit organizations registered with the IRS.2 
O f these, more than 7,200 are 501(c)(3) organizations. In 1997, 2,293 501(c)(3) non­
profit organizations in Louisiana filed IRS Form 990. Appendix C includes information 
on the non-profit sector in Louisiana.3
The growth in the non-profit sector is measured by the number of incorporated 
non-profit entities, the number o f paid staff in the sector, and the percentage of national 
income generated in the sector. The following table outlines the national changes from
: Non-profit organizations only need to register with the IRS if they have financial activity over S5,000. If they have 
activity over S25,000 in a year, then they must file an IRS Form 990 as an annual informational return.
3 The Appendix includes a list o f  the 501(cX3) non-profit organizations in Louisiana which file IRS Form 990’s and a 
publication from the Louisiana Association o f  Non-profit Organizations called “S and Sense: Profile o f Louisiana 
Non-profits".
5
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1977-1992 {Non-profit Almanac, 1998, 2). Additional data through 1996 is included in 
some categories.
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Sources: Hodgkinson and Weitzman, Non-profit Almanac 1996-197 and interim update, 
January 1998, INDEPENDENT SECTOR; Giving and Volunteering in the United States
Steuerle and Hodginkinson (1999) reported on the scope of the sector and
tracked the changes over the last two decades. Employment in the sector grew from
5.3% in 1977 to 7.4 % in 1996. Steuerle and Hodgkinson observed that there is a
complementary change in employment in the public sector from 18.6% in 1977 to 16.5%
in 1996. Steuerle and Hodgkinson speculated that a transference of authority, funding
and programming may be responsible for the change. In addition to employment
growth, government payments to non-profit organizations grew much faster than private
sector payments and contributions (Steuerle and Hodgkinson, 1999, 87):
In recent decades the government and the non-profit sector have often 
acted more as complements than substitutes in many o f their activities.
When one considers the relatively constant rate of charitable 
contributions out of personal income and the growth in shares of total 
output and employment by the non-profit sector—all of which occurred 
during a period of rising social welfare spending by government— it is 
hard to argue that increased government activity has displaced private 
non-profit activity in any aggregate sense. Indeed, one of the most
6
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important aspects of the modem relationship between the sectors is the 
way government has increasingly turned to the non-profit sector to serve 
as an intermediary or contractor in providing many public services 
(Steurle and Hodgkinson, 1999,93).
Many scholars are aware of the magnitude of the sector and the implications of the
organizational behavior of non-profits and the linkage to public policy.
According to Boris and Steuerle, “scholars are beginning to document the central
role that formal and informal non-profit organizations play in creating the glue that holds
communities together and the avenues they provide for civic participation'’ (1999,3).
Other scholars such as Etzioni (1993) and Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) outline
the significant role that non-profits play in creating a civil society.
The notion that non-profit organizations form the civic infrastructure of the
country is not a modem idea. The importance o f the non-profit sector was first reported
by Alexis de Tocqueville in his visit to America in the 1830’s. In Democracy in
America, Tocqueville suggested that Americans have a natural tendency to form
alliances or associations and presumed that this behavior is based on mutual self-interest
or common interest:
Americans of all ages, all stations in life, and all types o f  dispositions are 
forever forming associations. There are not only commercial and 
industrial associations in which all take part, but others o f a thousand 
different types -  religious, moral, serious, futile, very general and very 
limited, immensely large and very minute. Americans combine to give 
fetes, found seminaries, build churches, distribute books, and send 
missionaries to the antipodes. Hospitals, prisons, and schools take shape 
in that way. Finally, if  they want to proclaim a truth or propagate some 
feeling by the encouragement of a great example, they form an 
association. In every case, at the head o f a great new undertaking, where 
in France you would find the government or in England some territorial 
magnate, in the United States you are sure to find an association 
(Tocqueville, Lawrence, 1969 translation, 517).
7
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Tocqueville stated that, “Nothing, in my view, more deserves attention than the
intellectual and moral associations in America” (Tocqueville, 1969, 518).
Today, it is accepted that non-profit organizations form the civic infrastructure of
the United States, creating opportunities for citizens to engage in community building
activities and organizing to provide services and functions not met in the market or
public sectors. However, the responsibility for the provision of services is increasingly
falling into the realm of the third sector—the voluntary sector, the non-profit sector or
sometimes called the independent sector (Non-profit Almanac, 1996-1997,
INDEPENDENT SECTOR, 1998). Rose-Ackerman (1986), Powell and Clemens
(1998), Gronbjerg (1998) and Perlmutter and Gummer (1994) report that the
contemporary non-profit sector is affected by government policies such as privatization
and devolution. These policies have enhanced the role of the non-profit sector as a
service delivery mechanism of the state. The changing civil society has promoted the
rise of non-profit organizations as social forces as well as economic and service entities.
Recent studies by the INDEPENDENT SECTOR (1997), Drucker (1990, 1993),
Weisbrod (1986, 1988, 1996, 1998), and Rose-Ackerman (1986) further elaborate on the
significance o f the non-profit sector in sustaining civil society. Salamon in America's
Non-profit Sector described the role o f the non-profit sector:
[T]he non-profit sector plays an important role in promoting a crucial 
social value— ‘the value of freedom and pluralism by encouraging the 
public good.’ John Stuart Mill pointed out in his treatise, On Liberty. 
‘Government operations tend to be everywhere alike. With individuals 
and voluntary associations, on the contrary, there are varied experiments 
and endless diversity of experience” (Salamon, 1992, 9).
8
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To define the significance of the non-profit sector’s role in the United States’ civil
society, Drucker describes the evolution o f organizations:
[Sjociety in all developed countries has become a society of 
organizations in which most, if  not all, social tasks are being done in and 
by an organization: the business enterprise and the labor union; the 
armed services and the hospital; schools and universities; a host of 
community services—some o f them government agencies, many more 
non-profit institutions o f the ‘social sector’ (1993, 49).
Non-profit organizations have increasing responsibilities as providers of services as a
means to promote social change, build community, promote economic development, and
build civil society.
According to Drucker’s analysis, the autonomous social sector has increased in 
importance as a means of defining and encouraging citizenship and reweaving the fabric 
of society. The belief that non-profit organizations can work as ‘agents of government’ 
and society has added to the complex expectations o f the roles non-profit organizations 
play and the range of services provided (Drucker, 1993). This service delivery 
relationship has altered the dynamic between the public, private, and non-profit sectors. 
As non-profit organizations are called on more frequently to provide services and 
contract with governmental entities, they have increasing interest in public policy and 
funding decisions.
The existence and financial viability of some organizations is inextricably 
intertwined with government funding and program priorities. The “collective goods” 
model views the behavior of non-profit organizations in terms o f offering an alternative 
to government for the production of public goods. Weisbrod (1977, 1988) treats the 
presence of non-profit organizations as the result of the inability o f  government to meet
9
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the demand for public goods, such as care for the medically indigent and other services 
(Frank and Salkever, 1994,134). Gronbjerg and other political scientists suggest that the 
non-profit sector emerged in response to community needs not met by government and 
the limitations o f the market system or market failure. Therefore, government and 
community must collaborate for the provision of services in the non-profit sector.
A debate exists within the academic community about the blurring of the lines 
between the public, private and non-profit sectors. The distinctiveness of the non-profit 
sector and the shared roles with government and business for service provision are 
debated by national level non-profit infrastructure groups such as the Non-profit Sector 
Research Fund o f the Aspen Institute, the INDEPENDENT SECTOR, the Union 
Institute, and the National Center on Charitable Statistics at Urban Institute. These 
issues are also relevant in the practitioner community as represented by the National 
Council of Non-profit Associations and in the scholarly community as represented by 
professional and academic groups such as the Association for Research on Non-profit 
Organizations and Voluntary Action 4(ARNOVA) and Applied Research and 
Development International, Inc. (ARDI)3.
This research effort began with the overarching question: “What are the possible 
effects of government funding on non-profit organizations?.” The literature review in 
Chapter 2 examines the evolution of the non-profit sector and the increasing complexity
'  ARNOVA, is a community o f people dedicated to fostering the creation, application and dissemination of research 
about voluntary action, non-profit organizations and philanthropy (www.amova.org).
5 ARD1 accomplishes this mission through advocating the importance o f effective leadership and management and 
conducting applied research which creates, enhances and facilitates utilization o f knowiedgefwww.ardi.org).
10
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of funding relationships between the public and non-profit sectors. Salamon (1993), 
Smith and Lipsky (1993) and Gronbjerg (1998) report on the changing nature o f the non­
profit sector and the organizational behavior o f  non-profits. Non-profit organizations are 
responding to the changing landscape in order to compete for government funding and 
private sector resources.
One change may be that non-profit organizations are becoming more 
professional, sophisticated and complex because they have an increasingly complex 
relationship with government as both a funder and regulator. One of the areas this study 
will address is the impact of funding on organizations to determine if sophisticated 
and/or larger organizations are more likely to seek and maintain government funding.
Some of the issues to be addressed in the study, is such as the effects o f funding 
on advocacy and alliance behavior, are addressed by prominent scholars in the field.
One of the frequently cited authors is Salamon (1982, 1989, 1992, 1995, 1997, 1998, 
1999), who has written extensively on the non-profit sector, government funding and the 
role of the sector in civil society. Weisbrod, Wolpert, Ryan, Gronbjerg, Smith and 
Lipsky and other scholars have started to focus on the advocacy activities o f non-profits 
and the involvement in associations.
The goal of this study is to understand how organizational characteristics and 
government funding affect the organizational behavior of non-profit organizations as 
determined by the dependent variables— advocacy behavior, alliance behavior and 
diversity of programs. The results of this study will provide empirical evidence about 
differences in organizational behavior in non-profit organizations in Louisiana. These
11
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findings may shed some light on the discussion o f the impact and relationship of 
government funding and organizational behavior.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The research questions for this study are:
1. What is the direct effect o f government funding on non-profit organizational 
behavior in terms o f (a) advocacy behavior, (b) alliance behavior, (c) diversity of 
programs?
2. What is the direct effect of organizational characteristics on non-profit organizational 
behavior in terms o f (a) advocacy behavior, (b) alliance behavior; (c) diversity of 
programs?
3. Do organizational characteristics affect these behaviors indirectly as well by 
affecting government funding?
4. Does the source o f government funding affect these relationships?
5. Are there reciprocal relationships between the dependent organizational behavior 
variables for funding, advocacy behavior, alliance behavior and program diversity?
The model below outlines the relationships o f the variables to be examined in 
this study. The analytical portion o f  this study relies on data generated from a survey of 
Louisiana non-profits completed in the summer of 1997.
The model identifies the conceptual framework o f the study. There are four 
primary areas o f interest to be evaluated in the study: the contextual factors, 
organizational characteristics, funding, and organizational behavior. The discussion of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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The contextual issues are the overarching issues or policies that affect the sector. 
The impact of privatization and devolution on the behavior o f non-profit organizations is 
a critical aspect of this study. Ryan (1999) identified the problems of non-profits in 
balancing their missions to provide services as well as serve as educators, advocates and, 
agents of social change. The role of non-profits is also to challenge society to respond to 
human problems in new ways—particularly through public policy and advocacy.
Ryan (1999) recognized the potential conflicts of non-profits to manage their 
missions—a public policy agenda that includes advocating on behalf of their clients that 
in turn might mean criticizing their funding sources and policy makers who issued their 
contracts. Privatization, devolution and other policy changes are affecting governmental 
decisions about funding and the provision of services by non-profit organizations. The 
literature review suggests that non-profit organizations are responding to meet funding 
changes and the demands of government oversight and increased contracting for the 
provision o f services.
The changes in organizational characteristics, according to Smith and Lipsky, 
(1993) indicate that power is shifting from voluntary boards to more highly trained 
professional executive directors who are more responsive to funding and regulatory 
relationships with the state. Government expectations for professional management of 
non-profit organizations that contract with the state have altered the management 
dynamic and the perception of non-profit organizations in the community. Other 
possible organizational changes resulting from the emphasis on contracting are changes 
in the mission of the organization, composition of the board o f directors, sophistication
14
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in record keeping, contract and financial management and increases in the administrative 
demands on organizations (Crimmins and Keil 1983; Grayson and Tompkins 1984; 
Herman 1994; Knauft, Berger, Gray 1991; O ’Neill and Young 1988; Powell 1987).
Schlesinger (1998) and Smith and Lipsky (1993) suggest that the 
professionalization o f the non-profit sector displaces community volunteers with paid 
professionals, which results in higher program costs, reduced services, and a distancing 
of the client from the organization. One of the side effects o f the increased 
sophistication o f organizations is that non-profit organizations may be working less as 
advocates for the clients and more as advocates for themselves. Changes in funding may 
mean that non-profit organizations are now required to think and act in strategic and 
political terms rather than strictly in terms of service provision or responsiveness to 
community needs (Weisbrod ,1986; Young, 1981; Alexander, 1998).
Opportunities for state or federal funding may provide the impetus for 
organizations to diversify from their original mission (Staeheli, Kodras, Flint 1997; 
White, 1981; Rose-Ackerman, 1986; Powell and Clemens, 1998; Gronbjerg, 1998; 
Perlmitter and Gummer, 1994). These strategic decisions affect every management 
decision from the type of services provided, the qualifications of staff, standards for 
services, accountability, and monitoring of programs and cost effectiveness. These 
changing expectations alter the roles and use o f volunteers and may reduce the viability 
of effectively using volunteers for services (Herman 1994; Mason 1996). Non-profit 
organizations may also be becoming more aware o f and active in advocacy-related
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activities in an effort to seek or maintain funds and respond to devolution and 
privatization (Arsenault, 1998; Young, 1998; Smith and Lipsky, 1993).
In addition to the changes in advocacy, funding may also affect the alliance 
behavior of non-profit organizations. The increased significance of non-profit 
organizations participation in associations is addressed by Smith and Lipsky (1993), 
Ryan (1999), and Gronbjerg (1998). According to Gronbjerg (1998), non-profit 
statewide coalitions and major child welfare agencies are indispensable partners of 
public agencies—providing high quality, professional social services. The contractor 
dynamic is one o f mutual dependence, shared goals, contractual relationships, and 
complex institutional relationships balanced by demand for payment for services and the 
need to advocate for services and clients.
The literature review addresses the work of Gray and Lowery, who promote a 
methodological framework for discussing organizational behavior, advocacy and 
alliance behavior. This review will also explain reasons for institutional membership in 
associations based on material, solidary and purposive benefits. The literature suggests 
that non-profit organizations are becoming more complex and sophisticated in response 
to changing public policy and funding trends that affect their organizational behavior 
regarding advocacy activities and membership in alliances and associations.
Instead o f mission driving the development o f the organization, funding drives 
the decision-making process (Rose-Ackerman, 1986). Non-profit organizations which 
contract with the state or federal government may be more likely to diversify their 
programming in search o f additional funds or in response to funding availability. Mason
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suggested that voluntary enterprises accumulate additional purposes in response to 
opportunities for additional resources (Mason, 1984, 29). Survival needs contribute to 
their share of additional programs and purposes as organizations justify their 
relationships and their very existence by seeking to fulfill additional community needs 
and attract additional funding. Mason noted that often the original purpose or official 
goals o f the organization are left behind as more priority is given to new goals or new 
funding sources (Mason, 1984, 131).
According to Ryan (1999), Smith and Lipsky (1993) and Alexander (1998), 
“pragmatism is overtaking passion” in the management o f organizations. The 
opportunities and obligations o f government contracting have allowed some 
organizations to expand and incorporate other smaller non-profit organizations that may 
not have been able to compete in a changing environment. The opportunity for 
government contracts may encourage an organization to change course, expand its 
mission, add new services, or plan new programs to access available funding. According 
to some authors, “chasing the funding” may not be the wrong strategy if  it allows some 
organizations to survive. At times, the availability of funding can be the impetus for an 
organization to respond to more pressing community needs (Powell and Clemens, 1998; 
Sandler and Hudson, 1998; Smith, 1996; Wolpert, 1993).
The fundamental hypothesis o f the study is that organizational behavior of non­
profits is affected by government funding in three areas: advocacy behavior, alliance 
membership and program diversification. Organizational behavior may also be directly
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related to the organizational characteristics including staff size, budget size, age of 
organization and staff credentials.
The literature review in Chapter 2 addresses the public policies affecting 
government funding of non-profits, advocacy behavior and alliance behavior. The 
review will bring into focus the important areas o f consideration in evaluating the 
dynamic relationship between non-profit organizations, types o f funding and 
organizational behavior
Chapter 3 describes the model and outlines the steps in the development of the 
survey and the completion of the quantitative analysis. This study relies on data 
generated from a random and purposive sample of surveys distributed by the Louisiana 
Association of Non-profit Organizations (LANO) in the summer of 1997 and five case 
studies completed in 1999.
Chapter 4 reports the findings from the quantitative data analysis, and will 
corroborate the general theory suggesting a relationship between funding and 
organizational behavior.
Chapter 5 provides information on the five case studies selected based on the 
Smith and Lipsky typology of organizations: (1) those considered to be traditional, (2) 
those that are nontraditional, i.e., formed in response to funding opportunities and (3) 
those formed in response to an unmet community need. The addition of qualitative data 
analysis strengthens and enhances the findings of the quantitative analysis.
Chapter 6 elaborates on the significance of the study and discuss other avenues 
for research. The a priori belief is that government funding has led non-profit
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organizations to become increasingly involved with advocacy activities to maintain and 
secure funding. In order to meet these advocacy needs, non-profit organizations may be 
joining associations in response to funding and regulatory changes. In addition, non­
profit organizations may be diversifying programs in an effort to attract or maintain 
stable government funding.
The need for more substantive quantitative analysis is apparent to determine 
exact nature of the relationships and behavior o f non-profit organizations which receive 
government funds. Bernstein (1991), Grayson and Tompkins (1984), Hammack and 
Young (1993) all based their analysis o f the impact o f contracting and policy changes on 
small subsector studies.
Hall in “Inventing the Non-profit Sector” (1992) suggests that the breadth of the 
non-profit sector and the increasingly complex relationships with government make it 
difficult to refer simply to the non-profit sector—because there is such a blurring of 
sectors. After several decades of changing expectations about the role of government in 
the provision o f services, the non-profit sector has emerged as an engine of government 
services. Government contracting at the local, state, and federal level with the non-profit 
sector has created new linkages, relationships and obligations between the public and 
non-profit sectors that will be explored in this study.
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature review begins with a discussion o f the growth of the non-profit 
sector followed by a discussion of the public policies affecting the funding o f  non-profit 
organizations. Then the literature describing organizational issues, advocacy behavior 
and alliance behavior are reviewed. The literature review will highlight the significant 
authors and issues to be addressed in the study. First, the federal funding policies are 
addressed to frame the discussion of public funding o f non-profit organizations.
The non-profit sector growth over the last thirty years is attributable to federal 
legislation providing support for Medicare and Medicaid, education grants, programs of 
support in housing, job training and other social welfare programs. From 1977 to 1994, 
the growth rate of the INDEPENDENT SECTOR was greatest between 1977 and 1982 
and between 1987 and 1992.6
Table 2.1 Percentage Share of Total Annual Funds by Source of Revenue
Source 1977 1982 1987 1992
Private contributions 26.3 21.8 22.9 18.4
Private sector payments 37.5 38.7 40.8 39.1
Government sector payments 26.6 28.1 27.9 31.3
Other revenue 9.6 11.4 8.4 11.2
Total % 100 100 100 100
Source: Non-profit Almanac, 1998 
Abramson and Salamon in The Federal Budget and the Non-profit Sector (1986) 
indicated that President Reagan deliberately minimized the relationship between 
government funding and the non-profit sector in an effort to justify his rhetoric about 
cutting government funding and encouraging the expansion of non-profit sector to
° During the Reagan years, the sector grew at a slower rate that resulted from a round o f  budget cuts and the desire to 
reduce federal level involvement.
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provide essential community resources. As of 1980, approximately S40 billion or 25 
percent of all government spending in the fields where non-profit organizations were 
active went directly to non-profit organizations (Abramson, 1997,47). The government 
had actually become the largest funder of many organizations in the non-profit sector. 
With the expansion o f federal funding of social programs came the conservative 
backlash of the Reagan era, which prompted significant cuts in social welfare spending 
and a retrenchment of programs and sendees.
In The Non-profit Sector and the New Federal Budget, Abramson and Salamon 
(1986), described the funding changes in the eighties. The conservative agenda of 
reducing government involvement so that non-profit organizations could respond to 
meet community needs stressed the non-profit sector and reduced the services available 
in many communities. The emphasis on community support o f social services during 
the Reagan administration was intended to strengthen the community response to the 
major social problems facing the country. Unfortunately, the policies that were intended 
to promote volunteerism and philanthropy were not sufficient to counteract the funding 
cuts by government.
The almost mythical belief by the conservative White House that the non-profit 
sector through the efforts of the community-based non-profit organizations volunteers, 
and the good intentions of the citizens could replace the social service delivery system 
was not founded in reality. The interest of the Republicans in downsizing-govemment 
dramatically affected the social service delivery system for community based services.
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In the updated study completed by Abramson, Salamon and Steuerle, “The Non­
profit Sector and the Federal Budget: Recent History and Future Decisions,” the authors 
demonstrate that the federal budget decisions affect the demand for non-profit services 
by increasing or decreasing the resources available from government for non-profit 
functions. Their summary from 1980-1997 demonstrates that the overall federal 
spending in program areas of interest to non-profits fell below FY 1980 levels during the 
early years of the Reagan administration, but has significantly recovered by 1997.
The efforts o f  the Bush administration and the Clinton administration have 
focused new attention on domestic spending for social service programs. In the last ten 
years, there has been a steady increase in federal funds in areas where non-profits are 
active. During the Clinton administration, the Department o f Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) has enjoyed a renaissance with increased funding for community 
development and faith based efforts that have directly benefited the non-profit sector.
Even though there have been increases in federal funding for community based 
services, the inclusion o f Medicaid, Medicare and income assistance figures inflates the 
numbers significantly. These service areas for health care and public assistance 
continue to dominate the federal budget in areas where non-profits are active. The 
inflated figures can be somewhat misleading as to the actual health o f the sector. The 
growth excluding Medicaid, Medicare and public assistance has not kept pace with the 
needs at the community level an is actually negative in real FY 1980 dollars . The 
following chart outlines the changes in government funding from 1980-1997.
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Tabic 2.2 Federal Spending in Program Areas Where Non-profits Are Active, (FY 1980-1997 By Year (In Billions of Constant 
FY 1998 Dollars)
Fiscal Year All Programs Excluding Medicare and Medicaid, 
Change from FY 1980
Excluding Medicare and 
Medicaid and Income 
Assistance, Change from FY 
1980
Federal
Spending as % 
o f GDP FY 
1980 = 100
Fiscal Year Outlays Change from 
FY 1980
Amount Percent Amount Percent
1980 $345.4 100
1982 339.1 -$6.3 -$25.9 -14 -$26.9 -24 76
1983 342.5 -2.9 -25.7 -14 -31.6 -28 70
1984 345.6 +0.2 -27.1 -15 -31.8 -28 65
1985 365.2 +19.8 -20.9 -11 -27.6 -28 66
1986 363.0 +17.7 -23.0 -12 -30.0 -24 62
1987 361.7 +16.3 -26.2 -14 -32.6 -26 58
1988 371.7 +26.3 -19.8 -11 -30.6 -29 57
1989 382.3 +36.9 -16.1 -9 -29.1 -27 56
1990 402.1 +56.7 -8.4 -5 -25.1 -26 58
1991 426.9 +81.5 +8.7 +5 -17.9 -22 63
1992 464.0 +118.6 +24.4 +13 -13.6 -16 64
1993 488.7 +143.3 +38.5 +21 -8.6 -12 66
1994 514.9 +169.5 +51.6 +28 -5.9 -8 65
1995 537.3 +191.9 +59.6 +32 -4.1 -4 65
1996 543.5 +198.1 +56.4 +31 -6.1 -5 62
1997 554.1 +208.7 +59.0 +32 -4.6 -4 60
Total 1982- 
1997
6,802.6 + 1,276.4 +105.1 +4 -$325.8 -18 63
One of the data problems at the national level is that no governmental or other 
tracking system follows the flow of funds to non-profit organizations. The analysis 
completed by Abramson, Salamon and Steuerle (1999) is the most comprehensive and 
indicates that the budget shifts in federal spending priorities had a significant effect on 
the need for services from non-profit organizations and on the federal funds available to 
help meet those needs.
In addition to funding changes, other policies affect the dynamic between the 
non-profit and public sectors. Devolution is the term used in the 1990’s for what 
Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan called New Federalism—the transfer o f authority, 
responsibility and funds from the federal government to the states and then to local 
municipalities (DeVita, 1999,214).
The devolution o f  funds for welfare and health care reform to the states may be 
the most significant domestic initiative of the Clinton administration. The implications 
for state and local government are immense as they redefine service delivery strategies 
and design time-limited programs that emphasize work first (Eisinger, 1998, 315). The 
devolution o f welfare reform to the states in the form o f block grants alters the 
mechanisms for the provision of services from only government-provided services to 
creating opportunities for “privatization or non-profitization” o f services. The shift in 
funding and the potential for privatization with for-profit entities has created new threats 
and opportunities for non-profits.
Abramson, Salamon and Steuerle (1999) acknowledge the central role of 
government spending and tax policies in shaping the non-profit sector:
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Government spending policies affect the levels of need in society and hence the 
extent of the problems that non-profit organizations might be called upon to 
address. Moreover, since government has become an important financier of non­
profit activity, these same policies can enhance or circumscribe the ability of 
non-profits to respond to these needs. Government tax policies, in turn, affect 
the levels of private charitable support to which non-profits have access and 
thereby their ability to make up from private sources what they lose from 
governmental ones (Abramson, Salamon, Steuerle, 1999, 99).
The relationship between non-profit organizations and the government is
changing as a result of the emphasis on downsizing government and shifting services
and responsibility of services to the state and local levels through the public policy
known as devolution. According to Abramson, Salamon and Steuerle, in FY 1997, more
than 30 percent of the overall federal spending in programs of interest to non-profits was
channeled through non-profits for delivery of services (Abramson, Salamon, Steuerle,
1999, 100).
Even though non-profit organizations have historically played the role o f service 
providers for the public, competition with for-profit companies is becoming a serious 
threat. As government turns to the market to contract out for services that it hopes will 
be more efficient, less costly and more accountable, non-profits may be excluded from 
these opportunities because o f for-profit competition (Boris, 1999,22).
Young (1999) acknowledges that non-profits have served as privately supported 
supplementary service providers of public goods, as complementary partners with 
government in public service provision, and as advocates and adversaries in the process 
of public policy formulation and implementation. Young admits that the relationship 
between government and non-profits is complex and at times messy, with intertwining 
roles and responsibilities (Young, 1999, 32).
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In the supplementary model, non-profits are fulfilling the role and demand for 
public goods that are unfilled by government. As government funds increase, voluntary 
donations do not need to increase to fill the gaps. In the complementary view, non­
profits are seen as partners working with government to deliver public goods with public 
funds which help the non-profits. In the adversarial view, non-profits prod government 
to make changes in public policy and promote accountability to the public.
Young identifies the tension in the relationship by noting that government 
attempts to influence the behavior of non-profit organizations by regulating the services 
and responding to advocacy initiatives. These roles for non-profits are not mutually 
exclusive. Non-profits may finance services not funded by government, deliver services 
funded by government and advocate for changes in government policies and practices. 
Kramer (1981) observed that non-profits’ reliance on public funds to deliver services did 
not necessarily constrain their advocacy activity (Young, 1999,33).
Non-profit organizations designed to “express collective interests and solve 
community problems” have taken on a “new political role in representing the welfare 
state to its citizens, providing a buffer between state policy and service delivery” (Smith 
and Lipsky, 1993, 3). Smith and Lipsky (1993) and Smith (1999) reinforce the 
significance of the non-profit sector in the provision of services funded by government. 
The complex funding relationship between the non-profit sector and government has 
precipitated the professionalization of the non-profit sector and the rise o f advocacy 
activities not merely for program recipients but for the agencies themselves.
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One o f the more comprehensive studies is Partners in Public Service: 
Government and the Non-profit Sector in the American Welfare State (Salamon, 
Mussehvhite and DeVita, 1986). Salamon et al. (1986) suggested that the government 
and non-profit sectors are not inherently in conflict, but have joined forces in the pursuit 
of public objectives and service provision through increased contracting and funding 
relationships.
With changes in government funding, some subsector non-profits are 
disproportionately affected and unable to make-up lost revenue. This may result in 
changes o f the client population or type of services to be provided by the organizations 
and either program contraction or expansion based on funding availability.
Unfortunately, reliable data are not uniformly available on government contracting with 
non-profit organizations and direct government expenditures for similar services. One of 
the findings o f the Salamon et al. (1986) study is that the geographic areas where 
government spending is highest is generally where the non-profit sector is most highly 
developed.
A connection between federal and state funding and the non-profit sector also 
exists. The federal government is the dominant source o f funding for government social 
welfare programs, but state and local governments must provide match funding and 
program administration for these federal programs. In some states, non-profit 
organizations deliver about as many government-funded human services as the 
government. According to Salamon (1986), government budget cuts in the 1980’s fell
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particularly hard on non-profit organizations and have led to increased competition from
for-profit providers.
In Gronbjerg’s (1998) analysis, non-profits are influenced by the two major 
driving forces in American society: the dominance of market models and the scope and 
structure of public sector activities. In this discussion of government funding and non­
profit organizational behavior, Gronbjerg acknowledges that non-profits have vested 
interests in the scope and structure o f public sector activities. Accordingly, non-profits 
act to protect those interests and engage in interest group politics: “Where they come to 
share in the delivery o f  public goods, their political interests become especially well 
focused and their relations with the public sector institutionalized and difficult to 
restructure” (Gronbjerg, 1998, 137).
Gronbjerg (1998) outlines the practical reasons why non-profit organizations 
need to be involved with advocacy activities:
The types of operational practices that public funding encourages in or 
imposes on the non-profit partners affects the organizations’ response to 
public policy challenges. The receipt of public funding by non-profit 
social service agencies means that they must track the fallout from budget 
negotiations and shifting priorities up and down the paths o f 
governmental transfers. They must adhere to rules and regulations that 
limit internal management discretion, meet work intensive reporting 
requirements, and survive cost control and cost sharing. They must 
overcome built in proclivities toward fragmentation and the ad hoc 
planning associated with managing multiple contracts with idiosyncratic 
requirements and timetables. Finally, they must weigh the opportunity 
costs associated with pursuing alternative funding sources. In return for 
accepting these contingencies, non-profit social service agencies obtain 
sizable dependable funding (1998, 145).
Unfortunately, with the increasing funding, programmatic complexities and 
expectations of government funders, for-profit organizations see new financial
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opportunities in what has historically been seen as the realm o f non-profit organizations. 
Non-profit organizations must respond to the changing expectations for service delivery, 
government funding and increased accountability in order to be competitive and 
sustainable: “Non-profits are pulled between the logics of business, public good, 
democracy and the state. Non-profit organizations are increasingly governed by 
business norms and state regulations along with models of charity and 
democracy”( Alexander 1998,287).
According to Levine (1998), many of the classic non-profits have, de facto, 
become quasi-govemmental entities. Their income base is essentially limited to 
government. The blurring of the lines between the sectors has significant consequences 
for constituencies, modes of operation and the philosophies of a three sector approach or 
the lack thereof. This merging of sectors and expectations may not ensure the best 
features of any sector are preserved (Demone, 1998,236). Kramer (1994) refers to the 
mutual interpenetration and dependence of the sectors as third-party government, 
indirect public administration, the contract state, non-profit federalism or the new or 
mixed economy o f welfare (Demone, 1998).
Goldberg suggests that significant cutbacks in government support could have 
crushing effects on social service agencies, even to the point of agencies being forced to 
cease operations (1997, 87). With the trends toward privatization o f public services and 
the interest in devolution of decision-making to the state and local level, changes in 
funding and decision-making have created what some for-profit organizations see as
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business opportunities in direct competition with non-profit organizations for state
contracts.
Many scholars attempt to capture the role, value and viability o f the non-profit
sector in terms of the for-profit market. The efforts o f non-profits are often described as
either the result o f ‘market failure’ or ‘contract failure’ in that non-profits provide
services that can not or are not provided by for-profit entities because o f lack of demand
or high cost o f production (Gronbjerg, 1998, 139).
In order to understand the Non-profit Functions in A Market Economy,
Gronbjerg discusses the implications for the market:
[T]he economic theories of non-profit organizations (Hansmann 1980,
1987; Rose-Ackerman 1986; Weisbrod 1975, 1977, 1988) usually imply 
that non-profits fulfill narrow but important functions in compensating 
for imperfections in standard market relationships in which informed 
customers shop for the best bargain and producers seek the largest profit. 
Non-profits solve two kinds o f problems in these relationships: market 
failure and contract failure. Market failure occurs when demands for a 
product or service are so low or thin that private firms cannot generate 
sufficiently high profits to stay in business by meeting the demand.
Because non-profits have access to private donations and are exempt 
from certain taxes and fees, they can subsidize service activities or 
products and still meet operating costs in the case of low demand.
(Gronbjerg, 1998, 138).
According to Gronbjerg, contract failure occurs when the customer does not have
sufficient information to evaluate the quality or competitive value of goods and services
available in the marketplace. Market transactions occur in situations o f “asymmetric
information” that impede the free operation o f market forces. Given the concerns about
market or product information, the general perception is that non-profits are more likely
to offer high quality services than to take advantage o f consumers, a complaint often
made about for-profit entities (Gronbjerg, 1998, 138).
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In terms of privatization, Weisbrod (1998) describes the forces increasing 
attention to non-profits as the apparent decline in confidence in government and an 
accelerated search for alternatives. For Weisbrod’s study, privatization and purchase of 
services (POS) are used to explain a governmental policy of seeking non-govemmental 
providers of services which can be paid by contract, grant or fee for service. Weisbrod 
reports that privatization o f social services is a powerful worldwide force today, but there 
is little attention paid by government decision-makers or researchers to the merits and 
demerits of divestiture to private business firms relative to private non-profit 
organizations. The practice o f privatization is being scrutinized by government and the 
for-profit sector in terms o f costs and responsiveness to governmental oversight, not 
necessarily responsiveness to community need or quality of services.
The emphasis on privatization is being driven by devolution and national policy 
changes to shift power and authority to state and local levels. In State Devolution in 
America: Implications fo r  a Diverse Society (1997), Staeheli, Kodras and Flint delineate 
three restructuring strategies: devolution, privatization and the dismantling o f service 
systems that focus on the changing expectations of interpretations o f  federalism.
The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 heralded the “devolution revolution,” which 
would promote the efficiency o f government by substituting block grants for matching 
entitlements and providing greater flexibility for states in implementing a grants and 
contracting process for additional services and review of the current provision o f services 
with an eye to accountability and efficiency. Devolution is most keenly seen as the shift 
of power and decision-making to the forms of government closest to the citizens. The
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shifting of power and money to states has led to some service delivery changes in
government funded services and the reduction of formula-funded services.
From the non-profit perspective, the increase in government contracting with
non-profit organizations is the optimal goal in order to provide funding for organizations
and high quality services for clients. In many instances, the national and state
governments have increased the provision of service delivery through non-profit
organizations as a result of policy and program changes and pressure from local
advocates to provide more community based services. In efforts to reduce bureaucracy,
limit costs and improve service delivery, contracting with non-profit organizations has
been seen as an appropriate policy change to meet these objectives.
Gronbjerg in Markets, Politics and Charity {1998) outlines relations with the
public sector payments structure o f public spending: income insurance or direct
payments to individuals, means tested income assistance or vouchers for purchase of
services, and public subsidies to private providers in the forms of grants or contracts.
According to Gronbjerg, the “contract system not only supports market goals of
efficiency by forcing the public sector to exploit nonpublic infrastructures, but obviates
the need for expansion or creation o f public infrastructures at taxpayer expense, activities
presumed to be mismanaged or operated inefficiently” (1998, 144).
Even given some of the concerns regarding outsourcing, the non-profit sector has
materially benefited from the contract system. According to Gronbjerg, the contracting
system has actually helped to structure the non-profit sector:
[The contracting system] provides non-profits with revenues and gives 
them a culturally approved role to play, but also simplifies management
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tasks. It reduces the need for non-profits to compete for and satisfy, in 
the case o f social agencies, a large number of individual clients with 
fickle interests. Instead, non-profits with public contracts must satisfy 
only a limited number o f funders, over whom they obtain substantial 
levels o f funding, secure for the duration of the contract (Gronbjerg 1998,
144).
Therefore, non-profits which have secure public funding become more sustainable. The 
dependence is mutual as public agencies depend on non-profits to enhance and provide 
social services and non-profits depend on public funding for social service organizations.
The spending structure is strengthened by the dynamics under which public-non­
profit resource relationships play themselves out in the social policy arena. Once the 
public grants or contract funding system is established, public agencies purchase more 
than service capacities and access to infrastructures and non-profits obtain more than 
revenues. The relationship comes to involve the exchange of legitimacy, knowledge and 
influence (Saidel 1991, Gronbjerg 1998). The result is a self-reinforcing process in 
which non-profit social service agencies develop complex inter-organizational relations 
with public sector agencies (Gronbjerg, 1998, 147).
These complex relationships involving funding and service delivery change the 
behavior o f non-profit organizations in subtle and sometimes substantive ways. 
Devolution is seen by some non-profits as an opportunity and as a threat by others 
because o f the potential restructuring of service delivery strategies and the perceived 
influx o f for-profit entities into the social service arena. Large for-profit firms have the 
capacity to respond to new program opportunities at the state level. Ryan in “The New 
Landscape For Non-profits,” (1999), reports on the threats that for-profit firms pose for 
non-profits. No longer are non-profits seen as entitled to be the social service providers.
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According to Ryan, for-profit firms have the size, capital, mobility and responsiveness to 
seek and acquire large statewide service delivery contracts. Ryan cites many examples 
of for-profits, such as Lockheed Martin, which bring the sophistication, capital and 
technology to the contracting equation and are rapidly gaining ground in the social 
serv ice arena.
The demands of government, the expectations of clients and the potential threat 
of the for-profit sector all contribute to the changing dynamics o f the non-profit sector. 
Non-profit organizations are being compelled to evaluate their missions and operations 
in an effort to be competitive with for-profit firms and responsive to funding 
opportunities. The blurring lines between the sectors could dramatically affect the 
values and operations of each sector. In addition to financial pressure, the increased 
expectation of government for measurable outcomes and accountability is changing the 
priorities of the non-profit sector as well.
Whereas non-profit organizations may have historically served all who entered 
their doors, with strict performance expectations, non-profits may become more selective 
or exclusive in their services in order to fulfill contractual targets. According to Ryan, if 
non-profits are competing with for-profits on performance-based contracts which focus 
on productivity and results, the concern is that non-profits will be forced to reconfigure 
their operations in ways which could compromise their missions. In the past, non-profits 
might have augmented their programs with other philanthropic funds and served a 
broader spectrum of clients, but now are limiting the scope and access to services based 
on funding source and contract requirements.
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The increased attention to accountability in contracting has direct programmatic
implications for non-profit organizations. Higher overhead costs, better accounting,
monitoring and contract compliance are all costs o f doing business with government.
The expectation o f higher quality services is admirable, but whether services are actually
more effective in helping the agencies’ clients remains a source of debate (Smith, 1999,
190; Glazer, 1989; Schambra, 1997). Non-profits must meet the expectations of
government contracting to maintain programs and funding.
In Government and the Third Sector, Gidron, Kramer and Salamon attempt to
dispel the notion that government and the non-profit sectors are competitors. The
authors describe the paradigm o f competition as follows:
Simply put, this paradigm portrays the relationship between government 
and the non-profit sector in terms that are close to what economists call a 
zero-sum game—a competitive relationship in which one actor’s gains 
are another’s loss. The prevailing rhetoric thus posits a conflict between 
the non-profit sector and the state (1992, 5).
The authors do not conceptualize the relationship between non-profits and government
as adversarial but as complementary. The stereotype o f government as bureaucratic and
oppressive and the voluntary sector as innovative, flexible, responsive and humane may
be too simplistic, so the authors posit that a more reciprocal and intertwined relationship
exists.
Government has historically been both the funder and the provider of services. 
The relationship between the sources o f funding and the provision of services and the 
inherent expectations for services from the public creates the tension between the 
sectors. According to Gidron et al.(l992), a further complication in characterizing the
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relations of government and non-profits arises from different levels o f analysis at the
local, state, and national levels. Non-profits have service functions, social functions, and
representational functions; government has financing, regulatory and service functions.
“Third sector organizations are often in the position o f having to bite the hand that feeds
them, attacking government agencies on which they are dependent for financial support”
(Gidron et. al, 1992,11).
The issue of privatization is central to understanding some of the changing
policies at the federal and state levels. According to Paul Starr (1989), “privatization
came to mean two things: (1) any shift in activities or functions from the state to the
private sector, and (2) any shift from public to private sector o f the production of goods
and services” (Kamerman and Kahn, 1989, 22). The discussion o f privatization could be
broadened to include the increasing role o f for-profit entities contracting with the
government to provide services. In Starr’s discussion, privatization means a devolution
from the state to ostensibly nonpolitical and noncommercial forms of human association.
A third perspective sees privatization as a political strategy for diverting demands
away from the state and thereby reducing government overload (Kamerman and Kahn,
1989, 22). According to Starr (1989), many see privatization as a means of fine-tuning a
three sector economy:
The ongoing theoretical debate regarding the non-profit sector deals with 
this three sector relationship: government, the market and the non-profit 
sectors. Burton Weisbrod (1977) continues to focus on market and 
government failure as the prevailing reasons for the existence and 
emergence of the non-profit sector. Weisbrod makes the case for public 
sector interest in broad service delivery systems where services are 
demanded by a broad constituency. He indicates that often non-profits 
have to begin by providing services to a narrow clientele and when the
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demand expands sufficiently, the program is transferred to the public 
domain (Kamerman and Kahn, 1989, 56).
Weisbrod (1986) and Rein (1983) make the case for the blurring of lines between 
the public and non-profit sectors. Rein identifies three tools o f government used in 
allocating resources to the non-profit sector: 1) direct grants to organizations, 2) 
subcontracting, and 3) reimbursement to individuals for purchase of services. In 
addition, non-profit organizations receiving public funds are obligated to meet required 
accountability standards, service provision benchmarks, and reporting and 
documentation requirements. This reciprocal reliance on public funds and non-profit 
accountability leads to a blurring of the lines between the sectors (Kamerman and Kahn, 
1989, 57). The regulatory role of the public sector provides a heavy counterweight to the 
flexibility of the non-profit sector.
Wolpert (1993) suggests that the partnership between the non-profit sector and 
the government sector has been accepted by the public and that the increase in the 
charitable sector can be attributed to greater revenues from government contracts, grants 
and increased fees for services. Wolpert further suggests that non-profits have lost some 
of their independence and become more agents of the state and their corporate and 
foundation sponsors (Wolpert 1993).
The “contracting regime” has altered the nature o f the relationship of non-profits 
and government, shifted priorities, limited access, created new intermediaries, reduced 
services, and created more specialization and diversification in service delivery. Non­
profit organizations have gained powers for selection, admission, treatment, and
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outcomes which have rested with government. Non-profit organizations have become
advocates not for their clients, but for their own organizations’ viability:
If we turn to the obligations o f  citizens to the state, the contracting regime 
poses additional issues. Political scientists have puzzled for some time 
about the apparent increase in participation in single-interest politics at 
the same time that electoral participation is declining and American 
political parties are in disarray. It would seem that as the electoral system 
appears unable adequately to incorporate citizen concerns, people turn to 
interest groups, community activities, and social movements to articulate 
their collective interests. The move to privatization may exacerbate this 
trend (Smith and Lipsky 1993, 210).
According to the Smith and Lipsky analysis, non-profit organizations are 
changing to meet the demands of government oversight of the contracting regime. 
Smith and Lipsky speculate that non-profit organizations are becoming more 
professional. Power is shifting from voluntary boards to more highly trained 
professional executive directors who are more responsive to funding and regulatory 
relationships with the state. Rather than passionate committed advocates for an issue, 
executive directors are now more highly trained astute financial managers.
According to their study in Massachusetts, many directors shift over from the 
public sector to work with non-profits. Government expectations for professional 
management o f non-profit organizations who contract with the state have altered the 
management dynamic and the perception of non-profit organizations in the community. 
More highly trained and highly paid executives may not share the same compassion and 
commitment that community volunteers, client advocates, and families generally 
demonstrate.
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The opportunities and obligations of government contracting have allowed some 
organizations to expand and incorporate other smaller non-profit organizations who may 
not have been able to compete in a changing environment. The opportunity for state 
contracts may encourage an organization to change course, expand its mission, add new 
services, or plan new programs to access available funding.
The Smith and Lipksy (1993) analysis referred to Seymour Martin Lipset, who 
called attention to these internal changes in organizations which significantly alter the 
representation of the community. Lipset argued that, “the internal organizational 
democracy and conflict within voluntary organizations may promote cohesion and 
solidarity in the larger society” (Smith and Lipsky, 1993, 92). The emphasis on 
contracting changes the dynamics of the organization, which may lead to changes or 
expansion in the mission o f the organization, and may alter the composition and 
relationships o f the board o f directors. These changes in organizational operation and 
oversight may in turn alter the organization’s public role and community support. As 
organizations attempt to respond to the opportunities of the contracting regime, they may 
actually become more responsive to community needs and priorities (Smith and Lipsky, 
1993,92).
According to Smith and Lipsky’s analysis, funding affects organizational 
behavior:
Government funding of non-profit agencies may indirectly strengthen ties 
between the board, the agency and the community in another way.
Government funding politicizes the relationship between non-profit 
agencies and government: agencies usually want to keep their contracts 
and often will lobby government administrators, legislators, and others if 
necessary. Federal cutbacks and the greater competition for public and
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private funds have, if anything encouraged non-profit agencies to be even 
more aggressive politically (1993, 93).
With government contracts come new levels of sophistication in record keeping, contract
and financial management and increases in the administrative demands on organizations.
Strategic decisions affect types of services provided, the qualifications of staff,
standards for services, accountability, and monitoring of programs and cost
effectiveness. These changing expectations alter the roles and use of volunteers and in
fact may reduce the viability of effectively using volunteers for services. Non-profit
organizations become the front line for services and their staff become “street level
bureaucrats.” In many instances, non-profit organizations are now providing mediating
functions for citizens as they negotiate their needs for public services and becoming a
buffer between citizens and the state (Smith and Lipsky, 1993, 119).
The prediction by Smith and Lipsky is that the coming public policy changes of
more regulation and less money will reduce the viability of smaller organizations and
encourage the development/consolidation o f agencies into larger multi-service
organizations dominated by contract services. The ramifications of this vision are fewer
choices for services, higher costs, and the growth o f a non-profit bureaucracy. Only
well-organized and well-funded entities will be sustained given the vagaries o f cash
flows and contracts and the inherent operational issues of changing costs, regulations,
and standards.
One of the repercussions of the potential conflict between funding and advocacy 
could be the limiting of advocacy efforts o f some non-profit organizations. In a time of 
heightened competition from for-profit organizations, non-profits must be even more
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interested in tracking and monitoring government contracting. Ryan (1999) suggested 
that there is potential disparity in service quality between non-profit and for-profit 
contractors because of the difference in motives and methods. Ryan cited examples of 
abuses in for-profit juvenile detention centers and psychiatric hospitals in Louisiana. 
Ryan acknowledged that designing and enforcing contracts that promote efficient 
services while protecting the individual client’s need for high quality and humane 
services is challenging to contract administrators. Ryan concluded that “the job of 
lobbying for better government funding, staffing and enforcement—and the design of 
standards that will protect client’s interests is by nature a non-profit job. If non-profits 
are consumed by the challenges of becoming competitive providers, that job may be in 
jeopardy” (1999, 136).
Demone in The Political Future o f Privatization, (1998) develops the idea that 
one major concern has to do with the dimunition of the non-profits’ capacity to act as 
advocates for their clients in an environment when the very public agency funding the 
vendor is the one that should be criticized. The INDEPENDENT SECTOR and other 
national non-profit groups have outlined the challenges to non-profits advocacy rights 
from the Istook amendment and other efforts to limit the non-profit sector’s advocacy 
efforts.
Rep. Ernest Istook, R-OK, is one of the leading proponents in Congress of 
limiting the advocacy rights of non-profit organizations. Istook’s concern seems to stem 
from the perception that tax exempt organizations have special privileges and therefore a 
special relationship with government. In the last four years, Istook has attempted to
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amend several pieces o f legislation to redefine non-profit organizations and narrow the 
definition of charities to merely organizations with a public benefit purpose such as 
serving the poor, homeless or disenfranchised.
Istook has also attempted to limit the rights o f non-profit organizations to testify 
and advocate for issues and legislation before Congress. In late 1996, the “Truth in 
Testimony” legislation was passed in an effort to require non-profit organizations 
testifying before Congress to disclose the number and dollar value of any government 
contracts. Istook’s concerns seem to be based on the increasingly complex nature o f the 
relationships between government and the non-profit sector.
In the 1999, appropriations debate in Congress U.S. Senator Kit Bond (R- 
Missouri) attempted to add riders to the HUD appropriation bill to limit non-profit 
advocacy for organizations receiving federal funds. The riders were stripped from the 
legislation, but the threat continues to exist that a non-profit’s advocacy rights will be 
further limited. The limitations on advocacy by organizations which receive government 
funds could have a chilling effect on the level o f debate. Demone (1998) suggested that 
the conservative position is that the organizations most able to offer constructive advice 
should not be criticizing the hand that feeds them.
The expectations for service delivery may directly affect the advocacy and 
alliance activities o f organizations. One of the key activities o f non-profit associations is 
advocacy on behalf o f members and the non-profit sector. Non-profit organizations, 
their executives, staff, and board may engage in political and electoral activities to 
protect the vested interests of the organization. With jobs and services on the line, non-
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profit organizations have a powerful incentive to build effective relationships with 
agency staff and department heads as well as elected officials. Some organizations make 
the decision not to be politically active or not to receive public funds and remain funded 
by other philanthropic sources or through fees for services. For those agencies who do 
receive public funding, there is no alternative to involvement in advocacy and lobbying 
activities if the organization is to survive and thrive.
Advocacy has become a common activity for many non-profits who rely on 
government funding. The advocacy efforts may be in the form o f consistent contact with 
key department heads, administration officials, or state legislators to insure that policies 
or legislation enacted will not adversely affect the operation o f the organization or the 
maintenance of funding levels. In addition to direct contacts with public officials, 
organizations seek to have board members serve on policy advisory committees, or 
special commissions which may be established. Many smaller or more marginal non­
profits do not have the luxury of time and resources to lobby extensively; these 
organizations are focused on keeping the doors open.
The government regulates the advocacy activities o f 501(c)(3) non-profit 
organizations by prohibiting these organizations from spending more than 25% of their 
budgets on political activity. Non-profit organizations can advocate for or against 
legislation, and meet with governmental officials and elected officials, but they can not 
participate in partisan politics or endorse candidates Federal tax law outlines the 
limitations on non-profit organizations activities in grassroots and direct lobbying, 
expenditure limits and reporting requirements.
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Unfortunately, many non-profit organizations are not familiar with the law and 
assume that they cannot be involved in advocacy activities. Membership in associations 
of non-profits provides one means for organizations to be informed about public policy 
changes and participate in advocacy activities.
Smith and Lipsky posit that as non-profits become clients of government, they 
also become more active in the political process not only as sellers of services but as 
political players. Successful non-profit organizations have developed the support of 
influential citizens and elected officials, created a recognizable public awareness of the 
agency and collaborated with government on policy and program development and 
implementation; they are seen as exemplary service providers. Non-profit agencies must 
maintain a positive relationship with government to insure their continued funding, even 
though they can “mobilize political support to fight unfavorable decisions. The result is 
a complex relationship o f “unbalanced reciprocity.” Government and non-profit 
contractors may be interdependent, but government dominates the relationship” (Smith 
and Lipsky, 1993, 172).
According to De Vita, “if a key tenet o f devolution is to decentralize decision­
making then monitoring who participates in the political process and how voices are 
heard will be an important part of assessing policy-making under devolution. Access to 
the political process and effective communication between the non-profit sector and 
various levels o f government will be essential components in assessing how effectively 
welfare reform is implemented” (De Vita 1999, 230). Government seems to want to 
manage, regulate, and limit the activities o f non-profit organizations while
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simultaneously raising expectations and lowering funding. According to Young,
legislators are taking interest in the advocacy behavior of non-profits:
While extolling the virtues o f private, charitable initiative, many 
legislators seem more willing now both to challenge the tax exemptions 
of non-profit organizations and to limit the voice of non-profits in the 
policy arena. Thus, while reducing its own resource commitments to 
social needs, government appears also to be hampering the ability o f non­
profits to function successfully, both in raising their own resources and 
speaking out for those who may be ill-served under a new regime of 
government responsibility (Young, 1999,63).
Non-profit organizations may sense that they are compelled to engage in political 
activities to ensure their survival. In addition to maintaining their contracts, agencies 
also are advocates for their clients.
The increased emphasis on contracting has promoted the collective identity of 
non-profit service agencies and has led to the creation of statewide associations to lobby 
on behalf of the members. According to Smith and Lipsky, non-profits and government 
officials may be complicit in lobbying for policy and program changes. The public 
sector employees are unable to advocate and may rely on their non-profit counterparts to 
push for additional program funds or policy changes. Heclo (1977) referred to similar 
relationships as the “Iron Triangle” describing the relationships between interest groups, 
committees and elected officials at the congressional level. According to Reid in “Non­
profit Advocacy and Political Participation,” “politically active non-profits contribute to 
democratic governance by representing civic concerns in policy-making, by enlarging 
opportunities for citizen participation in public decisions, and by creating accountability 
between government and citizens (Reid, 1999, 293).
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In “Transforming Public Services: Contracting for Social and Health Services in 
the U.S.,” Smith (1998) elaborated on the complexity of the relationships between non­
profit contractors and their funding sources, citizen groups, the legislature, the executive 
branch and other public agencies and private service providers as private foundations. 
While the government purchasing agent may deal primarily with the non-profit provider, 
it is also subject to a variety o f  political pressures from elsewhere in government and the 
private sector (Smith, 1998, 115).
According to Smith, associations are fostered by government:
To build their political base and increase their chances o f legislative 
success, government officials will directly or indirectly create political 
associations of contract agencies. Government sponsorship of interest 
group formation has been a general trend in American politics in the last 
twenty years (Walker 1991; Salisbury 1990). In response to contracting, 
many private service providers have banded together to form political 
associations to further their concerns. Government purchasing agencies 
sometimes provide seed money for the establishment o f these political 
associations because they are important political assets. Federal and state 
purchasing agencies are typically barred from lobbying legislators. By 
contrast, these associations can lobby legislators directly for more money 
or new contract programs (Smith, 1998,119).
In addition, Smith lists the various means for state agencies to support non-profits
through research grants, technical assistance, convenings, other funding and participation
in policy discussions and formulation of government regulations.
Contracting non-profit organizations develop strategies to pursue funding and
maintain existing contracts by establishing relationships with the executive branch and
administrative departments and key legislators. According to Smith, many non-profit
organizations join collaborations and associations in order to successfully advocate for
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funding. An obvious goal of provider political advocacy may be generating more
funding. Smith further clarifies the relationships of non-profits in associations:
State associations representing providers help to overcome the problems 
of individual agency advocacy.. .statewide associations representing 
service providers are complex, somewhat fragile political organizations.
To an extent, these associations represent the exploitation of the strong 
by the weak or in some instances the exploitation of the weak by the 
strong. The large providers might look like special interests if they 
approached legislators, bureaucrats or political executives directly. A 
membership organization can lobby for many of the same goals and 
appear to be more legitimate and representative (Smith, 1998, 123-124).
Smith and Lipsky state, “ it is virtually a law of public policy that every new
program generates organized recipient groups to protect and extend it” (1993,
177).
Therefore, it is no surprise that non-profit organizations have formed 
associations at the national, state, and service sector levels. National 
associations provide information about changes in Congress, policy development 
in the federal departments, and the availability o f funding and grant 
opportunities. These organizations also notify their members when there is a 
need to generate grassroots responses and lobbying efforts.
The state associations o f non-profits are being formed in response to the growth 
of contracting, the decentralization o f many federal programs to the states, the rise of 
state funding for services and the need for information, coordination, advocacy, and 
technical assistance. One of the areas of inquiry in this study is the motivations o f non­
profit organizations to join collaborations, coalitions and associations and the nature of 
the behavior of these associations as interest groups.
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According to Berry, a public interest group is one that seeks a collective good, 
the achievement o f which does not selectively or materially benefit the membership or 
activists of the organization (1986). Non-profit groups are often considered public 
interest groups. The debate about interest groups focuses on the equation of motivation, 
expected outcome, group size, membership, benefits and costs.
According to Olson (1971), only a separate incentive will stimulate a rational 
individual in a latent group to act in a group-oriented way. Special interest groups that 
provide lobbying and other services are more successful when membership is 
compulsory or when there are sufficient incentives in noncollective benefits to warrant 
membership and support. Olson concludes that large unorganized groups are not 
effective, do not organize, have no galvanizing structure, offer no benefits and provide 
no services. A large group with a common interest is insufficient. Only when groups 
are small or when they are fortunate enough to have an independent source of selective 
incentives will they organize or act to achieve their objectives.
McCann explains that political theorists think Olson’s underlying assumptions 
and analysis about human motivations are too narrow, simple and static. Some critics 
have protested that the “rational actor” model is too cynical and pessimistic and 
presumes that individuals are only motivated by economic gain. McCann refers to Clark 
and Wilson’s 1961 article about incentive systems in organizations which emphasized 
the importance of intangible, solidary and purposive benefits as well as material 
incentives to formal group membership. The Clark and Wilson typology has been 
generally adopted in the field o f political science (Walker, 1991, 85).
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The exchange theory offered by Salisbury describes the relationship between an 
entrepreneur and a consumer and focuses on the efforts o f the “entrepreneurs” motivated 
by individual “profits” (prestige, salary) to develop those material, purposive, and 
solidary benefits which are sufficient to attract a public following. Moe emphasizes the 
political character of purposive incentives such as a sense of personal efficacy, 
ideological advancement, and information access which draws citizens to join large 
membership organizations (McCann, 1986, 175).
Walker suggests that groups are compelled to offer a mix of benefits in an effort 
to attract members. Walker’s finding that purposive or collective benefits consistently 
receive high rankings by all types of groups and are more important than personal 
material benefits or solidary benefits is different from Olson’s findings. According to 
Walker, Olson’s by-product theory of benefit provisions asserts that interest groups able 
to engage in the pursuit o f collective goals will be those ‘that obtain their strength and 
support because they perform some function in addition to lobbying for collective goods 
(Olson 1965, 132).
Berry in Lobbying fo r  the People: The Political Behavior o f Public Interest 
Groups, asks about the process that leads to the establishment of an organization from a 
particular constituency (1977,18). According to Berry, there are two theories o f group 
origin: David Truman’s disturbance theory and Robert Salisbury’s exchange theory.
The key to David Truman’s theory is that people are stimulated to organize 
because they undergo a disturbance that alters their relationship with other groups or 
institutions. A disturbance is some force that changes the equilibrium of the group with
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other elements o f society. The purpose o f forming an interest group or association is to 
overcome these disadvantageous forces and to stabilize relations so that a new 
equilibrium may be reached (Berry, 1977, 20).
In determining whether the event or disturbance is important, Salisbury feels that 
exchange theory postulates that individuals enter into interpersonal relationships because 
they derive some type of benefit from the relationship or exchange. The political 
entrepreneur must make potential members aware of any o f the benefits they may 
receive by joining the organization: 1) Material benefits—tangible benefits, 2) Solidary 
benefits— friendship, social, 3) Purposive benefits—ideological satisfaction.
Lobbying as a by-product is Olson’s intriguing theory o f why people become 
sustaining members of interest groups. It is only rational for an individual to join an 
interest group if  he or she receives a separate and selective incentive. There must be 
some benefit that accrues to the individual only if he or she is an official member of the 
group (Berry, 1977, 37). People join because o f selective benefits or services and 
lobbying is a by-product. According to Berry’s study, philanthropic public interest 
groups do not offer tangible organizational benefits sufficient to prompt membership. 
Solidary benefits are also not found to be significant. Berry concludes that purposive 
incentives or benefits are the most crucial type o f inducement for public interest group 
membership (Berry, 1977, 42).
Gray and Lowery take the behavioral ecology approach to studying lobbying 
alliances and characterize activities in terms o f foraging behavior. With this construct 
there are environmental constraints such as the distribution of critical resources,
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defendability of resources, intensity of predator pressure, and the intensity and nature of 
intraspecific competition. The Gray and Lowery hypotheses about resource competition 
and predators are very illuminating in terms of 1) difficulty in securing the resource and 
2) distribution of the resource—dispersed vs. clumped.
Their study o f six states, Arkansas, South Dakota, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, 
Michigan, and Minnesota analyzed three types o f organizations: associations, 
membership groups and institutions. The alliance activity and intra-species differences 
such as strength o f individuals and lost opportunity led to discussions o f issues in 
organizational alliance behavior. These issues are working alone, policy niches and 
alliance behavior. Their findings suggest that opposition increases alliance behavior. 
Lobbying for large or intractable policies should enhance reliance on alliances. In their 
study, the dependent variable is the intensity of alliance activity. Their construct 
suggests that organized interests may increase and hunting alone may decrease if there is 
sufficient opposition to encourage flock behavior.
In order to address the theory of alliances modeled in the Lowery and Gray 
study, the following questions were included in the survey for this study: “In conducting 
your lobbying activity with the state legislature, how often do you consult, communicate, 
or cooperate with other organizations sharing your goals and also engaged in lobbying 
the state legislature?” “In lobbying the state legislature, how often do you find yourself 
in direct competition with other organizations opposed to your position?” The findings 
by Gray and Lowery most relevant for this discussion o f non-profits in Louisiana are 
about the forces o f government in altering the interest group environment:
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Our analysis suggests that the explosion o f state interest organizations 
since 1975 likely resulted from economic driven changes in the relative 
mix o f constituent numbers, declining interest certainty associated with 
increased party competition, and increasing constituent interest arising 
from fiscal scarcity (Hrebenar and Thomas 1992, 13). Expansion of 
interest populations was likely influenced as well by Reagan era 
devolution or responsibilities from the federal government to the states, 
which further accentuated policy uncertainty (1995, 25).
Gray and Lowery in “A Niche Theory of Interest Representation,”
examine the patterns of the development of interest groups and the resource
dimensions creating the context for the group. Gray and Lowery have identified
five resource sets that are requirements for a viable interest group niche:
1. Organizations must have members. (Lowery and Gray, 1995)
2. Organizations must have access to selective benefits in order to mobilize potential 
members. (Olson, 1965, Moe, 1980)
3. Interest groups must have sufficient finances to maintain their organizations 
internally. (Walker, 1983)
4. Organizations must have some access to the policy making process on issues of 
concern to it. (Browne, 1990)
5. There must be authoritative action or proposed action by government o f concern to 
the organization. Without something to lobby for, legitimizing lobbying activity is 
difficult. (Salisbury, 1994)
As mentioned previously, Lowery and Gray are also interested in competition for 
limited resources and the potential conflict between organizations which might lead to 
partitioning o f interest groups. This suggests that interest group niches and thus the 
structure of interest group communities are more strongly determined by the internal
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needs o f organized interests than by their patterns and interface with government (1996, 
109).
Hojnacki in “Interest Groups Decisions to Join Alliances or Work Alone” 
examines why and when organized interests join coalitions. Hojnacki attempts to outline 
the factors which influence the decision to join an alliance: issue context, allies, 
autonomy and character. According to Hojnacki’s assumptions, groups representing 
social or public interests would be more inclined to engage in allied activity because they 
generally must work harder to raise funds, maintain the support o f a relatively 
amorphous clientele and keep the public and decision makers focused on their concerns 
(Hojnacki, 1997, 70). Hojnacki refers to these groups as expressive groups and suggests 
that there is a tendency to work in groups or coalitions to leverage resources, contacts, 
and expertise. The activity o f  similar groups seems to be an important indicator in the 
decision to work together. Hojnacki’s analysis suggests that certain types of 
organizations are more likely to join in collective advocacy. The groups with more 
experience as allies and expressive groups tend to join coalitions more regularly because 
they need the broader support for their causes.
Non-profit organizations may participate in a variety o f interest-group-like 
behavior from participation in coalitions, alliances and associations. The interest in 
participation in non-profit associations seems to be better documented than the broader 
discussion of transitory coalitions, alliances and collaborations. The experience of the 
development of non-profit associations substantiates the viability of interest group niche 
scenario for non-profit organizations.
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One o f the key activities of non-profit associations is advocacy on behalf of 
members and the non-profit sector. Non-profit organizations, their executives, staff, and 
board may engage in political and electoral activities to protect the vested interests of the 
organization. With jobs and services on the line, non-profit organizations have a 
powerful incentive to build effective relationships with agency staff and department 
heads as well as elected officials. Some organizations make the decision not to be 
politically active or not to receive public funds and remain funded by other philanthropic 
sources or through fees for services. For those agencies who do receive public funding, 
there is no alternative to involvement in advocacy and lobbying activities if  the 
organization is to prosper.
Given the threats to the non-profit sector o f reduced funding, block grants, taxes, 
and other public policy changes, non-profit organizations need to be knowledgeable 
about lobbying and actively engaged in promoting and protecting the sector. Walker 
evaluates the political tactics used in advocacy by groups. Walker and Gais suggest that 
a group’s advocacy strategies are generally made early in the life of the organization and 
stable over time. According to Walker and Gais, “this stability grows out o f the strong 
roots of these strategic choices, which are intertwined with the group’s constituency and 
resources, as well as with crucial aspects o f its political environment” (Walker, 1991, 
103).
One o f the most important factors determining the level o f political activity by 
interest groups is the amount of conflict they experience in their immediate environment. 
Walker refers to Schattschneider’s study in 1960 on how private conflicts lead to group
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politicization. Truman in The Governmental Process (1971) also discusses the
implications o f conflict on advocacy activities o f organizations.
Walker refers to internal activities such as legislative lobbying and external
advocacy strategies such as public education campaigns. The choice and mix of
advocacy strategies is dependent on political environment, organizational resources, the
character of the group’s membership, and the nature of financial support. Walker notes
that non-profit organizations and professionals in non-profit organizations are often
closely related to government agencies operating in their policy areas:
For the most part, the desires of their members to protect their 
professional standing and the requirements of organizational maintenance 
arising from their close associations with federal agencies encourage 
groups with members from the non-profit sector to avoid controversy and 
seek influence through inside political strategies (Walker, 1991, 106).
The goal o f  this study is to understand how organizational characteristics and
funding affect the organizational behavior o f non-profit organizations as determined by
the dependent variables— advocacy behavior, alliance behavior and diversity of
programs. Alliance behavior is broadly defined in the data analysis as participation in
coalitions, collaborations, associations and alliances. The results of this study will
provide empirical evidence about organizational behavior in non-profit organizations in
Louisiana.
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CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH DESIGN: MODEL, METHODS AND DATA
This dissertation’s purpose is to add to the body of knowledge about the effect of 
government funding on non-profit organizational behavior. By expanding the 
understanding of the relationships between organizational characteristics and funding 
that affect non-profit advocacy, association/alliance behavior and program 
diversification, this study advances the knowledge base about the relationship between 
government and non-profit organizations.
This chapter begins with a description of the limitations of previous research and 
establishes the significance of this study. The research design, the conceptual 
framework, and the development of the survey will be outlined. Then, the specification 
of the model and the definition of variables will be explained.
Much of the research on government funding of non-profit organizations has 
been based on limited case studies or small samples o f specific types of non-profits such 
as hospitals or certain social service type organizations (Gibelman and Demone 1998; 
Weisbrod 1988; Smith and Lipsky 1993; Weisbrod 1998). Bernstein (1991), Grayson 
and Tompkins (1984), and Hammack and Young (1993) all based their analysis of the 
impact of contracting and policy changes on small subsector studies. This study 
attempts to look at a broader view of the non-profit sector in Louisiana—not just 
hospitals, social services or foster care.
7 This dissertation topic satisfies the two major research considerations identified by King, Keohane and Verba, “is 
the question posed important in the real world and does this study make a specific contribution to an identifiable 
scholarly literature” (King, Keohane, Verba, 1994, 15).
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One source for this study Smith and Lipsky (1993) focused on 30 non-profit 
organizations in Massachusetts. The lack o f empirical evidence and the reliance on 
anecdotal and qualitative data on merely 30 organizations in Massachusetts called the 
Smith and Lipsky (1993) study into question by reviewers Gormley (1993) and Haskell 
(1995). Both reviewers suggested the need for further study and quantitative analysis.
This Louisiana study will determine the response of a larger sample of non-profit 
organizations completed in 1997 and five case studies completed in 1999. By using both 
quantitative analysis and qualitative analysis, this study can address the concerns of 
broader applicability of the findings from scholars who relied only on qualitative data 
from case studies and focus groups for limited empirical analysis.
Smith and Lipsky’s analysis o f the “contracting regime” suggested a connection 
between government funding and organizational behavior, advocacy and association 
membership, but was not able to rigorously test the model due to data limitations. The 
intent of this Louisiana study is to demonstrate that positive relationships exist between 
organizational characteristics, contextual factors and funding. These factors affect 
organizational behavior—advocacy behavior, alliance behavior and program 
diversification.
By examining the growing interest in government funding and organizational 
sustainability as motivating factors for non-profit organizations to join alliances, this 
study determines factors affecting non-profit organizational membership in single-issue 
coalitions, national, state and local coalitions. This study focuses on non-profit 
organizations in Louisiana as the unit o f study. The study will demonstrate that
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organizational behavior of non-profit organizations is affected by organizational 
characteristics and government funding. Organizations which receive government 
funding are more likely to participate in advocacy and alliance activities. Organizations 
which receive government funding are also more likely to have a wider range of 
programs.
The research questions for this study are the following:
1. What is the direct effect of government funding on non-profit organizational 
behavior in terms of (a) advocacy behavior, (b) alliance behavior; (c) diversity of 
programs?
2. What is the direct effect o f organizational characteristics on non-profit organizational 
behavior in terms o f (a) advocacy behavior; (b) alliance behavior, (c) diversity of 
programs?
3. Do organizational characteristics affect these behaviors indirectly as well by 
affecting government funding?
4. Does the source o f  government funding affect these relationships?
5. Are there reciprocal relationships between the dependent organizational behavior 
variables for funding, advocacy behavior, alliance behavior and program diversity?
In order to test this complex model, a lengthy survey was developed. In addition 
to the review of other state and national surveys8, the literature review on alliance and 
association behavior generated a series of questions, several directly from the work of
! The surveys from North Carolina, Utah. Maryland and Minnesota were reviewed for the Louisiana survey.
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The survey was developed in 1997 with input from practitioners in the field 
through the development of the Louisiana Association of Non-profit Organizations 
(LANO), faculty from LSU, LSU-S and Southern University. The field test consisted of 
ten non-profit directors completing the survey. The non-profit practitioners who field 
tested the survey complimented its comprehensive nature, commented on the length and 
intensity of the survey, yet recommended no substantive changes. The project proceeded 
with the original instrument with few substantive changes. (See Appendix A)
In July 1997, the questionnaire containing 54 questions was mailed to a random 
sample 750 Louisiana 501(c)(3) non-profit organizations which had assets o f over
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SI00,000 reported on the 1995 IRS Form 990. In addition to the random sample, 395 
United Way agencies, 179 community development and community based groups and 
95 LANO members received the questionnaire.
The surveys were mailed in July of 1997 and responses continued to be accepted 
through the end of the year. The overall response rate was lower than anticipated. Of 
the approximately 1,400 surveys mailed, 170 useable surveys were returned and 
inputted. The response rate was approximately 12%. This response rate may be due to 
several factors: conducting a survey in the summer, no follow-up by phone or mail, low 
name recognition of the sponsoring agency and the complexity of the survey.
A low response rate may be typical for non-profit organizations. Crimmins and 
Keil (1983) conducted a study of non-profit organizations across the country to study 
non-profit enterprises. Crimmins and Keil sent out approximately 1,800 surveys and 
received a response rate under 10%. The study of the Utah non-profit sector completed 
in March of 1998 relied on survey responses from 246 organizations (1998, 9). The 
Maryland study had a response rate of approximately 11% based on a distribution of 
over 4,800 surveys and a return o f400 usable surveys for analysis (Salamon, 1997).
The sample described in Table 3.1 indicates the number o f non-profit 
organizations in each region that are IRS 990 filers, the number of United Way agencies 
in each region and the number included in the sample. In addition, the table breaks 
down the sample and the universe by region to demonstrate that the sample is generally 
reflective of the state.
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Table 3.1 Summary O f Sample
Region Parishes = o f  United 










%  Total 
Sample 
Total
S IR S  990 
Filers in 
region





St. Tammany Jefferson. 
Orleans, Washington, 
Tangipahoa







Feliciana, West Feliciana, 
West Baton Rouge, East 
Baton Rouge





St. Charles, Terrebonne, 
Assumption, St. Mary




Vermillion, Acadia, St; 
Landry, Evangeline







37 6 7 4.2% 109 4.5%
Alexandria
Metro
Concordia. La Salle. 
Winn, Rapides, Vemon, 
Sabine















40 5 13 7.7% 172 7.1%




*Data from IRS for 990 Filers for 1998
This study utilizes a multi-variate regression analysis and logistic regression 
analysis using SPSS and SAS to test the hypotheses and evaluate the existence, strength 
and direction of the hypothesized relationships. The data generated from the original 
survey provided the necessary data to categorize organizations by complexity and 
maturity in terms of the age o f the organization, board size, budget size and other factors 
used in the typology developed by Smith and Lipsky (1993).
The sophistication o f the organization seems to be an important factor as 
determined by characteristics such as organizational size, staff size, budget size, total
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revenue, age of organization, and board size. Smith and Lipsky (1993) indicated that 
power is shifting from voluntary boards to more highly trained professional executive 
directors who are more responsive to funding and regulatory relationships with the state. 
The education level of the CEO is therefore considered an important independent 
variable in the model. The race o f the CEO is included to determine whether or not race 
matters in terms of the funding and organizational relationships.
Other possible organizational changes resulting from the emphasis on contracting 
may include expansion in the mission of the organization, changing the composition of 
the board o f directors, increased sophistication in record keeping, contract and financial 
management and increases in the administrative demands on organizations (Crimmins 
and Keil 1983; Grayson and Tompkins, 1984; Herman, 1994; Knauft, Berger, Gray, 
1991; O’Neill and Young, 1988; Powell, 1987).
Some of the predicted organizational changes are difficult to specify. The 
organizational characteristics regarding board composition and increased sophistication 
in record keeping were not variables that could be quantified in the study. A proxy 
variable such as United Way affiliation was selected. Organizations who are affiliated 
with the United Way or have a national affiliation may be more sophisticated and more 
likely to receive government funding. The added benefits from a national organization 
such as training, advocacy and other services make these variables important in this 
model. The organizational characteristics selected to include in this study reflect the 
principal issue to be addressed in the analysis. The organizational variables are 
explained in Table 3.2.
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Table 3.2 Measurement Of Organizational Variables
UNITED WAY Dichotomous variable: 0 = no; l=yes
BOARD SIZE Actual number of board members
STAFFFULL Actual number of full time staff people





52 million-S4 million 
Over S4 million
NATIONAL Is your organization affiliated with a national organization? 
0 = no, 1 = yes
EDUCEO What is your education level?
High School = , College = . Masters = , Doctorate =







This variable was recoded as Black = 1, Other = 0
ORGAGE actual age of organization in years
The survey included an extensive list o f contextual factors which might be
significant to organizations. In the preliminary analysis conducted, several variables 
were evaluated to determine if they fit the specifications o f the model. The literature 
review indicated the significance of devolution (DEVOLUTION) on funding of non­
profits and therefore this variable is included to represent the importance of this federal 
policy. In considering the other possible contextual variables, only two were selected to 
be included in the analysis. The variable (DUPLICA) which is intended to measure 
concern over duplication o f efforts was selected to address the concerns expressed with 
the sector about competition for resources. The other variable selected was intended to
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complement the Gray and Lowery analysis about organizational behavior. The variable 
(COMPFEERCE) is intended to determines the level of concern about competition for 
resources. These three variables represent issues that may be significant to non-profit 
organizations.
Table 3.3 Contextual Factors
Describe the current environment for accomplishing your mission?
5 -  strongly agree, 4=somewhat agree, 3= don’t know, 2=somewhat disagree, 
l=strongly disagree
DUPLICA We need to encourage collaboration and mergers o f organizations 
to reduce duplication
COMPFEERCE Competition for resources is fierce between my organization and 
others with similar services and values.
How important are these challenges facing the non-profit sector in the next three to five
years?
5=verv important, 4=somewhat important, 3=don’t know, 2=not very important,
1= not important
DEVOLUTION Devolution: Block Grants and Federal Funding Cuts
Privatization, devolution and other policy and funding changes are affecting 
governmental decisions about funding and the provision of services by non-profit 
organizations. Opportunities for state or federal funding may provide the impetus for 
organizations to diversify from their original mission (Staeheli, Kodras, Flint 1997; 
White, 1981; Rose-Ackerman, 1986; Powell and Clemens, 1998; Gronbjerg, 1998; 
Perlmutter and Gummer, 1994). The funding variables for the model were limited to 
measures of government funding. The original intent was to focus on the percentage of 
government funds received by organizations.
However, after extensive analysis and testing of various models, this study 
focused on fewer funding variables to evaluate the distinction between receiving
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government funding through contracts or not receiving government funding. This 
decision to focus on the dichotomous relationship of receiving public funding was made 
because of inconsistent results from the analysis of the variables formatted as 
percentages of funding.
The results o f the analysis based on government funding coded as the 
dichotomous variable (CONTRACT) are the most interesting o f  the study. The 
(CONTRACT) question is very important, since the other efforts at evaluating 
contracting with the various departments of state government were not as productive due 
to the small number of cases with data for many departments. In addition to evaluating 
contracting, the source o f funds is o f interest as well.
In the preliminary analysis, a composite variable was created by adding the 
variables representing the percentage of funds from federal, state and local sources 
together. The Cronbach’s Alpha for the new variable (STATEFEDLOC) was .7259 
suggesting that it is not inappropriate to group the variables in this way. This variable 
(STATEFEDLOC) is only reported in one model, since it was not particularly 
responsive in the analysis.
In addition, new dichotomous variables were created to evaluate the effect of the 
existence of government funding rather than the amount o f government funding. These 
new variables for federal money (FEDMON), state money (STATEMON), and local 
money (LOCALMON) were included in the analysis. These variables reflect the 
significance of public funding for non-profits.
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Table 3.4 Funding Variables
Funding Variables included in final analysis
CONTRACT Do you contract with government agencies? 0=no, l=yes
Please estimate the percentage of your total operating revenues 
from each source.
FEDGRT Federal Grants and Contracts %
STAGRT State Grants and Contracts %
LOCGRT Local Grants and Contracts %
STATEFEDLOC Composite of FEDGRT, STAGRT, LOCGRT
FEDMON New Dichotomous Variable: Federal money 0 = no, 1 = yes
STATEMON New Dichotomous Variable: State money 0 = no, 1 = yes
LOCALMON New Dichotomous Variable: Local money 0 = no, 1 = yes
The impact of the policy changes o f privatization and devolution on the 
advocacy behavior of non-profit organizations is a critical aspect of this study. As a 
result of these policy and funding changes, non-profit organizations may also be 
becoming more aware o f and active in advocacy related activities in an effort to seek or 
maintain funds.
A broad array o f advocacy related variables were generated by the survey. In an 
effort to condense the variables, a new variable (ADVOACT) was created. ADVOACT 
is the summation of all o f the advocacy activity variables. The survey asked “What 
advocacy activities has your organization conducted in the last two years? At the 
Federal, state, or local level.” The responses were coded (0= no), (1= yes) and (missing). 
Each category was coded for federal, state and local.
a. Phone calls, faxes, letters to elected officials: (PHONEAD)
b. Personal visits with elected officials, community leaders: (VTSITAD)
66
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
c. Media involvement-editorials: (MEDIAAD) 
d Tracking of legislation/testimony at hearings: (TRACKAD)
e. Attending/Conducting meetings or briefings: (MEETAD)
f. Organizing grassroots efforts, mailings: (GRASSAD)
The variables were then aggregated in different combinations to test for 
significant relationships. The types of advocacy activities were aggregated to become 
(PHONEAD), (VISITAD), (MEDIAAD), (TRACKAD), (MEETAD), and 
(GRASSAD). The advocacy activities by level of contact were aggregated to become 
(STADVO), (FEDADVO), and (LOCADVO). The variables that emerged after 
extensive analytical reviews were ADVOACT, VISITAD, GRASSAD, and TRACKAD.
Table. 3.5 Advocacy Variables Included In Analysis
ADVOCACY VARIABLES
ADVOACT Composite Variable of all advocacy variables
VISIT AD Composite Variable of FEDVISIT, STAVISIT, LOCVISIT
GRASSAD Composite Variable of FEDGRASS, STAGRASS, LOCGRASS
TRACKAD Composite Variable of FEDTRACK, STATRACK, LOCTRACK
Another area of interest is the alliance or association behavior of non-profit 
organizations. The literature review explained reasons for institutional membership in 
associations/alliances or interest groups based on material, solidary and purposive 
benefits. The basic model focuses on alliance and coalition participation.
One o f the hypothesized changes in the habits of organizations is the increased 
participation in intermediary organizations such as associations, coalitions and 
collaborations. The literature suggests that alliance participation seems to be a common
67
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
means to promote advocacy activities, strengthen the non-profit sector and provide a 
buffer in dealing with government agencies. Alliance behavior is addressed by 
organizational participation in local, state, regional and national collaborations and 
associations. The survey question is “Is your organization affiliated or a member of any 
associations, coalitions or collaborations? If yes, check all that apply.” Each part of the 
collaboration, association question is coded independently as a dichotomous variable.
For example, the variable (NEIGHCOLL) is coded 0 (zero) for no and 1 (one) for yes. 
The new variable (COALITION) was created in an effort to generate more significant 
results and to develop a more parsimonious model. After many iterations of analysis, the 
alliance/association behavior variables were limited to (COALITION), (ISSUECOLL), 
(STATECOLL), and (NATCOLL).
Table 3.6 Alliance Behavior Variables
ALLIANCE BEHAVIOR VARIABLES
COALITION Composite Variable of all coalition, collaboration variables
ISSUECOLL Issue Coalition
STATECOLL State level coalition, association or collaboration
NATCOLL National level coalition, association or collaboration
In an effort to determine the reasons for participation in alliances, association and
coalitions, a lengthy question outlined the range of reasons for participating in interest 
group activities. The responses from the question, “How important are the following 
reasons for your organization to join a coalition, association or collaboration?”, were 
recoded into the new variables PURPOSIVE, MATERIAL and SOLIDARY. These 
variables are intended to reflect the interest group literature.
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Table 3.7 Reasons for Alliance Participation
The variables were coded 5=very important, 4=somewhat important, 3= Don’t Know or 
Neutral, 2=not very important, l=not important.
a) COSTSAVE To access costs savings and benefits such as discounts
b) GAJNSER To gain direct services, training and management assistance
: c) ADVOPOLI To receive advocacy and public policy information, updates
d) INFORESE To participate and receive information, research
e) GRANTSEM To participate in grantwriting seminars
f) EMERINIT To participate in a popular emerging initiative
g) EXTERNAL To respond to external threats to the sector
h) GALVSUPP To galvanize support and interest of the significance o f service
i) CAREERAD To meet and network with other professionals
j) TIME AD VO To receive up to date advocacy information on legislative
activities
k) TRENDSIN To receive publications on trends in the sector
1) FORUMS To participate in forums with grantmakers
Table 3.8 Participation In Alliances Variables
REASONS FOR PARTICIPATION IN ALLIANCES
MATERIAL COSSTSAVE, GAINSER, CAREERAD, GRANTSEM, 
FORUMS, TIME AD VO
PURPOSIVE ADVOPOLI, GALSUPP, INFORESE
SOLIDARY EMERINT, EXTERNAL, TRENDSIN
The organizational behavior variables for advocacy and alliance behavior were narrowed 
down to a manageable list to be included in the models.
The other organizational behavior identified in the model is program 
diversification. Program diversity is intended to measure the breadth and complexity of 
the organization based on the number of separate programs. The basic model suggests 
that programs which receive government funding may have diversified in an effort to 
remain sustainable. The survey asked, “How many separate programs, divisions or 
organizational units does your organization have?” (SEPPROGS) is the dependent
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variable used in the basic model to iheasure program diversity. This variable is coded as 
follows: (a) 0 to 3 programs, 1 (b) 4 to 8 programs, 2 (c) more than 9 separate 
programs or divisions, 3.
The final variables to be evaluated are the two Gray and Lowery questions 
included. A separate section of the analysis briefly deals with the interest group theory 
proposed by Gray and Lowery. The first question is: “In conducting your lobbying and 
advocacy activity with the state legislature, how often do you consult, communicate, or 
cooperate with other organizations sharing your goals and also engaged in lobbying the 
state legislature?” This variable is (CONSULTG). The second question is “In 
conducting your lobbying advocacy activity with the state legislature, how often do you 
find your self in direct competition with other organizations opposed to your position?” 
This variable is (COMPOPPO). The possible values for both variables are the 
following: never, rarely, sometimes, often, always on a five point scale.
These variables are included to determine how organizations work together on 
advocacy and alliance activities. As mentioned previously, the contextual variables for 
duplication of services and competition for resources are predicted to be significant with 
these variables. This very brief review of these Gray and Lowery variables may be 
instructive for other research efforts since they are given only a cursory analysis in this 
project.
The final step in the analysis is to evaluate the reciprocal relationships between 
selected dependent variables. The causal diagram/model indicates that there may be
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some interaction between the dependent variables. In order to properly estimate this 
hypothesized relationship, two stage least squares are calculated.
The hypotheses are intended to test the effect of organizational characteristics, 
contextual factors and funding on organizational behavior:
1) Organizational characteristics including staff size, budget size, age o f organization 
and staff credentials affect whether or not a non-profit organization receives 
government funding.
2) Government funding affects non-profit organizational behavior in three areas: 
advocacy behavior, alliance behavior and program diversification.
Given the complexity and the number of variables included in the model, several 
versions were tested. The number of dependent variables to be tested made it necessary 
to work through different scenarios including the various combinations o f  funding and 
advocacy variables.
In order to test fully all the hypothesized relationships over one hundred logit and 
regression tables were generated. Therefore, the results are quite complicated to present 
and explain the different scenarios of combinations of models. The term model is used 
to distinguish a combination of variables to test a component of the original causal 
diagram or basic model. The following equation identifies the variables in the models to 
be tested.
EQUATION FOR BASIC MODEL
DV = a + bl (UNITED WAY) + b2 (BOARD SIZE) + b3 (STAFFFULL) + b4 
(REVENUE) + b5 (DEVOLUTION) + b6 (NATIONAL) + b7 (EDUCEO) + b8 
(RACECEO) + b9 (ORGAGE) + blO (DUPLICA) + bl 1 (COMPFIERCE) + bl2 
(FUNDING VARIABLES, CONTRACT, STATEFEDLOC, FEDMON, STATEMON,
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LOCALM ON)-bl3 (ADVOCACY VARIABLES, AD VO ACT, VIS IT AD, 
TRACKAD, GRASSAD) ^bl4 (COALITION VARIABLES, COALITION, 
STATECOLL, NATCOLL, ISSUECOLL) + b!5 (SEPPROGS)
In addition to the extensive list of variables, another factor complicating the 
analysis is the overrepresentation of United Way agencies in the sample. Since it was 
thought that this overrepresentation would affect the representativeness of the results, the 
analysis was completed on weighted and unweighted data. The weighting procedure 
was necessary to reflect the proportional representation o f United Way agencies in the 
universe, since the sample significantly over-represents United Way agencies. The 
weighting equation is based on the proportion of United Way agencies in the sample 
divided by the proportion in the population.
Table 3.9 United Way Agencies in the Sample
Region # o f  United 
W ay O rgs. In 
region
# United 
W ay Orgs. 
In sam ple
Total Sam ple 
#
%  UW in
Sample
Total
*  IR S  990 
Filers in 
region
• / .o fU W  
IRS 990 
Filers
Total 395 78 170 45% 2395 16.5%
’''Data from IRS for 990 Filers for 1998
By weighting the analysis to restore the proper distribution o f  United Way 
agencies, the results of the analysis should be more reflective of the universe. In order to 
test all the scenarios on the weighted and unweighted data, the results are lengthy and 
cumbersome to report. Therefore, the results of all the models are reported in the 
Appendix D. as weighted and unweighted to differentiate the impact o f  United Way 
agency representation in the sample. The comparison of the unweighted and weighted 
models is intended to indicate how the weighting process affected the models The 
model variations are based on including the different variables for funding, advocacy
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behavior and alliance behavior in different combinations to determine if patterns emerge 
in the analysis. Each dependent variable is covered in a separate table which includes the 
unweighted and weighted models for each scenario. In most cases, four scenarios are 
reported which include the combinations for the funding, advocacy and alliance 
variables. The models reported are intended to clarify the analysis and serve as 
representative models from the extensive analysis completed. Most of the models 
reported in the analysis chapter include only the separate measures for advocacy 
behavior and alliance behavior. Only the weighted models are reported for the selected 
models for the dependent variables (CONTRACT), (STATEFEDLOC), (FEDMON), 
(STATEMON), (LOCALMON), (ADVOACT), (VISITAD), (TRACKAD), 
(GRASSAD), (STATECOLL), (NATCOLL), (ISSUECOLL) and (SEPPROGS).
Table 3.10 Dependent Variables Reported in Analysis
CONTRACT Do you contract with government agencies? 0=no, l=yes
FEDGRT Federal Grants and Contracts %
STAGRT State Grants and Contracts %
LOCGRT Local Grants and Contracts %
STATEFEDLOC Composite of FEDGRT, STAGRT, LOCGRT
FEDMON New Dichotomous Variable: Federal money 0 = no, 1 = yes
STATEMON New Dichotomous Variable: State money 0 = no, 1 = yes
LOCALMON New Dichotomous Variable: Local money 0 = no, 1 = yes
ADVOACT Composite Variable of all advocacy variables
VISITAD Composite Variable of FEDVISIT, STAVISIT, LOCVISIT
GRASSAD Composite Variable of FEDGRASS, STAGRASS, LOCGRASS
TRACKAD Composite Variable of FEDTRACK, STATRACK, LOCTRACK
COALITION Composite Variable of all coalition, collaboration variables
ISSUECOLL Issue Coalition
STATECOLL State level coalition, association or collaboration
NATCOLL National level coalition, association or collaboration
73
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CASE STUDIES
In addition to the data from the original mailed survey sample, five case studies 
to enhance the analysis and the results. The inclusion of the case studies helps to 
elaborate on some of the main issues to be addressed in the study. The survey for the 
case studies is included as Appendix B. Given the discussion regarding organizational 
sophistication, the organizational typology suggested by Smith and Lipsky (1993) was 
used in the selection of organizations to be included as case studies.
A. Traditional
1. Volunteers of America of Greater Baton Rouge has an eighty year history as a 
human service organization, but which has diversified into 20-30 different programs 
in response to funding and policy changes. This United Way Agency has changed 
dramatically over its lifespan and is now primarily funded by government sources.
2. Kingsley House in New Orleans founded in 1896 was initially a settlement house in 
New Orleans and now offers an array o f services. Kingsley House received funds 
through the state capital outlay budget for an addition and the staff is knowledgeable 
regarding policy implications.
B. Formed in response to government funding
3. Community Support Programs in Shreveport, Louisiana was created in 1990 in 
direct response to available government funding in the areas of health and human 
services.
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4. Unity for the Homeless in New Orleans was founded in 1992 in an effort to 
coordinate the activities of over 50 homeless and social service agencies in the 
greater New Orleans area.
C. Formed in response to unmet community need
5. Urban Restoration Enhancement Corporation in Baton Rouge is a community 
development and housing organization which is funded by government and 
community funds.
This chapter explains the research design for the study, the model and the 
combinations of variables tested. This study evaluates a broad spectrum of non-profit 
organizations in Louisiana, fills a gap in the literature, and provides a foundation for 
further research on non-profit organizational behavior.
The research design includes the quantitative analysis of a survey of non-profits 
and the results o f five case study interviews. After the review of the results of this study, 
other concerns for further research are identified that address the limitations of this 
study.
This study successfully addresses the research questions and identifies new areas for 
further study. Although there is more that can be done to improve the precision of this 
area of inquiry, it makes a contribution to the understanding o f organizational behavior 
of non-profits and the effects of government funding.
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CHAPTER 4. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
This chapter will report the findings from the quantitative data analysis o f the 
results of 170 surveys completed in the summer of 1997. The findings will corroborate 
the hypotheses predicting a positive relationship between organizational and contextual 
factors, funding and organizational behavior as specified in terms of advocacy behavior, 
alliance behavior and program diversity. The original model/causal diagram is referred 
to as the basic model and identified multiple dependent variables.
In the methods chapter, the selection o f variables was explained. There were 
several possible measures of advocacy behavior and alliance behavior. For advocacy 
behavior, the variables included in the analysis are meeting with elected officials 
(VISITAD), participating in grass roots advocacy (GRASSAD), and tracking legislation 
(TRACKAD). The composite variable for advocacy (ADVOACT), is included in some 
models for comparison to the separate measures o f advocacy. In some models, the 
separate measures were not significant, but the composite measure (ADVOACT) was 
significant; therefore, the comparison of the models is instructive.
In reviewing the results from coalition/alliance behavior variables, the composite 
measure (COALITION) is not included in the reported tables because it is rarely 
significant. For alliance behavior, the variables included in the reported tables are 
participating in state alliances, collaborations or associations (STATECOLL), 
participating in national alliances, collaborations or associations (NATCOLL), and 
participating in issue coalitions, alliances or coalitions (ISSUECOLL). As mentioned,
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many combinations of variables were reviewed in the preparation of this study. The full 
report of models evaluated is included in Appendix D.
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• Devolution / 
oiocx grants
The analysis reported is organized in these sections: Funding, Advocacy 
Behavior, Alliance Behavior and Program Diversification. Extensive analysis was 
conducted on several variations on the basic model as described in the research design. 
This chapter reports on a representative sample of the models to evaluate the research
questions.
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SUMMARY OF FUNDING DEPENDENT VARIABLES
Table 4.2 displays the results when CONTRACT is considered as a dependent 
variable. Because of the dichotomous nature o f this variable, a logit model is used to 
estimate parameters. In the model reported for CONTRACT, the organizational 
characteristic variables, contextual variables, the measure of program diversity and the 
separate variables for advocacy behavior and alliance behavior are included. As 
previously mentioned, program diversification is an indication of the complexity o f the 
organization as measured by the number o f separate programs.
The organizational characteristics are important in determining the factors which 
may influence the funding of the organization. In the model with CONTRACT as the 
dependent variable, the organizational characteristics board size (BOARDSIZE), the 
number of full-time staff (STAFFFULL) and organizational age (ORGAGE) are 
significant.
Board size is positive and significant at the .10 level indicating that organizations 
with larger boards may have more contracts. The number o f full-time staff is positive at 
the .05 level indicating a stronger relationship with larger organizations and contracting. 
It is interesting to note that budget size (REVENUE) of the organization is not 
significant, even though staff size is significant. Generally, it was thought that budget 
size and staff size would be indicators of larger organizations and that larger 
organizations would be more involved in contracting.
The analysis by Smith and Lipsky suggested that organizational age might be an 
important indicator. Smith and Lipsky suggested that older, more established
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organizations might be more involved in contracting. However, they also suggested that 
new organizations might emerge to receive contract funds. In this model, organizational 
age (ORGAGE) is significant at the . 10 level but the coefficient is negative, leading one 
to believe that newer organizations are better able to secure contracts with government.
In terms of advocacy behavior, meeting with elected officials (VISITAD) is 
positive and significant at the .05 level, indicating that contracting is affected by the 
direct advocacy behavior of the organization. The other advocacy variables are not 
significant. The significance o f meeting with elected officials makes sense since most 
contracting does take place at the state level. Direct involvement with elected officials is 
a good method of raising the visibility o f the organization and strengthening the 
connection of officials who could intervene on behalf of the organization in the 
contracting process.
In reviewing alliance behavior, participation in state-wide alliances, 
collaborations, or associations (STATECOLL), is positive and significant at the .10 
level. However, the coefficients for participation in national and issue alliances are not 
significant. The participation in state level activities makes sense as an indicator of 
contracting since most contracting is done at the state level. In Louisiana, there are 
many state level advocacy groups and provider groups working on funding and 
regulatory issues. Participation in these types o f groups is an appropriate strategy for 
organizations seeking contract funding.
One of the points discussed in the literature review is the impact of program 
diversification on organizational behavior. Several authors suggested that organizations
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may be diversifying in an effort to pursue new funding strategies. Another possibility is 
that organizations who remain specialized may have a niche they can protect. In this 
analysis, the measure o f program diversification (SEPPROGS) is negative, but 
significant at the .10 level. This finding indicates that organizations that have not 
diversified or have a narrower range of programs may be more involved in contracting in 
Louisiana.
These findings indicate that newer organizations with large staffs may be focused 
on a smaller array of services as evidenced by the coefficient in separate programs, but 
are also more likely to be involved in state collaborations and direct advocacy. Also o f 
interest is what is not significant. The contextual issues measuring the 
importance o f the public policy issue devolution (DEVOLUTION), concern about 
duplication of services (DUPLICA) and concern about fierce competition for funding 
(COMPFIERCE) are not significant in the contracting model. These contextual issues 
were included based on the prospect that these factors would be important in the 
decision-making process of organizations and in how they respond to funding. It is 
interesting to note that these variables do emerge as significant in subsequent funding 
models.
In addition to the contextual variables, there were some organizational variables 
that did not emerge as significant. Budget size (REVENUE), United Way membership 
(UNITEDWAY), and affiliation with a national organization (NATIONAL) are not 
significant. It is also interesting to note that the race o f the CEO (RACECEO), is 
significant and negative, but the education of the CEO (EDUCEO) is not significant.
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The race o f the CEO was included to test the perception that minority led organizations 
were not as likely to receive state funds. In this model, that perception is realized and the 
race of the CEO does seem consistently negative but not significant across many of the
models.
In summarizing the dependent variable (CONTRACT), it seems that 
organizations with larger staffs and larger boards, who do not have minority CEOs and 
are leaders of younger non-profit organizations with a narrower focus and which are 
involved in direct advocacy activities such as meeting with elected officials (VISITAD), 
and participate in state level collaborations, coalitions or associations (STATECOLL) 
are involved with contracting activities.
In the second model reported for funding, the dependent variable represents the 
percentage of public funds received from state, federal and local government 
(STATEFEDLOC). Because this is a composite variable, a regression model is used to 
estimate the parameters. Each of the individual variables included is coded as a 
percentage of funding. The Cronbach’s Alpha for this variable was .76 indicating that it 
is not inappropriate to group the variables in this way. In this model, board size 
(BOARDSIZE) is negative and significant at the .01 level. Staff size (STAFFFULL) is 
negative and significant at the .10 level. In reviewing the contextual factors, the 
importance o f devolution (DEVOLUTION), is positive and significant at the .01 level, 
but concern about duplication of services (DUPLICA) is negative and significant at the 
.05 level. Once again, the advocacy variable for meeting with elected officials
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(VISITAD) is positive and significant at the .05 level. The measure of state alliance 
behavior (STATECOLL) is also positive and significant at the .05 level.
These results indicate that the percentage of public funds is not necessarily 
limited to organizations with large boards or staffs. It is interesting to see the 
significance of the contextual factors, (DEVOLUTION), (DUPLICA), and 
(COMPFIERCE) emerge consistently with (STATEFEDLOC). The positive sign for 
meeting with elected officials (VISITAD), confirms the basic premise o f the hypothesis 
that there is a positive relationship between public funding and advocacy activity. The 
positive results for state alliance behavior (STATECOLL) and the negative results for 
participation in national level alliances (NATCOLL), may be explained by the fact that 
most of the organizations are receiving state funds and not national funds. Therefore, 
participation in state level activities would more likely affect their funding opportunities. 
In addition, many organizations do not have national affiliations and are more focused 
on local issues. Program diversification (SEPPROGS), is not significant and may 
indicate that program diversity is not an essential quality to receive public funding.
At this point, the next analysis is to determine if the source of funding from local, 
state or federal sources alter the results. This review of source o f funding is completed to 
determine if the independent variables relate differently to the funding sources from 
different levels of government. For example, the participation in state level alliance 
behavior may change depending on the funding source.
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Table 4.2: Logistic Regression Models Estimating the Effect of Funding on
Organizational Behavior of Nonprofit Organizations
Dependent Variable: CONTRACT STATEFEDLOC
Contract Fuads Aggregate M easure o f State, Federal
aad Local Funding
Weighted Model W eighted Model
b t score b t score
Intercept -I 0613 .5129 17.327110 .749
Organizational Characteristics
United Way M em ber A gency (U nited Way) .2147 .2762 1 .168306 .133
Size o f Board (Board size) .0562 1.7763* -.475274 2.541 —
Number o f Full-Tim e S taff (S tafffuil) .1166 2.2570* * -023142 -1.714*
Budget Size o f Organization (R evenue) .1398 .5258 -1.342454 -.798
Naaonal Affiliation (National) 0964 .1418 7.708199 1.001
Education o f  CEO (Educeo) -.2862 6223 .034836 .007
Race o f  CEO (Racecco) -1.5191 1.6387* -1.022693 -.094
Age o f  Organization (Orgage) -0370 1.8648* -.029952 -.163
Contextual Factors
Importance o f  Devolution (D evolution) .2922 1.2748 6.614332 2.419—
Duplication o f  Resources (D uplica) -2040 .8913 -5.198694 1.954**
Fierce Competition for Resources (Com pfierce; .1233 .5866 2.666154 1.060
Fuoding Variables
Receiving Contract Funds (C ontract)
State. Federal and Local Funding (Statefedloc)
Federal Money (Fcdmon)
State Money (Statemon)
Local Money (Localm on)
Advocacy Variables
Aggregate Advocacy M easure (Advoact)
Meeting with Elected Officials (V isitad) .8034 2.0040* * 9.355397 2.199**
Tracking Legislation (Trackad) -.0196 .0583 .230254 .057
Grass Roots Advocacy (G rassad) -.4045 .9170 -3.683925 -.761
Coalition/Alliance Behavior
Aggregate Coalition M easure (C oalition)
State Alliance (State collaboration) 1.2512 1.8519* 27.186696 3.537—
National Alliance (National coll.) -.3452 .5010 -12.522227 -1.513




Program Diversifications (Separate Programs) -.08702 1.6004* -5.408640 -1.000





Adj. R £ q u a re .2479
df-degrccs o f  freedom 120
F 3.198
Prob (F) .0001
*** Prob < 0.01, two-tailed test 
** Prob < 0.05. tw o-tailed test 
* Prob <  0.10. tw o-tailed test
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Table 4.3 displays the results from the models where the dependent variables 
represent federal money (FEDMON), state money (STATEMON), and local money 
(LOCALMON). Because o f  the dichotomous nature of these variables, logit models are 
used to estimate the parameters. In completing the analysis, these variables were created 
to indicate the acceptance o f public funds by non-profit organizations. Rather than 
relying on measures of percentage of funding received by organizations which had 
significant variance in the sample, these variable were created in order to test the 
hypothesis whether or not the existence of public funding makes a difference.
In this section, two models are reported for each dependent variable,
(FEDMON), (STATEMON), (LOCALMON). Both models include all the 
organizational variables, contextual variables, alliance behavior variables and program 
diversification. The first model o f each set includes the separate advocacy variables 
meeting with elected officials (VISITAD), tracking legislation (TRACKAD), and grass 
roots advocacy, (GRASSAD). The second model includes the aggregated advocacy 
variable, (ADVOACT).
In the first model for federal money as the dependent variable (FEDMON), board 
size (BOARDSIZE) is negative and significant at the .10 level. The education of the 
CEO (EDUCEO) is not quite significant. Of the contextual factors, concern about 
competition for resources (COMPFIERCE), emerges as positive and significant at the 
.01 level. Meeting with elected officials (VISITAD), emerges as positive and significant 
at the .10 level, yet neither o f  the other two advocacy variables are significant.
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In alliance behavior, participation in state level alliances (STATECOLL), 
emerges as significant at the .10 level, but participation in national level alliances 
(NATCOLL) is not significant. Participation in issue alliances (ISSUECOLL) is 
positive and significant at the .01 level. The increased significance of state level alliance 
behavior and issue alliances is interesting since the dependent variable is federal money.
This model indicates that receiving federal money may not be as dependent on 
organizational characteristics as on relationships with elected officials and participation 
in state level coalitions and issue alliances rather than national alliances. The emergence 
of the significance of competition for resources (COMPFIERCE) may be an indication 
that aggressive organizations that participate in advocacy activities and have 
relationships with elected officials may be more likely to receive federal funding.
In the second model evaluating federal money as the dependent variable, there 
are similar results. The size of the board (BOARDSIZE) is negative and significant at the 
.10 level. Competition for resources (COMPFIERCE) is positive and significant at the 
.01 level. In this model, the aggregated advocacy variable (ADVOACT) is positive and 
significant at the .10 level. State alliance behavior (STATECOLL) is no longer 
significant, but participation in issue coalitions, collaborations and associations 
(ISSUECOLL) remains positive and significant at the .01 level.
When reviewing the various combinations in the models for the dependent 
variable (FEDMON) several patterns emerge. The negative sign on board size may 
indicate that smaller or more elite boards may be better suited in advocacy for federal 
funding. Board size is negative across all the funding variables except for the first model
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for contracting. Organizational size or organizational age do not seem to be important 
factors affecting funding. Another factor that does not emerge as significant is national 
affiliation (NATIONAL). This is somewhat surprising since the a priori belief was that 
larger organizations with national ties, might be better positioned to seek and maintain 
federal funds.
The contextual factors were not as significant as expected. It is interesting to see 
the significance of the contextual factor (COMPFIERCE) emerge as consistently across 
the federal funding models. Competition for resources may be a motivating factor in 
seeking federal funds. However, it seems that concern about devolution 
(DEVOLUTION) is not a factor in federal funding. That may be appropriate since 
devolution is a federal policy which is affecting the availability of federal funding 
through mechanisms o f state funding. Concern about duplication (DUPLICA) of 
services does not emerge in either model.
These models reflect the significance o f advocacy behavior. The positive status 
of ADVOACT and VISITAD confirms the basic premise of the hypothesis that funding 
is affected by advocacy activity. Meeting with elected officials (VISITAD), may be a 
key indicator of sophistication in advocacy activities. This variable emerges consistently 
across many of the models, more so than grass roots advocacy and the tracking of 
legislation. The significance o f the aggregate advocacy variable (ADVOACT) is 
important since this is the comprehensive measure of advocacy activity.
In reviewing the alliance behavior variables, issue alliance (ISSUECOLL) 
emerged as significant in both models for federal money. Issue coalitions may be more
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homogeneous and therefore more effective in identifying or advocating for funding. It 
was presumed that national coalitions (NATCOLL) might emerge as significant for 
federal funding. The significance o f state level alliance behavior might also be reflective 
of well organized interests at the state level which could assist in funding.
In the first model for state funding (STATEMON) is the dependent variable, the 
size of the staff (STAFFFULL) is negative and significant at the .10 level. The budget 
size of the organizations (REVENUE) is positive and significant at the .10 level. The 
other organizational characteristics are not significant. O f the contextual variables, 
devolution as a public policy issue (DEVOLUTION) is positive and significant at the .05 
level. Of the advocacy variables, only tracking legislation (TRACKAD) emerges as 
positive and significant at the .10 level. In alliance behavior, participation in state level 
coalitions (STATECOLL) is positive and significant at the .01 level. But participation in 
national level coalitions (NATCOLL) is negative and significant at the .01 level. Unlike 
the previous model for federal funding, in this state model, participation in issue 
coalitions (ISSUECOLL) is not significant. The measure o f program diversification 
(SEPPROGS) is positive and significant at the .05 level.
In the second model for the dependent variable STATEMON, once again, the 
size of the staff (STAFFFULL) is negative and significant at the .05 level. 
DEVOLUTION is positive and significant at the .05 level. The aggregate measure of 
advocacy (ADVOACT) is positive and significant at the .01 level. Participation in state 
level coalitions, collaborations or associations (STATECOLL) is positive and significant 
at the .01 level. Participation in national level coalitions, collaborations, or associations
87
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
(NATCOLL) is negative and significant at the .01 level. The measure of program 
diversification (SEPPROGS) is positive and significant at the .10 level.
These results indicate that the state funds are not directly affected by board or 
staff size. The negative sign on staff size is surprising since this indicates that smaller 
organizations are better able to receive state funding. In the models for federal money, 
competition for resources (COMPFIERCE) was significant, but it is not significant in the 
state models. The contextual factor (DEVOLUTION) was not significant in the federal 
models but is significant in both state models. Concern about devolution 
(DEVOLUTION) may be important in the state level analysis since devolution is a 
federal policy affecting funding availability and regulation at the state level. The 
presumption was that competition for resources would also be significant at the state 
level. It may be that one of the effects of devolution is that there is the perception of 
more funding being available at the state level.
O f the advocacy variables, tracking and monitoring legislation (TRACKAD) 
emerges as significant at the state level. Generally, many of the smaller non-profit 
organizations only participate in legislative monitoring activities. The expectation was 
that meeting with local elected officials would emerge as an important strategy for 
acquiring state funds (VISITAD), and so it is surprising that VISITAD is not significant. 
In the second model, the significance at the .01 level of the aggregated advocacy variable 
(ADVOACT) indicates that advocacy is important to receiving state funding.
When evaluating the alliance behavior variables, it makes sense that the state 
level variable (STATECOLL) would be positive and significant. However, the
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difference in signs yet similarity in intensity o f state level alliance behavior 
(STATECOLL) and national level alliance behavior (NATCOLL) is not consistent with 
the picture developed. The relationship between state funding (STATEMON) and 
participation in state coalitions, collaborations and associations (STATECOLL) is 
expected.
Upon further reflection, participation in national level coalitions, collaborations, 
associations (NATCOLL) would not be necessary to seek or attain state level funds. In 
fact, those organizations which are active at the national level may be expending vital 
resources at the national level which would make them less likely to attain state funds. 
By the same reasoning, participation in issue alliance behavior probably would not affect 
state funding. In both state level models, (ISSUECOLL) is not significant.
Program diversification is an important factor affecting state funding as 
demonstrated by (SEPPROGS) which is significant at the .10 level. This result is 
consistent with the hypothesis that organizations with a broader array of services would 
be more likely to have more state funding. These models generally confirm the basic 
premise of the hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between state funding, 
coalition behavior, advocacy activity and program diversity.
In the two models for local funding, very few variables emerge as significant. In 
the first model, only the number o f full-time staff (STAFFFULL) is negative and 
significant at the .10 level. None of the other organizational or contextual factors are 
significant. None o f the advocacy variables emerge as significant. The measure of 
participation in national level coalitions, collaborations and associations (NATCOLL) is
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negative and significant at the .10 level, but (STATECOLL) is not significant. The 
measure of issue alliance behavior (ISSUECOLL) is positive and significant at the .01 
level. The measure o f program diversification (SEPPROGS) is no longer significant.
In the second model for local funding, none o f the organizational or contextual 
variables are significant. However, in this model, the aggregate advocacy variable 
(ADVOACT) is positive and significant at the .05 level. It is somewhat surprising that 
in the first local model, none of the advocacy variables were significant, and in the 
second model (ADVOACT) is significant. ADVOACT is the composite variable created 
from all the advocacy activity variables. Even though the separate advocacy variables 
are not significant, this indicates that advocacy is important to local funding.
The local funding models are interesting because many o f the variables that 
were significant in terms o f federal and state funding are no longer significant. The 
emergence of issue coalitions as an important indicator of local funding may suggest that 
local money is more targeted to a few issues and participation in these issues is important 
for funding. These results indicate that the local funds are not significantly affected by 
many organizational or contextual characteristics. None o f the separate advocacy 
variables are particularly significant, but the aggregate measure (ADVOACT) is 
significant. These models generally confirm the basic premise of the hypothesis that 
there is a positive relationship between local funding, coalition behavior, and advocacy 
activity. The measure of program diversification (SEPPROGS) was not significant in 
either o f these models reported.
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When reviewing the models for contracting (CONTRACT), federal money 
(FEDMON), state money (STATEMON) and local money (LOCALMON), the negative 
coefficients for staff size (STAFFFULL) and board size (BOARDSIZE) indicate that 
organizational size is not a determining factor in government funding. The difference in 
contextual factors (COMPFIERCE) and (DEVOLUTION) indicate that there are 
differences in factors affecting federal and state funding. The most consistent variable 
across the models is the aggregate advocacy variable (ADVOACT), which is 
consistently positive.
This finding supports the hypothesized relationship between funding and 
advocacy. It is also interesting to see issue alliance behavior (ISSUECOLL) emerge at 
the federal and local level, but not at the state level. State alliance behavior 
(STATECOLL) is positive with federal and state funding, but not with local funding. 
This distinction makes sense in evaluating the variables affecting funding. It seems that 
program diversification is not significant except with state funding.
Basically, these results indicate that larger organizations, as indicated by staff 
and board size, do not necessarily have the advantage in receiving state funding.
Another unexpected result is that the contextual factors are not significant, but advocacy 
is a consistently important factor affecting public funding. The results for alliance 
behavior confirm that funding is affected by state and national alliance behavior at the 
state and national level and by local advocacy behavior at the national and local level. 
These findings confirm advocacy and alliance behavior affect funding. In the next 
section, the advocacy variables will be evaluated as the dependent variables.
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Tabic 4.3: Logistic Regression Models Estimating the Effect of Eunding on Organizational llehavior of Nonprofit Organizations
Dependent Variable: FEDMON STATEMON LOCALMON
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SUMMARY OF ADVOCACY DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
After reviewing the funding variables, the next step is to evaluate the advocacy 
variables as dependent variables. Table 4.4 displays the results when the composite 
advocacy variable (ADVOACT) is considered as the dependent variable. A regression 
model is used to estimate the parameters determining the effect o f  organizational 
characteristics, funding, alliance behavior and program diversification on advocacy 
activities o f the organization. This table reports the findings o f two scenarios.
The first model includes the funding variables (FEDMON), (STATEMON) and 
(LOCALMON). The second model includes the funding variable (CONTRACT). Both 
models include the organizational characteristics, contextual factors, alliance behavior 
variables (STATECOLL), (NATCOLL) and (ISSUECOLL) and the measure of program 
diversification (SEPPROGS).
In the first model, board size (BOARDSIZE) is positive and significant at the 
.01 level. The size of the staff, (STAFFFULL) is positive and significant at the .01 level. 
These variables have changed signs from the evaluation of funding as the dependent 
variables. In the previous section, it was determined that organizations with smaller 
staffs might be more likely to receive public funds. This model suggests that larger 
organizations with larger boards are more likely to participate in advocacy activities.
This finding may be plausible since organizations with larger staffs might have 
the time and resources to participate in advocacy activities, but none o f the other 
organizational characteristics are significant. The a priori belief was that national 
affiliation (NATIONAL) or budget size (REVENUE) would be positive and significant.
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Following the same reasoning, it was presumed that organizations with larger budgets 
and access to national resources and information might be more involved in advocacy. 
Since national affiliation (NATIONAL) is not significant in this advocacy model, 
national affiliations might be helpful in other ways besides assistance with advocacy . 
Another possible explanation is that advocacy may be essentially the responsibility of 
the local organization.
In fact, none o f the other organizational or contextual factors are significant. The 
importance of the devolution (DEVOLUTION) and competition for resources 
(COMPFIERCE) were predicted to be important, but according to the analysis, these 
factors are not significant. The presumption was that devolution would be significant 
because it is an important public policy shifting funds from the federal to the state level. 
Therefore, concern about devolution (DEVOLUTION) would be an important factor in 
encouraging non-profit organizations to participate in advocacy efforts. But the analysis 
does not reflect this reasoning, since most of the organizational characteristics are not 
significant and none o f the contextual factors are significant in this model for 
ADVOACT.
Of the three funding variables included in this model, STATEMON is the only 
funding variable that is positive and significant at the .01 level. In Table 4.3,
ADVOACT was positive and significant in each of the three federal, state and local 
funding models when FEDMON, STATEMON and LOCALMON were the dependent 
variables. However, in this table, only STATEMON is significant when ADVOACT is
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the dependent variable. Therefore, receiving state money seems to be very important in 
explaining advocacy behavior.
The state level measure of alliance behavior (STATECOLL) is negative and 
significant at the .05 level while the national level measure (NATCOLL) is positive and 
significant at the .10 level and (ISSUECOLL) is not significant. In the previous table 
when funding was the dependent variable, the signs were reversed for these two 
variables. When evaluating (ADVOACT) as the dependent variable, state alliance 
behavior is negatively related to advocacy behavior, but participation in national level 
alliance behavior is positive. The measure o f program diversification (SEPPROGS) is 
positive and significant at the .05 level.
In the second model for the dependent variable (ADVOACT), CONTRACT is 
included as the funding variable. In this model, the only significant organizational 
characteristic is board size (BOARDSIZE), which is positive and significant at the .10 
level. None o f the contextual variables are significant. It is surprising that once again, 
DEVOLUTION is not significant.
However, the funding variable government contracting (CONTRACT) is 
positive and significant at the .01 level. National level alliance behavior (NATCOLL) is 
positive and significant at the .10 level, but neither STATECOLL or ISSUECOL are 
significant. The measure of program diversification (SEPPROGS) is positive and 
significant at the .01 level.
In these models, some of the organizational characteristics which emerged in 
previous models o f the dependent variables are not significant. Only BOARDSIZE
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seems positively related to advocacy activities. O f the funding variables only 
STATEMON and CONTRACT are positively related to advocacy activities. The 
presumption that devolution would be an important factor affecting advocacy is not 
confirmed by either model for ADVOACT.
Based on the results in these models, it appears that larger organizations with 
diverse programs and large boards are more involved with advocacy. In addition, 
advocacy activities are positively affected by participation in national level alliance 
activities and negatively affected by state level alliances. The difference in sign of the 
coefficients for NATCOLL and STATECOLL is unexpected. This difference may be 
attributable to the dependent variable ADVOACT which is the aggregate advocacy 
variable. In the next models, with the separate advocacy variables, the sign and direction 
of the alliance variables will be evaluated to see if the difference in signs is consistent.
One of the central expectations o f the study is that there is a positive relationship 
between funding and advocacy behavior. The significance o f CONTRACT and 
STATEMON confirms the basic hypothesis. In addition, the consistent significance of 
program diversification (SEPPROGS) in both models indicates a positive relationship 
between diverse programs and advocacy which is consistent with the hypothesis.
The contextual factors which emerged as significant in previous models are not 
significant with ADVOACT as the dependent variable. This finding is puzzling since 
the contextual factor, concern about devolution, (DEVOLUTION) was thought to be a 
key predictor in motivating organizations to become involved in advocacy. None of the 
contextual factors emerge as significant.
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When reviewing the alliance behavior, STATECOLL and NATCOLL are only 
significant with the combination of FEDMON, STATEMON and LOCALMON. It is 
interesting to see that ISSUECOLL drops out as significant in both models. The measure 
of program diversification (SEPPROGS) emerges as significant, leading to the 
reevaluation o f  the previous models where SEPPROGS was only positive and 
significant with STATEMON as the dependent variable.
These results indicate that advocacy activities are directly affected by funding 
and program diversity more than by organizational characteristics. These models 
generally confirm the basic hypothesis that funding, alliance behavior, and program 
diversity affect advocacy as measured by ADVOACT.
The most surprising finding for ADVOACT as the dependent variable is the 
opposite signs o f the alliance variables at the national and state level. The literature, 
research and experience suggested that participation in state level alliance behavior 
might be the most positive independent variable. However, the findings indicate a 
negative relationship. The only conclusion might be that ADVOACT measure the 
advocacy activity o f the organization separate from its participation in state alliance 
activities. However, the national level variable (NATCOLL) was positive, which further 
complicates the scenario. The next step will be to determine if these alliance behavior 
variables behave the same way when part o f  models with the separate advocacy 
variables. The connection between funding and alliance behavior is one o f the critical 
linkages evaluated in the study. The findings thus far indicate that these relationships 
may be more complex than anticipated.
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Table 4.4: Logistic Regression Models Estimating the Effect of Funding on
Organizational Behavior of Nonprofit Organizations
Dependent Variable: ADVOACT ADVOACT
Advocacy Aggregate Advocacy Aggregate
Weighted Model W eighted Model
b t score b t score
Intercept -1.4G0642 -.587 -1.579026 -634
Organizational Characteristics
United Way M em ber Agency (United Way) - 646681 -.687 -.478212 -.476
Size o f Board (Board size) 055324 2.814*** .035900 1.769*
Num ber o f  Full-Time Staff (StaffTuII) .002836 1.995** .000794 .513
Budget Size o f  Organization (Revenue) .256245 1.414 .223030 1.199
National Affiliation (National) .528127 .647 .457902 .548
Education o f  CEO  (Educeo) - 4369S8 -.860 -.377200 -.705
Race o f CEO (Raccceo) -641238 -.566 -.920350 -.753
Age o f  Organization (Orgage) -.016238 -.844 -.008357 -.408
Contextual Factors
Importance o f  Devolution (Devolution) .326301 1.166 .443441 1.540
Duplication o f  Resources (Duplica) .322475 1.159 .297260 1.030
Fierce Competition for Resources (Compfierce) 135493 .509 .054916 .199
Funding Variables
Receiving Contract Funds (Contract) 2.103599 2 606—
State. Federal and Local Funding (Statefedloc)
Federal M oney (Fcdmon) .758229 .876
State M oney (Statemon) 2.354544 2.685***
Local Money (Localmon) .116623 .118
Advocacy Variables
Aggregate Advocacy Measure (Advoact)
M eeting with Elected Officials (Visitad)
Tracking Legislation (Trackad)
G rass Roots A dvocacy (Grassad)
Coalition/Alliaoce Behavior
Aggregate Coalition Measure (Coalition)
State Alliance (State collaboration) -1.685673 -2.037— -1.305768 -1.551
National Alliance (National coll.) 2.037180 2.291 ** 1.477014 1.624*
Issue Alliance (Issue coll.) -.215208 -.242 -.217273 -.237
Program Diversifications (Separate Programs) 1.229249 2.221 ** 1.494972 2 626—
R  S quare .4021 .3560
A dj. R ^ q u a re .2966 .2509
df-degrecs o f  freedom 120 14
F 3.811 3.386
P rob  (F“) 0001 .0001
**• Prob < 0-01. two-tailed test
• * Prob < 0 .0 5 . two-tailed test
* Prob < 0 .1 0 . two-tailed test
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Table 4.5 displays the results for the separate advocacy variables. The dependent 
variables are meeting with elected officials (VISITAD), tracking legislation 
(TRACKAD), and grass roots advocacy (GRAS SAD). Since these are composite 
variables, a regression model is used to estimate the parameters. Two models are 
reported for each dependent variable. The first model includes the funding variable 
CONTRACT. The second model includes the separate funding variables for federal 
money (FEDMON), state money (STATEMON) and local money (LOCALMON). Both 
models include all the organizational characteristic variables, contextual variables and 
the measure of program diversification.
The first pair o f models are for the dependent variable for meeting with elected 
officials (VISITAD) which is an aggregate of the federal level variable (FEDVISIT), 
state level variable (STAVISIT) and local level variable (LOCVISIT). In the first 
model, the only significant organizational characteristic is the education of the CEO 
(EDUCEO), which is negative and significant at the .10 level. None of the 
organizational characteristics which emerged as significant in previous models are 
significant in this model. Neither staff size (STAFFFULL) nor board size 
(BOARDSIZE) are significant in this model. The negative sign on the education o f  the 
CEO was not expected since the presumption was that the education of the CEO would 
be positive. It makes sense that better educated CEOs would be active in advocacy 
activities and would know to contact local elected officials. However, less well educated 
CEO’s may only know to contact an elected officials. The education of the CEO rarely 
emerges as positive in any models.
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The only contextual factor that is significant is DEVOLUTION, which is 
positive and significant at the .10 level. None o f the other contextual factors are 
significant. The significance of DEVOLUTION is consistent with the hypothesis which 
suggests that concern about devolution is a motivating factor for organizations to 
participate in advocacy activities. CONTRACT is positive and significant at the .01 
level which re-enforces the expectation of the importance of funding in organizational 
behavior.
The presumption was that CONTRACT, DEVOLUTION and the alliance 
behavior variables would be positive. The only significant alliance variable is the state 
level alliance measure (STATECOLL), which is negative and significant at the .01 level. 
This result is unexpected since participation in state level alliance behavior and in state 
level advocacy, meeting with elected officials (VISITAD), were thought to be positively 
related. One possible reason for STATECOLL to be negative with the dependent 
variable VISIT AD would be that a non-profit leader who is not part o f a statewide 
coalition, might have to meet individually with elected officials. The measure of 
program diversification (SEPPROGS) is positive and significant at the .01 level which is 
consistent with the expectations. This model makes sense because organizations with 
multiple programs, which receive contract funds, but have poorly educated CEO are 
likely to go meet with elected officials. As hypothesized, funding in the form of 
contracts (CONTRACT) is the most powerful indicator of advocacy behavior in this 
model.
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In the second model for VISIT AD, the significant organizational characteristics 
are board size (BOARDSIZE), which is positive and significant at the .05 level, the size 
of the staff (STAFFFULL), which is positive and significant at the .10 level, and the 
education of the CEO (EDUCEO), which is negative and significant at the .10 level. 
None of the other organizational factors are significant. Only the contextual variable 
competition for resources is fierce (COMPFIERCE) is positive and significant at the .10 
level. All three separate funding variables are significant. Federal money (FEDMON) is 
positive and significant at the .10 level. State money (STATEMON) is positive and 
significant at the .01 level. Local money (LOCALMON) is negative and significant at 
the .10 level. The funding variables indicate that organizations which receive state and 
federal funds are engaged in meeting with elected officials.
The alliance behavior is different than expected because STATECOLL is 
negative and significant at the .01 level, while NATCOLL is positive and significant at 
the .10 level, and ISSUECOLL is not significant. The presumption was that both 
STATECOLL and NATCOLL would be positive since both STATEMON and 
FEDMON were positive. However, meeting with elected officials may not be as 
dependent on alliance participation as suspected. The organizational complexity as 
measured by program diversification (SEPPROGS) is positive and significant at the .01 
level which may mean that more diverse organizations need to participate in direct 
advocacy activities.
When reviewing the models for the dependent variable meeting with elected 
officials (VISIT AD), some o f the organizational characteristics that emerged in previous
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models o f dependent variables are significant. BOARDSIZE seems positively related to 
advocacy activities. The funding variables CONTRACT, STATEMON, FEDMON are 
positive and significant. Only LOCALMON is negative and less significant. The 
consistent significance o f program diversification (SEPPROGS) across the models 
seems to indicate a positive relationship between organizations with multiple programs 
and advocacy activity which is consistent with the hypothesis.
These findings for VISITAD are somewhat similar to the models for 
ADVOACT. The contextual factors which had emerged as significant in previous 
models are mixed with VISIT AD as the dependent variable. DEVOLUTION is 
significant with CONTRACT and COMPFIERCE is significant with the separate 
funding variables (STATEMON), (FEDMON), and (LOCALMON). It is surprising that 
state level alliance behavior (STATECOLL) is negative and national level alliance 
behavior (NATCOLL) is positive, while issue alliance behavior (ISSUECOLL) drops 
out as significant in these models.
One possible explanation for this scenario is that meeting with elected officials is 
an activity that an organization would conduct regardless of its participation in other 
alliances. It was presumed that state level funding and alliance behavior might be 
positive with the dependent variable VISIT AD, since this type of direct advocacy 
activity is probably easier at the state level with elected officials.
Thus far, these results for ADVOACT and VISITAD indicate that advocacy 
activities are directly affected by funding and program diversity more than by 
organizational characteristics. These models generally confirm the basic premise of the
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hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between funding, advocacy activity and 
program diversity. Considering these results for the first advocacy variable VISITAD, it 
will be interesting to see if STATECOLL and NATCOLL remain significant with 
opposite signs in the next variable.
The next models are for the dependent variable TRACKAD which is an 
aggregate of the variables for the tracking of legislation at the federal level 
(FEDTRACK), state level (STATRACK), and local level (LOCTRACK). In the first 
model, none of the organizational or contextual factors are significant. The funding 
variable CONTRACT is positive and significant at the .05 level. However, none of the 
alliance behavior variables or the measure of program diversification (SEPPROGS) are 
significant.
In this case, what is not significant is as interesting as what is significant. Only 
CONTRACT is significant, which indicates that tracking legislation is affected by 
government funding, but no other variables emerge as significant. The tracking of 
legislation was presumed to be a function completed by smaller non-profit organizations 
that might not have the capacity for other advocacy efforts. It is surprising that none of 
the organizational characteristics that are routinely emerging are significant in this 
model.
In the next model, the separate funding variables that are included generate 
similar results to the models for VISITAD. When STATEMON, FEDMON and 
LOCALMON are in the model, board size (BOARDSIZE) is positive and significant at 
the .05 level and the size of the staff (STAFFFULL) is positive and significant at the .10
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level. The only significant contextual variable is competition for resources 
(COMPFIERCE), which is positive and significant at the .10 level. Of the funding 
variables, only STATEMON is positive and significant at the .01 level. The alliance 
variables retain their direction since STATECOLL is negative and significant at the .10 
level, while NATCOLL is positive and significant at the .05 level. In this model, 
SEPPROGS is not significant, meaning that program diversification is not a factor in 
tracking legislation.
When reviewing the dependent variable, TRACKAD, board size and staff size 
were expected to be positive and significant. Board size is positive indicating that 
organizations with larger boards have more opportunities or more resources to be 
involved in advocacy. The significance of CONTRACT and STATEMON are 
consistent with the hypotheses.
The different signs on STATECOLL and NATCOLL are unexpected. The 
concerns about STATECOLL may be answered by organizations participating in 
tracking legislation regardless of their coalition and alliance behavior. It does make 
sense to think that participation in state level alliances makes an organization less likely 
to track legislation if  that service is being provided by the coalition.
Unlike some o f the other models of dependent variables, DEVOLUTION is not 
significant in these models, but COMPFIERCE is positive in one model. Program 
diversification is not a significant factor affecting tracking o f legislation.
In the next models, the dependent variable for grass roots advocacy (GRASSAD) 
is evaluated. GRASSAD is the aggregate of federal grass roots advocacy (FEDGRASS),
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state level grass roots advocacy (STAGRASS), and local level grass roots advocacy 
(LOCGRASS). In the first model, the only organizational characteristic that is 
significant is board size (BOARDSIZE) which is positive and significant at the .01 level. 
The race of the CEO (RACECEO) is positive and significant at the .10 level. This 
indicates that minority led organizations are more likely to participate in grass roots 
advocacy.
Of the contextual variables, DEVOLUTION is not significant, but concern about 
duplication of services (DUPLICA) is positive and significant at the .10 level. However, 
concern about competition for resources (COMPFIERCE) is negative and significant at 
the .10 level. These findings suggest that concern about duplication contributes to grass 
roots advocacy while concern about competition for resources reduces grass roots 
advocacy.
In reviewing the effect of the funding and alliance variables, the findings are not 
as expected since CONTRACT is not significant. State (STATECOLL) and national 
level alliance behavior (NATCOLL) are not significant. Only issue level alliance 
behavior (ISSUECOLL) is negative and significant at the .01 level. The measure of 
program diversification, (SEPPROGS) is not significant. Therefore, one could speculate 
that smaller organizations with a narrow focus led by minority CEO’s who are 
concerned about duplication o f services are engaged in grass roots advocacy.
In the next model, the separate funding variables are included. Once again, some 
of the expected organizational characteristics emerge as significant. Board size 
(BOARDSIZE) is positive and significant at the .01 level. The size o f the staff
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(STAFFFULL) is positive and significant at the .05 level. The size o f the budget 
(REVENUE) is positive and significant at the .10 level. The same contextual variables 
are significant in this model, concern about duplication of services (DUPLICA) is 
positive and significant at the .05 level and competition for resources (COMPFIERCE) 
is negative and significant at the .10 level. In the previous model, CONTRACT was not 
significant. In this model, only federal money (FEDMON) is positive and significant at 
the .05 level. Once again, neither STATECOLL or NATCOLL are significant, but 
ISSUECOLL is negative and significant at the .01 level. The measure of program 
diversification is not significant either.
The models for grass roots advocacy yield interesting and unpredicted results. 
The size of the board seems to be important in both models, but not necessarily the size 
of the staff. The funding variables are not significant nor is the contextual factor 
DEVOLUTION. The concern about competition for resources (COMPFIERCE) and 
duplication of efforts (DUPLICA) emerge in these models more consistently than in 
others. Grassroots advocacy is affected by smaller organizations that are concerned 
about competition, but do not participate in coalitions, collaborations or alliances. The 
race of the CEO (RACECEO) is rarely significant, but does emerge in the first model. 
This may be an important clue about grass roots advocacy.
The results for the advocacy variables support the hypotheses because contract 
funding and state funding are important in most cases. In three of the four advocacy 
variables, CONTRACT and STATEMON are positive and significant, FEDMON is 
positive and significant in two models and LOCALMON is barely significant in one
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model. The size of the board is frequently positive and significant, but few o f the other 
organizational characteristics are significant.
Based on the results o f the previous models, DEVOLUTION was expected to be 
significant. However, it is duplication of resources (DUPLICA) and competition for 
resources (COMPFIERCE) that emerge as significant in the last models for grass roots 
advocacy. In the other models, the contextual factors are not significant. It was 
anticipated that devolution (DEVOLUTION) would be a significant factor in advocacy 
behavior. It seems that competition for resources (COMPFIERCE) and concern about 
duplication (DUPLICA) are also important.
The alliance variables are not behaving as anticipated. Across the board in these 
models, state alliance behavior (STATECOLL) is negative and national alliance 
behavior (NATCOLL) is positive, while issue alliance (ISSUECOLL) is negative in one 
model. It was thought that most advocacy activities might take place at the state level 
and that state level alliance behavior would be positive and significant. Therefore, it is 
surprising that national level alliance behavior is positive in the models for the advocacy 
variables as the dependent variables.
In all the models for advocacy as the dependent variables, NATCOLL and 
STATECOLL have had opposite signs. As mentioned, the significance o f NATCOLL 
was not predicted, because it was thought that most advocacy and alliance activities 
would take place on the state level. In the next section, the alliance behavior variables 
will be evaluated as dependent variables. It will be interesting to note if  the advocacy 
variables are significant with the alliance variables.
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Tabic 4.5: Multivariate Models Estimating the Effect on Advocacy Behavior o f Nonprofit Organizations
Dependent Variable: VISITAD TRACKAD GRASSAD
M eeting ssith F leeted 
Officials
M eeting W ith  F leeted 
Officials
T rack ing  Legislation T ra ck in g  Legislation C R A SS Knots Advocacy C R A SS  Roots Advocacy
W eighted M odel W eighted M odel W eighted M odel W eighted  M odel W eighted M odel W eighted  M odel
b t score It 1 score b 1 score b 1 score b 1 score b 1 score
Intercept • 091694 •145 .007444 .012 •1.059189 • 1.578 -.982152 •1.533 ■ 037635 -083 - 281385 -591
O rg an ira tlo n a l C h aracteristics
United W ay M ember Agency (United W ay) -.178227 -.703 -.222584 -.929 -.173733 -647 -.202895 -.808 .081228 .447 .023822 .128
Size o f  Hoard (Hoard sire) 006556 1.269 .011823 2.345** .007430 1.358 .010557 1.999** 009909 2 677*** .010690 2.722***
Number o f  bull •Tone Staff (StaflTull) .000513 I..100 .000865 2.369** 000341 815 .000662 1.731* 000200 707 000598 2 100**
budget S ire o f  Organization (Revenue) .033335 704 .064630 1.391 -.019817 -.395 -.022089 -.454 .040188 1.184 .061318 1.694*
National Affiliation (National) -.222047 -1.048 -.165684 -.793 .171303 .763 .232055 1.061 .111405 .73.1 .084619 520
I-ducalion o f  C liO  (lidncco) -.247855 •1.819* -.260056 -1.992* .162955 1.129 .149890 1.096 •048928 • 501 005875 058
Race o f  CliO  (Raccceo) -.274941 -.884 -.330972 -1.136 -.307067 -.931 -.266839 -.875 366051 1.641* 327861 1.445
Age o f  Organization (Orgagc) 
C o n te itu a l R a d o n
-.004022 •773 -.004990 -1 O il • 001996 -.362 -.002827 ■ 547 -.002650 - 711 -.005159 •1 341
Importance o f  Devolution (Devolution) 
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F und ing  V arlih les
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Stale M oney (Slatciuon) 
l.ocal M oney (l.ocaliiHin)
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Aggregate Advocacy M easure (Advoact) 
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Aggregate Coalition M easure (Coalition) 
State Alliance (State collaboration) -.601193 •2.805*** -.681824 •3.212*** -.362995 -I 599 -.403997 •1.818* - 070003 -4 5 6 •136124 ■823
National Alliance (National coll.) .357014 1.544 .442007 1.940* .390856 1.595 .500250 2.097** 231616 1.397 .260310 1.467
Issue Alliance (Issue coll.) .092971 .400 .139418 614 .020252 082 069178 291 ■ 443029 -2 658*** -467004 -2 638***
P ro g ram  D iversifications .492076 3.401 • • • .423173 2.981*** .217745 1.420 .130094 .875 - 025500 -.246 .022353 .202
(S ep ara te  P rogram s)
K S quare .3958 .4237 2460 2894 .2335 .2515
Ad). K S tp iare .2982 .12.10 1241 .1652 .1096 .1207
df-dcgrees o f freedom 115 121 115 121 115 121
F 4.054 4 207 2018 2.130 1 885 1.923
P rob  (F ) 0001 .0001 0188 0041 0306 .0216
*** I’ru b  <  0 .0 1 , tw o -lu ilcd  lest 
• *  I’rol) <  0 .0 5 , Iw u -la ilcd  lest 
•  I’ro b  <  0 .1 0 , tw o -ta ile d  test
SUMMARY OF ALLIANCE VARIABLES 
Table 4.6 reports the selected models the dependent variables state alliance 
behavior (STATECOLL), national alliance behavior (NATCOLL) and issue alliance 
behavior (ISSUECOLL). Since these are dichotomous variables, logit models are used 
to estimate the parameters. In the models reported, all the organizational characteristic 
variables, contextual variables and the measure o f program diversity are included. In the 
first model for state alliance behavior, CONTRACT is included. In all the subsequent 
models the variables for federal funding (FEDMON), state funding (STATEMON) and 
local funding (LOCALMON) are included. All the models include the separate 
advocacy variables meeting with elected officials (VISITAD), tracking legislation 
(TRACKAD) and grass roots advocacy (GRASSAD). Since this table reports the 
alliance behavior models, three additional variables are included: MATERIAL, 
PURPOSIVE and SOLIDARY to determine the reasons for participation in alliance 
behavior.
In the first model, state level alliance behavior (STATECOLL) is the dependent 
variable. Some of the organizational characteristics which emerged in the previous 
models are no longer significant. Board size (BOARDSIZE) and staff size 
(STAFFFULL) are not significant, but budget size (REVENUE) is positive and 
significant at the .10 level. This is one of the few times when REVENUE emerges as 
significant. Another change in the results is that the race o f the CEO (RACECEO) is 
negative and significant at the .05 level. It is also interesting to note that organizational 
age (ORGAGE) is negative and significant at the .05 level.
109
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
When reviewing the other independent variables, none of the contextual factors 
are significant, but CONTRACT is positive and significant at the . 10 level. The only 
advocacy variable that is significant is meeting with elected officials (VISITAD) which 
is negative and significant at the .01 level. The measure of program diversification 
(SEPPROGS) is positive and significant at the .01 level. These findings indicate that 
“younger” organizations with larger budgets and diverse programs that do not have 
minority CEOs, but who contract with government are participate in state coalition 
activities.
In the second model for STATECOLL, the separate funding variables are 
included. In this analysis, there are similar results to the first model. Budget size 
(REVENUE) is positive and significant at the .01 level, but neither staff size 
(STAFFFULL) or board size (BOARDSIZE) are significant. The race of the CEO 
(RACECEO) is negative and significant at the .01 level, but the education of the CEO 
(EDUCEO) is not significant. None of the contextual variables devolution 
(DEVOLUTION), concern about duplication of efforts (DUPLICA) or competition for 
resources (COMPFIERCE) are significant. Once again, the size o f the budget 
(REVENUE) and the race of the CEO (RACECEO) are the most important 
organizational characteristic variables determining state alliance behavior.
In addition, FEDMON is positive and significant at the .10 level and 
STATEMON is positive and significant at the .01 level, but LOCALMON is not 
significant. The importance of the state and federal funding variables are consistent with 
the hypothesized relationships, but the advocacy variables are not behaving as expected.
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Of the advocacy variables, only VISITAD is negative and significant at the .01 level. 
This is the first model where any of the variables indicating reasons for joining an 
alliance, interest group or association are significant. Only PURPOSIVE is positive and 
significant at the .10 level. Once again, the measure o f program diversification 
(SEPPROGS) is positive and significant at the .01 level.
These findings indicate that larger organizations that do not have minority CEOs 
receive state and federal funds and participate in state level alliance behavior for 
purposive reasons o f ideological satisfaction. In both models, the funding variables are 
positively related to state coalition activities. The relationship between diverse programs 
and coalitions/alliance behavior is consistent with the hypothesis.
These results indicate that coalition activities are directly affected by 
organizational budget size. These models generally confirm the basic premise of the 
hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between funding, coalition behavior, and 
program diversity. However, none of the contextual variables DEVOLUTION, 
DUPLICA or COMPFIERCE are significant. These variables were predicted to be 
significant with the alliance variables since these factors were thought to encourage 
alliance behavior and advocacy behavior.
The only advocacy variable that is significant in either model is VISITAD, which 
is negative. In the previous models when the advocacy variables were analyzed as the 
dependent variables, STATECOLL was negative. Now, in these models, VISITAD is 
negative. The connection between advocacy and alliance behavior may indicate that the 
less direct advocacy an organization participates in, the more important it is to be
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involved with a collaborative. Another interpretation may be that if  the organization is 
doing direct advocacy, then it does not need to be part o f a collaborative, association or 
coalition. This connection between advocacy and alliance behavior is important to track 
through the next models for national and issue alliance behavior to see if  a pattern
emerges.
In the model of national alliance behavior (NATCOLL), neither board size 
(BOARDSIZE) or staff size (STAFFFULL) are significant, but budget size 
(REVENUE) is positive and significant at the .01 level. The variable for national 
affiliation (NATIONAL) emerges as positive and significant at the .01 level indicating 
that national organizations are more likely to be involved in national level alliance 
behavior. Once again, the race o f the CEO (RACECEO) is negative and significant at 
the .01 level. Since race is significant, it is interesting that the education o f the CEO 
(EDUCEO) is not significant in these models. Another change is that organizational age 
is not important in this model, but it was in the STATECOLL model.
Another difference in the national alliance (NATCOLL) model is that 
competition for resources (COMPFIERCE) is negative and significant at the .01 level, 
but concern about devolution (DEVOLUTION) and duplication o f resources 
(DUPLICA) are not significant. None of these variables were significant in the model 
for STATECOLL. Organizations that are not concerned about resources are 
participating in national level alliance activities.
In the NATCOLL model, none of the MATERIAL, SOLIDARY or 
PURPOSIVE variables emerged as significant in these models. Another unexpected
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result is that none of the funding, advocacy, reasons for alliance membership and 
program diversification variables are significant when NATCOLL is the dependent 
variable. Therefore, these findings indicate that organizations with larger budgets and 
national affiliations with majority CEOs who are not concerned about resources 
participate in national level alliance behavior.
The insignificance of the funding and advocacy variables is puzzling since these 
were thought to be key predictors in motivating organizations to become involved in 
coalitions. These results indicate that coalition activities are directly affected by some 
organizational characteristics, but funding and advocacy do not seem to be connected to 
alliance behavior. These models generally do not confirm the hypothesis that there is a 
positive relationship between coalition behavior, advocacy activity and program 
diversity.
In the next model, issue alliance behavior (ISSUECOLL) is the dependent 
variable. Board size (BOARDSIZE) is positive as significant at the .01 level. Budget 
size (REVENUE) is positive and significant at the .05 level. National affiliation 
(NATIONAL) is negative and significant at the .10 level. The education o f the CEO 
(EDUCEO) is positive and significant at the .01 level. Organizational age (ORGAGE) is 
negative and significant at the .10 level. The race o f the CEO (RACECEO) is not 
significant.
In this model, the contextual variables are significant. Concern about devolution 
(DEVOLUTION) is positive and significant at the .05 level. Concern about duplication 
of resources (DUPLICA) is positive and significant at the .05 level. Competition for
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resources (COMPFIERCE) is negative and significant at the .01 level. The significance 
of the contextual factors in this model are consistent with the predicted results indicated 
that concern about devolution and duplication of resources are reasons for participating 
in alliance activities.
In the model for NATCOLL, federal money (FEDMON) is positive and 
significant at the .10 level, but state money (STATEMON) is negative and significant at 
the 10 level. Local money (LOCALMON) is not significant. In the model for 
STATECOLL, federal money was also positive and significant. It seems that federal 
money is more important contributing to alliance behavior.
As previously mentioned, the advocacy variables are not behaving as expected. 
For ISSUECOLL, neither meeting with elected officials (VISITAD) or tracking 
legislation (TRACKAD) are significant, but grass roots advocacy (GRASSAD) is 
negative and significant at the .01 level. This finding suggests that not participating in 
grass roots advocacy is an important indicator of participation in issue alliance behavior.
Another interesting finding is that none of the MATERIAL, SOLIDARY or 
PURPOSIVE variables emerged as significant in the ISSUECOLL model. In addition to 
this finding, the measure of program diversification is not significant. These findings 
indicate that organization size and capacity are important in determining participation in 
issue alliance behavior. Organizations that receive federal money, have large budgets 
and bigger boards, are not affiliated with national organizations, have educated CEOs 
and do not participate in grass roots advocacy activities, but do participate more in issue 
coalitions or alliances. These results indicate that issue coalition activities are directly
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affected by some organizational characteristics and funding, but the advocacy variables 
do not generally seem to be connected to alliance behavior.
When reviewing Table 4.6, the four models for alliance behavior suggest some 
interesting relationships. For example, state funding (STATEMON) is positive with 
STATECOLL, not significant with NATCOLL and negative with ISSUECOLL.
Federal funding (FEDMON) is positive with STATECOLL, not significant with 
NATCOLL and positive with ISSUECOLL. Program diversification (SEPPROGS) is 
significant only with STATECOLL. The biggest surprise is that of the advocacy 
variables, only VISITAD is negative with STATECOLL and GRASSAD is negative 
with ISSUECOLL. These models suggest that there is a relationship between funding, 
coalition behavior, advocacy activity and program diversity.
In these models for alliance behavior, the variables (MATERIAL), 
(PURPOSIVE) and (SOLIDARY) are included to determine reasons for participating in 
alliances. Based on the interest group literature, it was suggested that organizations 
might join together for specific tangible and intangible reasons. In all these models, 
PURPOSIVE was the only significant variable and was only significant with 
STATECOLL. Even though some of the results were not as anticipated, it was 
predicted that organizations might participate in state level alliances for ideological 
reasons. It is interesting to note that neither MATERIAL nor SOLIDARY emerge as 
significant in any of the models. There is more to be learned about the reasons for 
organizational participation in alliances. Unfortunately, this study only grazes the 
surface of the analysis that is merited to determine reasons for participation.
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Table 4.6 Logistic Regression Models Estimating the Funding on Alliance Behavior o f Nonprofit Organizations 
Dependent Variable: STATECOLL NATCOLL ISSUECOLL
S tate  A lliance S late Alliance N ational A lliance Issue Alliance
W eighted M odel W eighted M odel W eighted M odel W eighted  M odel
h 1 score b t score h t SCOIC h t score
Intercept •4.5803 1.9294** • 5 3233 2 0729** 1 6289 .5732 -10 8688 3 0088***
O rgan iza tiona l C h arac te ristic s
United Way M ember Agency (United Way) 

















Number o f  Pull-Time Staff (SlaftTull) 00222 6441 .00421 7225 .0286 .9203 (Hit 24 .9740
Hndgcl S i/c  o f  Organization (Revenue) 2784 1.8199* .4162 2.3383*** 7425 2 6260*** .676.3 2 2051**
National Affiliation (National) -0447 1 1492 - 3916 6319 1 3422 1.9697** •1.3750 1.6489*
lidueation o f  C liO  (lidncco) -.5285 1 38 -.6652 1.5504 -.4803 1.1837 1.3149 2.3928***
Race o f  C liO  (Itacccco) -I 7791 2.1438** -2.5269 2 933*** ■5.1769 2.5318*** - 3226 .3251
Age o f Organization (Orgagc) 
C o n le ilu a l K acton
-.0233 1.6167* -.0231 1.4934 -00234 .1411 • 0417 1.7947*
Importance o f  Devolution (Devolution) 
Duplication o f  Resources (Duplica)
Pierce Competition for Resources (Compficrcc) 

























Receiving Contract Funds (Contract) 1.0029 1.7239*
Slate, Federal and l.ocal Funding (Stalcfcdloc)
Fcdctal Money (Fedmon) 1.3172 1.8123* .5107 .4004 1.4647 1.8672*
State M oney (Statemon) 2.1654 2 8424*** - 8873 1.1913 •1.5859 1.8268*
l.ocal M oney (l.ocalm on) ■I 2851 1.5150 - 3203 3829 1 1013 1.3525
A dvocacy V ariables
Aggregate Advocacy M easure (Advoact) 
M eeting with Fleeted Officials (Visitad) -.8290 2 4I04*** •1 2204 2 8347*** 0803 2112 5715 1.3641
Tracking l egislation ( I'rackad) - 0680 .2214 -.0675 .1339 5066 1.1857 .4094 1.0175
(irass Roots Advocacy ((irassad) 6022 1.256 8352 1 4348 0479 .0911 •I 8155 2.7939***
C oalilian lA lllanee B ehavior
Aggregate Coalition M easure (Coalition) 
Slate Alliance (Stale collaboration) 
N ational Alliance (National c o l l)
Issue A lliance (Issue c o l l) 
I’uiposivc .1359 .9539 .2806 1.7361* .1546 .8841 ■ 2287 1.0598
M atciial .0520 .5951 .0205 2076 -.0149 .1353 •0318 .2634
Solidary -0108 .0824 -.0108 .0701 .1038 .6826 .1986 .9880
P ro g ram  D iversifications 1.3201 3.0744*** 1 2626 2.5598*** .2018 .3891 4322 7542
(S tp a ra lc  P rogram s)
N um ber o f O bservations I I I 117 117 117
Pseudo R 1 2874 .3303 3520 .3726
- I l .o g l . 161.384 167 544 164 634 151 456
M odel C h i-S quare .44764 59 825 63 569 69.475
• * *  P r o b  <  0 0 1 ,  I w o - t a i l c d  te s t  
•*  I’rob < 0 .05 , t w o - t a i l e d  t e s t  
•  P ro b  <  0 . 1 0 , tw c>-ta ilc< l te s t
I s c o tu  c a lc u la te d  a  V o f  W a ld  C lti S q u are
SUMMARY OF PROGRAM DIVERSIFICATION 
Table 4.7 displays the results when the dependent variable is program 
diversification (SEPPROGS) as measured by the number of separate programs.
Because of the nature of this variable, a regression model is used to estimate the 
parameters. The basic model suggests that programs which receive government 
funding may have diversified in an effort to remain sustainable. All the models 
generated with the different combinations o f funding, advocacy and alliance variables 
are not reported in the text.
Only two representative models are discussed in this section. The additional 
models are in Appendix D. Both models reviewed include the organizational 
characteristics, contextual factors, separate funding and alliance variables. The only 
difference in the reported models is the inclusion of different advocacy variables. In the 
first model, the separate advocacy variables VISITAD, TRACKAD, and GRASSAD 
are included. In the second model, the aggregate advocacy variable (ADVOACT) is 
included.
In the first model, the number of full time staff (STAFFFULL) is positive and 
significant at the .01 level. The national affiliation of the organization (NATIONAL) is 
positive and significant at the .01 level. None of the contextual factors and none of the 
funding variables are significant. The only advocacy variable that is significant is 
meeting with elected officials (VISITAD) which is positive and significant at the .01 
level. Of the alliance variables, only state level alliance behavior (STATECOLL) is 
positive and significant at the .01 level.
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In the second model, many of the same variables emerge as significant. The size 
of the staff (STAFFFULL) is positive and significant at the .01 level. National 
affiliation (NATIONAL) is positive and significant at the .01 level. Concern about 
duplication of efforts (DUPLICA) is negative and significant at the .10 level. Once 
again, none of the funding variables are significant. The aggregate measure o f 
advocacy activity (ADVOACT) is positive and significant at the .05 level. The state 
level measure of alliance behavior (STATECOLL) is positive and significant at the .01 
level.
When reviewing the models for the dependent variable, SEPPROGS, some of 
the organizational characteristics that emerged in previous models of dependent 
variables remain significant. Staff size (STAFFFULL) and National affiliation 
(NATIONAL) are significant in both models. Unlike previous models, the education of 
the CEO (EDUCEO) and the race o f the CEO (RACECEO) are never significant. The 
contextual factors do not seem to play much of a role, since only concern about 
duplication o f programs (DUPLICA) is significant in one model. None of the funding 
variables emerge as significant, which is surprising and contrary to the expected results. 
It was predicted that funding would be positively related to program diversification. 
However, the advocacy variables respond as expected. VISIT AD and ADVOACT are 
positively related to program diversity as measured by SEPPROGS. In reviewing the 
alliance behavior variables, only STATECOLL emerges as significant.
These results indicate that program diversification (SEPPROGS) is affected by 
staff size and national affiliation. This finding makes sense because the more programs
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an organization operates, the more staff is needed. National affiliation is also an 
indication of organizational sophistication and it expected that this would be positive 
with SEPPROGS. But by the same reasoning, one might expect REVENUE to be 
positively related as well. Based on the expectations, the age o f  the organization 
(ORGAGE) should be positive if  the theory is correct that organizations diversify over 
time in search of funding. This expectation was not substantiated by the models.
Another expectation that was not met by these models was the prediction that 
funding would be an indication o f program diversification. This aspect of the 
hypotheses was not validated because the funding variables are not significant in this 
model of program diversity. It was expected that government funding might be an 
indication of program diversity, since organizations were expected to diversify in order 
to seek funding.
Even though the expectations about funding were not validated by the models, 
the expectations about advocacy and alliance behavior are reflected in the models. Both 
VISITAD and ADVOACT are positive and significant indicating that advocacy does 
affect program diversification. In addition, STATECOLL is positive and significant in 
both models indicating that state alliance behavior is important in program 
diversification. Even though NATCOLL and ISSUECOLL are not significant, the 
model confirms the importance o f STATECOLL and program diversification. These 
models generally confirm the basic premise of the hypothesis that there is a positive 
relationship between organizational characteristics, advocacy activity, state alliance 
behavior and program diversity.
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Table 4.7: Multivaritive Models Estimating the Effect on Organizational
Behavior of Nonprofit Organizations
Dependent Variable: SEPPROGS SEPPROGS
Program Diversifications Program Diversifications
Weighted M odel Weighted Model
b t score b t score
Intercept .943292 2.328** 111 7469 2.777—
Organizational Characteristics
United W ay M em ber A gency (United Way) .075649 .469 .048495 294
Size o f  Board (Board size) -.004824 -1.377 -005569 -I 581
Number o f  Full-Time S taff (StaffTuII) .000642 2-615*** .000699 2.870—
Budget Size o f  Organization (Revenue) -.047125 -1.486 -.046699 -1.477
National Affiliation (National) .504704 3.786— .457408 3.372—
Education o f  CEO (Educeo) 0072S2 .079 046533 -.523
Race o f  CEO (Racecco) 155601 781 .104227 526
Age o f  Organization (Orgage) .005010 1.517 .005185 1.555
Contextual Factors
Importance o f  Devolution (Devolution) .045678 .942 .059129 1.210
Duplication o f  Resources (Duplica) -.056778 -I 171 -.081237 -1.683*
Fierce Com petition for Resources (Compfiercc) -.012134 -.253 .010943 .235
Funding Variables
Receiving C ontract Funds (Contract)
State. Federal and Local Funding (Starefedloc)
Federal M oney (Fedmon) 141106 -.913 -.092573 - 6 1 1
State M oney (Statcmon) 142693 899 .173123 1.098
Local M oney (Localmon) .017041 .099 -.085395 -4 9 6
Advocacy Variables
Aggregate Advocacy M easure (Advoact) .037530
Meeting with Elected Officials (Visitad) 227109 2.994***
Tracking Legislation (Trackad) -.050443 -.670
Grass Roots Advocacy (Grassad) -054413 -.602
Coalition/Alliance Behavior
Aggregate Coalition M easure (Coalition)
State Alliance (State collaboration) .416940 2.913 — .370055 2.590—
National Alliance (National coll.) -.027534 -.176 -.047495 -.298




Program Diversifications (Separate Programs)
R Square .4480 .4235
Adj. R Square .33S7 .3218
df-degrees o f freedom 121 120
F 4.099 4.163
P rob  (F) .0001 .0001
*•* Prob < 0.01. two-tailed test 
** Prob < 0.05, two-tailed test 
* Prob < 0 .1 0 , two-tailed test
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SUMMARY OF GRAY AND LOWERY VARIABLES 
In the literature review, the work o f Gray and Lowery was introduced to discuss 
some o f the implications of alliance behavior and the factors affecting organizational 
behavior. Two questions were included in the survey to address the Gray and Lowery 
theory regarding the external forces affecting interest group membership. In order to 
address the theory of alliances modeled in the Lowery and Gray study, the following 
question was included in the study o f Louisiana non-profit organizations: “In conducting 
your lobbying activity with the state legislature, how often do you consult, communicate, 
or cooperate with other organizations sharing your goals and also engaged in lobbying 
the state legislature?” In this survey, the question results were coded as the variable 
(CONSULTG). The second Gray and Lowery question is “In lobbying the state 
legislature, how often do you find yourself in direct competition with other organizations 
opposed to your position?” This question was coded as the variable (COMPOPPO).
The possible answers to both o f these questions are the following: always, often, 
sometimes, rarely, never, and don’t know.
The analysis was conducted using the basic model and the Gray and Lowery 
variables as the dependent variables. Because of the nature of these variables, 
regression models were used to estimate the parameters. The intent o f this additional 
analysis is to determine if the same factors included in the model are significant in 
relation to the Gray and Lowery variables. Specifically, the study was interested in the 
linkage between the contextual factors, advocacy and alliance factors and their 
significance with these new dependent variables.
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Table 4.8 displays the results for the Gray and Lowery variables, consulting with 
other organizations (CONSULTG) and competition with other organizations 
(COMPOPPO). All the organizational characteristics, contextual factors, advocacy 
and alliance behavior variables are included in these models. Only the separate funding 
variables, FEDMON, STATEMON, LOCALMON are included. In the model for 
CONSULTG, none of the organizational or contextual variables are significant. Local 
money (LOCALMON) is the only funding variable that is positive and significant at the 
.05 level.
The dependent variable (CONSULTG) is measures if organizations work 
together on advocacy activities. Therefore, it is not surprising that all three advocacy 
variables are positive and significant. Meeting with elected officials (VISITAD) is 
positive and significant at the .05 level. Tracking legislation (TRACKAD) is positive 
and significant at the .01 level. Grass roots advocacy (GRASSAD) is positive and 
significant at the .05 level. The only alliance variable that is significant is state level 
alliance (STATECOLL) which is positive and significant at the .01 level. The variables 
MATERIAL, PURPOSIVE and SOLIDARY are not significant.
The presumption was made that NATIONAL and UNITED WAY might be 
positive and significant, since the question essentially is asking about collaboration in 
advocacy and organizations with national affiliations or United Way agencies might be 
more likely to be concerned with or participate in advocacy activities. The dependent 
variable (CONSULTG) is based on the answers to the question, “In conducting your 
lobbying activity with the state legislature, how often do you consult, communicate, or
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cooperate with other organizations sharing your goals and also engaged in lobbying the 
state legislature?” The presumption was that the contextual factors might be significant 
in encouraging participation in advocacy activities. It is also interesting to note that 
DEVOLUTION is negative but not significant and COMPFIERCE is not significant. It 
was predicted that DEVOLUTION and COMPFIERCE might be positive and 
significant in order to indicate reasons for organizations to consult with one another
T
over limited resources. However, by the same logic, these variables might also be 
negative because o f fear o f competition over resources.
The significance o f the advocacy variables is to be expected, since the dependent 
variable is presuming some level of advocacy activities. LOCALMON is the only 
funding variable that is significant. The fact that LOCALMON and VISIT AD, 
TRACKAD and GRASSAD are significant is surprising, since LOCALMON has rarely 
been significant. It is also interesting to note that STATEMON is not significant, but 
that STATECOLL is significant. These findings indicate that there is a linkage with 
state level collaborations and advocacy in the intensity of communication about issues at 
the state legislative level.
The second Gray and Lowery question is “In lobbying the state legislature, how 
often do you find yourself in direct competition with other organizations opposed to your 
position?” This question was reported in the data as the variable COMPOPPO. In all 
model, the organizational characteristics, contextual factors, advocacy and alliance 
behavior variables are included. FEDMON, STATEMON, and LOCALMON
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are included. In this model, none o f the organizational or contextual variables are 
significant. Only LOCALMON is positive and significant at the .05 level, The only 
significant advocacy variable is grass roots advocacy (GRASSAD) which is positive 
and significant at the .05 level. The measure of program diversification (SEPPROGS) 
is positive and significant at the .05 level. None of the alliance variables are significant.
It was presumed that REVENUE or STAFFFULL might be positive and 
significant, since the question essentially is asking about competition in advocacy. 
Competition might be more obvious with larger organizations with more at stake. It is 
also interesting to note that DEVOLUTION and COMPFIERCE are not significant. It 
was thought that DEVOLUTION and COMPFIERCE might be positive and significant 
in order to indicate reasons for organizations to compete with one another over limited 
resources.
The significance of the advocacy variables is not as great as expected, since the 
dependent variable is presuming some level of advocacy activities. However, it is 
interesting to note that GRASSAD is the only significant variable. LOCALMON is the 
only funding variable that is ever significant. It is also interesting to note that 
STATEMON and STATECOLL are not significant. These findings indicate that there is 
not as much of a relationship with state level collaborations and advocacy in the intensity 
of competition about issues at the state legislative level. GRASSAD or grass roots 
advocacy has emerged as the most significant variable.
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Table 4.8: Multivaritive Models Estimating the Effect on Organizational
Behavior of Nonprofit Organizations (Gray and Lowery Variables)
Dependent Variable: CONSULTG COMPPO
Consul ting witb O ther Groups Competition with Other G roups
Weighted M odel W eighted Model
b t score b t score
Intercept 113992 .097 .302573
O rgan izational Characteristics
United Way M ember A gency (United Way) .323765 .961 -.000807 -.002
Size o f  Board (Board size) .002053 .203 .006434 .578
N um ber o f  Full-Time S ta ff (StafTfuN) -0000226 IS -.043 -.000356 -6 3 4
Budget Size o f  O rganization (Revenue) -.079803 -1.242 .028836 .419
National Affiliation (N ational) .26527$ .877 -.287604 - 856
Education o f  CEO (Educeo) -.027600 - 140 -329796 -1.436
Race o f  CEO (Raceceo) .206170 497 -341311 - 764
Age o f  Organization (Orgage) .005783 .320 007043 837
Contextual Factors
Importance o f  Devolution (Devolution) -.135307 -1.222 -.132594 -1 .100
Duplication o f  Resources (Duplica) .072184 .708 .011670 .107
Fierce Competition for Resources (Compfierce) .022170 .229 .124432 1 .162
Funding V ariables
Receiving Contract Funds (Contract)
State. Federal and Local Funding (StatcfcdJoc)
Federal Money (Fcdmon) -.327039 -1.042 -.349535 -1.037
State Money (Statemon) -.157610 -.464 -.246680 -.669
Local Money (Localmon) .691310 1.986— .716970 1.923—
Advocacy* Variables
Aggregate Advocacy M easure (Advoact)
M eeting with Elected O fficials (Visitad) .351011 2.045— .105018 .570
Tracking Legislation (Trackad) .464839 2.985— .253270 1.513
Grass Roots Advocacy (G rassad) .381825 1.942*" 474632 2.254—
Coalition/Alliance Behavior .882694 2.860— .402219 1.216
Aggregate Coalition M easure (Coalition) -.008977 -.027 -012304 -.032
State Alliance (State collaboration) .393016 1.203 -430790 -1.214
National Alliance (N ational coil.)
Issue Alliance (Issue coll.)
Purposive .055654 .826 .094270 1.257
Material .015023 .362 -.014082 -3 1 6
Solidary -.009867 -.159 .018161 .271
Program Diversifications (Separate Programs) .001865 .009 485014 2.219—
R S q u are .5374 4010
Adj. R ^ q u a r e .4097 .2319
df-degrees o f  freedom 111 109
F 4.210 2.371
P rob  (F) .0001 .0020
**• Pro'o < 0.01, two-tailed test 
• •  Prob < 0.05. two-tailed test 
• Prob < 0.10. two-tailed test
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ESTIMATING RECIPROCAL RELATIONSHIPS 
The next step is this analytical process is to evaluate the reciprocal relationships 
between the dependent variables. In the original model, certain reciprocal relationships 
between the dependent organizational behavior variables were hypothesized. A subset of 
variables were chosen to determine if any reciprocal relationships exist and to what 
extent these relationships might affect the analysis. The relationships tested and reported 
are STATEMON-STATECOLL and STATEMON-ADVOACT in tables 4.9 and 4.10.
In order to properly estimate these hypothesized reciprocal relationships, two 
stage least squares estimators are calculated. This method of estimation controls the 
simultaneity bias inherent in systems o f equations of this sort.
The findings are interesting, but not surprising. However, not all possible inter­
relationships were tested. In testing the reciprocal relationship for STATEMON and 
STATECOLL, the original models are evaluated first. When STATEMON was the 
dependent variable, STATECOLL was positive and significant at the .01 level. When 
STATEMON is the dependent variable in the new model, STATECOLL is positive, but 
not significant. When STATECOLL was the dependent variable in the original model, 
STATEMON was positive and significant. When STATECOLL is the dependent 
variable in the new model, STATEMON is positive and significant
In the second model, in testing for reciprocal relationships for STATEMON and 
ADVOACT, the original models were evaluated first. When STATEMON was the 
dependent variable, ADVOACT was positive and significant at the .01 level. When 
STATEMON is the dependent variable in the new model, ADVOACT is positive and
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significant at the .05 level. When ADVOACT was the dependent variable in the original 
model, STATEMON was positive and significant at the .01 level. When ADVOACT is 
the dependent variable in the new model, STATEMON is positive and significant at the 
.05 level again.
The analysis o f these two combinations o f  variables suggests that a significant 
reciprocal relationship does not exist. In further analytical efforts, it may be appropriate 
to complete the comparison of other variables that the model suggests may have 
reciprocal relationships. However, for the purposes o f  this study, this cursory evaluation 
is sufficient to address any preliminary concerns.
Given these results, it does not seem to make much difference whether we 
estimate these relationships as a system of equations or equation by equation using 
Ordinary Least Squares. Given that no real differences were found, it is not clear 
whether more complicated modeling to study this is necessary. The potential for 
reciprocal relationships does exist in this model, but not much would be added by further 
analysis.
The underlying assumption is that we want to present the analysis as 
straightforwardly as possible. The ordinary least squares (OLS) analysis is the most 
appropriate method for this effort. However, given the cursory nature of this review, the 
issues of reciprocal relationships may be an area for further study. The potential exists 
for these interrelationships to have a significant impact on further studies, especially as 
funding relationships become more complex. The summary o f the analysis will indicate 
other areas for additional research to evaluate these complex and integrated relationships.
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Table 4.9: Estimating Reciprocal Relationships
Dependent Variable: STATECOLL STATEM ON
Scale A lliances Stale M ooey
b t score b t score




United W ay M em ber A gency (United Way) .1323 .1682 .4551 6291
Size o f  Board (Board size) .0265 1.3082 -0323 .9713
Number o f  Full-Tim e Staff(StafTFuII) 00870 1.2748 -00918 1.9533 —
Budget Size o f  O rganization (Revenue) .3514 2.0027 .2757 1.6138*
Xanonal Affiliation (National) .2450 .3513 -6 4 1 9 .8819
Education o f  CEO  (Educeo) -.5993 1.4538 2963 6769
Race o f  CEO (Raceceo) -2.5548 2.7666— - 7971 .9519
Age o f  Organization (Orgage) -.0121 . "S3 i -0153 7964
Contextual Factors
Importance o f  Devolution (Devolution) -.2221 .8558 .4574 1.7207*
Duplication o f  Resources (Duplica) .3062 1.4667 -0145 .0608
Fierce Competition for Resources .0225 .1072 -.2323 1.1059
(Compfierce)
Funding Variables
Receiving C ontract Funds (Contract)
State. Federal and  Local Funding (Statefedloc)
Federal M oney (Fedm on) 1.1241 1.4859
State M oney (Statem on)
Local M oney (Localm on) -2.7S54 2.3019—
Advocacy' Variables
Aggregate A dvocacy M easure (Advoact)
Meeting with Elected Officials (Visicad) -1.4650 3.0370— 4096 1.1654
Tracking Legislation (Trackad) -.3812 .9519 .7693 2.3702—
Grass Roots Advocacy (Grassad) 1.2077 1.689* -9 1 5 9 1.7539*
Coalition/Alliance Behavior
Aggregate Coalition M easure (Coalition)
State A lliance (S tate collaboration)
National A lliance (N ational coll.) -1.8966 2.0436—




Program Diversifications (Separate .8790 1.7617* 9090 I.5S6I
Programs)




R S q u a re
Adj. R-Squarc 3487 3164
d (-degrees o f  freedom 117. 117
F 167.544 165.136
Prob (F) 60.476 53.952
•** Prob <  0.01, two-tailed test 
** Prob <  0.05, two-tailed test 
• Prob < 0.10, two-taiied test
t score calculated a V o f  Wald Chi Square
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Table 4.10: Estimating Reciprocal Relationships
Dependent Variable: ADVOACT STATEMON
A d v o ac t S ta te m o n
b t score b t score
Intercept .304844 .091 -4.3282 2.0704**
STM ONHAT 6.780949 2.198**
ADVOHAT .7980 2.8324**
O rg an iza tional C haracteristics
United W ay M ember Agency (United W ay) -.463456 -.468 .8740 1.1248
Size o f  Board (Board size) .073919 2.610*** -.0729 2.0618**
Number o f  Full-Time Staff (StafFfull) .003683 2.406*** -.00902 2.5431***
Budget Size o f Organization (Revenue) .143748 .745 .0934 .5559
National Affiliation (National) .861707 .918 -1.1621 1.6853*
Education o f  CEO (Educeo) -.600739 -1.119 .8645 1.7896*
Race o f  CEO (Raceceo) -.145946 -.114 -.5975 .7362
Age o f  Organization (Orgage) -.006679 -.325 .000662 .04
C o n tex tu a l Factors
Importance o f  Devolution (Devolution) .089101 .232 .2143 .8171
Duplication o f  Resources (Duplica) .315258 1.070 -.2445 1.1156
Fierce Competition for Resources .250245 .834 -.2194 1.1208
(Compfierce)
F u nd ing  V ariables
Receiving Contract Funds (Contract)
State. Federal and Local Funding (Statefedloc)
Federal Money (Fedmon) .660802 .733
State M oney (Statemon)
Local M oney (Localmon) -1.897671 -1.116
A dvocacy V ariables
Aggregate Advocacy Measure (Advoact)
Meeting with Elected Officials (Visitad)
Tracking Legislation (Trackad)
Grass Roots Advocacy (Grassad)
C oalition/A lliance Behavior
Aggregate Coalition Measure (Coalition)
State A lliance (State collaboration) -2.680061 -2.541 • • • 2.2898 3.1535—
National Alliance (National coll.) 2.559072 2.454 -3.0363 3 293S—




P ro g ram  D iversifications (S eparate .360112 .5962 .1558 .2898
P rogram s)
# o f  O bservations .4248
Pseudo R : .2962
-2Log L 115
M odel C h i-S quare 3.305
R  S q u a re .0001
A dj. R5>quare 117
df-degrees o f  freedom .3278
F 165.136
Pro b  (F) 57.066
**• Prob < 0.01, two-tailed lest
* * Prob < 0.05. two-tailed test
* Prob < 0.10, two-tailed test
t score calculated a V o f  Wald Chi Square
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SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS 
The review of the models for the dependent variables yield some interesting 
results. None of the models directly mirrored the predicted the relationships, yet pieces 
of the hypothesized relationships emerged in each. In a model as relatively complex as 
the one in this study and given the additional considerations of reciprocal relationships, 
the results of the analysis are satisfactory.
4.11 Summary Of Dependent Variables
FUNDING ADVOCACY ALLIANCE DIVERSITY







The models reported in the text are the selected weighted models that are 
representative o f the analysis. The analysis generally supports the theory developed 
from the literature review. Appendix D. includes all the models completed for the 
analysis and should be consulted for further analysis. The significance of weighting the 
sample emerged in each iteration of dependent variables. Tracking the significance of 
variables from the unweighted models to the weighted models, generally improved the 
significance of most variables. Therefore, the decision to report only the selected 
weighted models is appropriate.
In terms of organizational characteristics, only BOARDSIZE and STAFFFULL 
routinely emerged as positive and significant across most models. National affiliation
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(NATIONAL) seemed to be important in advocacy and some funding scenarios. Budget 
size as measured by REVENUE was not as significant as suspected. It is interesting to 
note that organizational age was rarely positive and significant.
It is interesting to note that RACECEO and EDUCCEO were rarely significant 
in the same models. Based on these findings, African-American CEOs were less likely 
to receive contracts. While better educated CEOs were more likely to participate in issue 
coalitions. These findings are consistent with the general expectations o f the sector.
The contextual factors DEVOLUTION, concern about duplication o f services 
(DUPLICA) and competition for resources is fierce (COMPFIERCE) were not 
consistently significant across the models. DEVOLUTION was predicted to be a 
positive influence on advocacy variables. This relationship existed but in most cases not 
with the intensity suspected. DUPLICA was rarely significant and this may not have 
been the best measure of the intended concept—interest in limiting duplication of efforts.
The connections between certain variables seemed to more consistent in terms of 
ADVOACT and VISITAD across models. It is interesting to see the emergence of both 
GRASSAD and TRACKAD in certain models where LOCALMON was also significant 
because LOCALMON was not significant in most models. The advocacy variables 
yield interesting results to see the connections with some of the funding variables. 
CONTRACT emerged as the most significant funding variable. But it is interesting that 
when ADVOACT was the dependent variable, and CONTRACT was included as the 
funding variable, none of the organizational or contextual variables were significant in 
the model. It is also interesting to note that program diversification (SEPPROGS) was
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significant in the ADVOACT models. This finding leads one to believe that more 
sophisticated or complex organizations participate in advocacy.
At this point, a summary o f the key dependent variables will help explain the 
significance of the study. When reviewing the analysis of the dependent variable 
CONTRACT, the race of the CEO is negative and significant. Board size and the 
number of full time staff are consistently positive and significant. The age o f the 
organization is negative and significant across the weighted models. VISIT AD, 
DEVOLUTION and STATECOLL are also positive and significant. Participation in 
state collaborations is also positive and significant. These findings are consistent with 
the primary hypothesis that the dependent variable contracting (CONTRCT) is affected 
by the organizational characteristics o f board and staff size, the contextual factor 
DEVOLUTION, advocacy behavior as measured by VISIT AD and alliance behavior as 
indicated by STATECOLL.
When reviewing the dependent variable FEDMON, organizational age 
(ORGAGE) is negative and significant. The contextual factor competition for resources 
is fierce (COMPFIERCE) is positive and significant. In terms of advocacy, ADVOACT 
and VISITAD are both positive and significant. Participation in state level 
collaborations as measured by STATECOLL is positive and significant. These findings 
are consistent with the hypothesis that federal funding is affected by advocacy and 
alliance behavior.
When reviewing the dependent variable STATEMON, the size o f the staff as 
measured by STAFFFULL is negative and significant. The national affiliation
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(NATIONAL) is negative and significant. Of contextual factors, DEVOLUTION is 
positive and significant. Of the advocacy behavior variables, TRACKAD and 
ADVOACT are positive and significant. Of the alliance behavior variables, 
STATECOLL is positive and significant, but NATCOLL is negative and significant. 
The measure of program diversity (SEPPROGS) is positive and significant. These 
findings are consistent with the hypothesis that state level funding is affected by the 
contextual factor DEVOLUTION, advocacy behavior and alliance behavior at the state 
level. In addition, organizational size as measured by the number o f  staff is not as 
significant as the diversity of programs.
When reviewing the dependent aggregated advocacy variable (ADVOACT), 
BOARDSIZE is positive and significant across most models. CONTRACT and 
STATEMON are all positive and significant. Participation in national level coalitions 
(NATCOLL) is positive and significant in all the weighted models. The measure of 
program diversity (SEPPROGS) is positive and significant across all the models. These 
findings are consistent with the hypothesis that advocacy is affected by funding, alliance 
behavior and program diversity.
The expectations for the study were met given the complexity of the model. In 
order to address effectively the original concepts identified in the literature review, a 
complex survey was developed. In an effort to match the concepts o f organizational 
behavior, advocacy behavior and alliance behavior with survey questions, the resulting 
data set was quite expansive. The goal was to devise a more elegant and streamlined 
method for testing the hypotheses. The survey generated a wealth of information that
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could be appropriately analyzed. The analysis that is reported in this dissertation reflects 
these efforts at streamlining the model.
The variables describing the organization were also reviewed in an effort to 
determine the most appropriate and significant variables to be included. The survey 
included information about full and part-time staff, contractors and volunteers but in the 
final model, only full time staff (STAFFFULL) w ere reported, even though some of the 
literature referred to the implications on the use o f volunteers. Volunteers were dropped 
from the model because o f inconsistent results and the belief that this variable did not 
add to the substance of the results.
The survey included a battery of questions regarding the mission of the 
organization and the response to environmental concerns. Given the overwhelming 
volume of variables generated from the survey, the first level task was deciphering 
which variables to include in the model and the analysis. After many iterations of 
analysis including a longer list o f variables describing the environment for non-profit 
organizations, several variables emerged as significant. Fortunately, these variables 
were consistent with the findings from the literature review which focused on 
privatization, devolution, and competition for resources. Therefore, these variables 
were included in the final model.
The efforts at limiting the size of the model also led to the elimination of other 
variables such as region o f the state, type of services provided, the training needs of the 
organization, and the organizational priorities for the next year. In addition, the 
classification of the types o f services provided by the organization was eliminated as
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not completely relevant. A series o f questions which generated information about the 
organization’s viability, external and internal threats and the mission of the organization 
were eliminated from the models in an effort to continue to pare down the number of 
variables included.
In an effort to determine only the essential variables to be included, each major 
component o f the basic model was reviewed: organizational characteristics, funding, 
advocacy behavior, alliance behavior and program diversity. As mentioned, the 
organizational characteristics were limited to those that most consistently emerged in 
the early iterations o f the analysis. The funding variables were reviewed in several 
different scenarios and combinations. The final variables were CONTRACT, the 
aggregate o f state, federal and local funding (STATEFEDLOC), and the new 
dichotomous variables created to indicate the existence of state (STATEMON), federal 
(FEDMON) and local money (LOCALMON). These variables were intended to best 
reflect the primary areas of the study and to help determine the impact o f  funding at 
different levels of government.
As originally conceptualized, the funding variables indicating percentage of 
funding when aggregated gave muddled results. The range of the values in the dis­
aggregated variables based on percentage of funding were not very illuminating. The 
new dichotomous variables seemed to work better. The variable CONTRACT emerged 
as an important means of conceptualizing the relationship of non-profits and 
government funding. The follow-up questions to contracting with particular 
departments were not as useful and were eliminated.
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The potential list o f advocacy variables was quite extensive and comprehensive 
for even.' conceivable type o f advocacy activity of a non-profit organization. The 
decision to include the aggregate variable (ADVOACT) and the aggregates for grass 
roots advocacy (GRASSAD), for visiting and meeting with elected officials (VISITAD) 
and for tracking legislation (TRACKAD) was intended to generate more useful results. 
The extensive preliminary analysis of the longer list of variables led to the emergence of 
these advocacy variables as representative for significance o f the types o f advocacy 
activities.
The interest group literature referred to was more directly on point with the 
discussion o f why a group joins another group. Given the complexity o f the questions 
and the number of variables included in this series, other options for discerning the 
information about interest group behavior and non-profits were evaluated. After much 
review of the options available, it was determined that a more generic approach to 
alliance behavior was appropriate for the analysis. The literature review introduced a 
broad range of topics, theories and constructs for interest group behavior. One of the 
concerns was that the analysis was not directly on point to the literature reviewed.
The intent was to translate interest group behavior into the model o f non-profit 
organizational behavior. One of the concerns was the attempt to introduce too many 
concepts into the analysis without sufficiently addressing the primary issues. For the 
purposes of the basic model and the analysis, the question about membership or 
affiliation with any associations, coalitions or collaborations was selected. This basic 
question had eight possible answers: neighborhood, local community, regional, state-
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wide, national, international, specific issue group and other. Each of these categories 
were coded as dichotomous variables. The variable (COALITION) was the aggregate 
of all these variables. After many iterations o f analyses, (COALITION), state 
collaboration (STATECOLL), national collaboration (NATCOLL), and issue 
collaboration (ISSUECOLL) were selected for the analysis.
In addition to specifying the alliance behavior with these variables, the reasons 
for joining alliances and coalitions were evaluated. One question addressed the reasons 
for non-profit organizations to join a coalition, association or collaboration. This 
question listed an array o f reasons for non-profits to join with other groups. These 
reasons were recoded into new variables (PURPOSIVE), (MATERIAL) and 
(SOLIDARY) to reflect the interest group literature reviewed. These new variables are 
close approximations to the concepts identified in the literature review.
The measure o f program diversification is not well specified. The question 
regarding how many separate programs, divisions or organizational units was selected 
as the measure o f  program complexity. This question best fit the concept o f program 
diversification, but a better measure probably could have been devised. As in the 
discussion of interest groups, there are some concerns about the specification o f the 
variables reflecting the true concepts of the model.
Conceptualization of the issues and the operationalization of the variables to be 
included in the model was cumbersome. The basic model that is tested in various forms 
in this analysis is representative of the best efforts at transforming a complex survey and 
a complex model into an understandable research project.
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The basic premise is that government funding affects non-profit organizational 
behavior. The results of the one hundred plus regression and logistic tables, 
substantiate this premise. In terms o f the specific research questions and hypotheses, 
the results are not as clear and convincing as one would like to report. Given the 
complexity of the model, this is not surprising. As reported with each series of models 
of the dependent variables, pieces o f the hypotheses are addressed. What is interesting 
and confusing and merits further analysis is the subtle changes within and across 
models of the sign and significance o f some variables.
Some of the concerns about the data and analysis are based on the limited sample 
size and the subsequent limitations on degrees of freedom in the analysis. By focusing 
on contracting as a threshold variable, a large number of cases were lost. Other nagging 
concerns are that some of the variables that were aggregated may not have sufficient 
internal consistency as measured by Cronbach’s A lpha.
This study is based on the research indicating that non-profit organizations are 
becoming more sophisticated, and professional and are diversifying their funding 
sources. The study is intended to indicate that the behavior o f non-profit organizations is 
affected by the organizational characteristics and contextual factors as well as by 
government funding. One o f the findings is that government funding affects the 
organizational behavior o f non-profit organizations. The behavior o f organizations is 
affected in three primary ways: in terms o f advocacy activities, alliance behavior and 
organizational complexity as measured by program diversification.
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CHAPTER 5. CASE STUDIES
This chapter summarizes the case studies evaluating the behavior of five non­
profit organizations which receive public funding. The results from the quantitative 
analysis provide one lens for review o f the hypotheses. By looking at five organizations 
from a more practical and qualitative perspective, one is able to enhance the findings o f 
the study.
Smith and Lipsky (1993) created a typology o f  non-profits which identified three 
types of non-profit service agencies which are most likely to be affected by contracting 
with government. Smith and Lipsky (1993) acknowledged the breadth o f the non-profit 
universe and chose to focus their discussion on the following types of organizations:
1) Traditional social service agency is the old line service associations which may have 
a hundred year history but have undergone some transformation in expanding their 
mission to meet changing community needs. Typically, these organizations have 
endowments and large boards of directors which are drawn from the political, 
economic, and community elite.
2) Non-profit social service agency was founded within the last twenty years in 
response to the availability o f government funding. Typically, these organizations 
were created to access government funding and do not have a lengthy history as a 
non-profit. These responsive agencies generally are governed by a small board and 
led by a professional executive director who may have close ties with the funding 
sources.
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3) The third type of agency is one founded in response to an unmet neighborhood or 
community need. These groups tend to be staffed by committed volunteers and 
those with a strong commitment to a particular issue or area (Smith and Lipsky, 
1993, 39).
These three types o f organizations form the continuum for Smith and Lipsky (1993) 
from the extremes of small community based volunteer organizations to those founded 
specifically to access government funds.
This study will follow the Smith and Lipsky (1993) typology given the basic 
interest in government funding. The study will attempt to demonstrate that non-profit 
organizations which receive funding from governmental sources are more likely to 
participate in advocacy activities.
This study intends to demonstrate the relationship between funding, advocacy, 
organizational complexity or program diversity and membership in state and national 
coalitions, associations and organizations. By examining the growing interest in 
government funding and organizational sustainability as motivating factors for non­
profit organizations to join associations, this study attempts to determine factors 
affecting non-profit organizational membership in single-issue coalitions, national, state 
and local coalitions as well as more broadly focused non-profit associations.
By demonstrating the impact o f important contextual issues that affect the sector 
and how these macro issues such as block grants and devolution have affected non-profit 
organizational behavior by promoting diversification of organizations and the increase in
140
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
government funding o f organizations, this segment of the study will contribute to the 
general understanding of the non-profit sector.
As previously mentioned, the study goes beyond the anecdotal normative studies 
that have been completed on subsector groups such as hospitals, day care, drug treatment 
programs (Gibelman and Demone, 1998; Fein, 1995; Herman, 1994; Knauft, Berger and 
Gray, 1991). Other state based analysis conducted regarded the economic impact of the 
non-profit sector (Rhode Island, Maryland, Michigan, Illinois, Utah) or other 
organizational issues such as training capacity, information needs on advocacy (North 
Carolina). Yet, no state based analysis has been conducted on the question of the 
relationships of funding, advocacy, and alliance activity. Therefore, this aspect of the 
study fills a gap in the literature and provides a foundation for further research.
The organizational typology suggested by Smith and Lipsky (1993) served as the 
selection criteria for the following organizations which are recommended for the case 
study.
1. Volunteers o f America o f Greater Baton Rouge has an eighty year history as a 
human service organization, but which has diversified into 20-30 different programs 
in response to funding and policy changes. This United Way Agency has changed 
dramatically over its lifespan and is now primarily funded by government sources.
2. Kingsley House in New Orleans was initially a settlement house in New Orleans and 
now offers an array of services. Kingsley House received funds through the state 
capital outlay budget for an addition and the staff is knowledgeable regarding policy 
implications.
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3. Community Support Programs in Shreveport, Louisiana was created in the last ten 
years in direct response to available government funding in the areas o f  health and 
human services.
4. Unity for the Homeless in New Orleans was created in an effort to coordinate the 
activities o f over 50 homeless and social service agencies in the greater New Orleans 
area.
5. Urban Restoration Enhancement Corporation in Baton Rouge is a community 
development and housing organization which is funded by government and 
community funds.
The case study questionnaire, which is included as Appendix B, tracks the issues 
identified in the model and the survey.
The concern about selection bias was mitigated by using the Smith and Lipsky 
typology as one criteria for selection o f cases. Secondly, “selecting observations for 
inclusion in a study according to the categories o f the key casual explanatory variable 
causes no inference problems. The reason is that our selection procedure does not 
predetermine the outcome of our study since we have not restricted the degree of 
possible variation in the dependent variable” (King, Keohane, Verba ,1994, 137). In 
order to conduct successful scientific inquiry, the systematic inference must be 
conducted according to valid procedures. The use o f qualitative case studies is a valid 
scientific approach, if care is taken regarding issues o f selection bias, understanding the 
distinction in cases and observations and appreciating the significance of the explanatory 
and dependent variables in the study.
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TYPE I. TRADITIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
1) The traditional social service agency is the old line service associations which may 
have a hundred year history but have undergone some transformation in expanding 
their mission to meet changing community needs. Typically, these organizations 
have endowments and large boards o f directors which are drawn from the political, 
economic, and community elite.
Organizational Summary: Volunteers of America o f Greater Baton Rouge
The President and CEO o f Volunteers of America o f Greater Baton Rouge 
(VOA), William Coffey, was interviewed on November 11, 1999. VOA is a national 
organization founded in 1896 to promote fundamental Christian beliefs and provide 
basic services to the poor. As a  national organization with affiliates, there are services 
available to local organizations from the national office. VOA began providing services 
in Baton Rouge, Louisiana in 1921. VOA of Greater Baton Rouge separately 
incorporated in 1984. The mission of VOA is to reach and uplift all people to bring 
them to the active knowledge o f  God.
The VOA accomplishes this mission by programming in four areas: services to 
the developmentally disabled, those with mental health issues, the homeless and abused 
children. VOA is organized around these four divisions, but operates sixty-seven 
distinct programs. VOA employs 362 full-time employees. While the basic mission of 
VOA has not changed over the years, its methods and service delivery priorities have 
changed. VOA has successfully diversified their programming in pursuit o f  funding and 
as a result o f governmental policy changes and as priorities and funding opportunities
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change. VOA is reevaluating its operation with an eye to getting back to the basics of 
the traditional mission in promoting Christian based services to help the indigent, and 
using community volunteers more effectively.
The twenty member VOA board and executive staff is completing a planning 
process which has brought to light their significant dependence on government funding. 
The VOA annual budget o f S8.5 million is 90% state, federal or local government funds. 
Even though the VOA is a United Way agency, a negligible portion of their budget is 
from this source. VOA has contracts with the Louisiana Department of Health and 
Hospitals, Department o f Social Services, Department of Correction and Department of 
Education. In addition, they have contracts with HUD and the city-parish.
VOA believes that receiving government funding does affect their organizational 
decision-making. They are more likely to be advocates for their clients and their agency 
as a result o f their reliance on government funding. One o f the concerns voiced by VOA 
is the increasing perception by policy makers that advocacy is self-serving for the 
organization because o f the dominance of funding. Policy makers do not respect the 
need to advocate for funding to continue services to the client groups.
In order to avoid this perception of advocacy for funding for the agency, VOA 
works through coalitions, associations and collaborations. VOA is a member of several 
professional organizations which are active in advocacy. VOA is member of the 
Louisiana Association o f Child Caring Agencies (LACCA), Coalition for Adult 
Rehabilitative Services Association (CARS A), the Louisiana Association of Non-profit 
Organizations (LANO), the Capital Area Homeless Coalition, the Human Services
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Consortium and the Baton Rouge Alliance for Transitional Living. VOA is also active 
at the national level through the corporate VOA public policy committee.
At the state level, VOA actively advocates for sustaining and additional funding 
by working closely with state agencies. The CEO is primarily responsible for advocacy 
activities, but occasionally the board members become involved. VOA has recently 
established a Board Public Policy Committee. Even though the board has not routinely 
engaged in advocacy, there is an increased interest in advocacy.
As mentioned earlier, VOA has joined many coalitions, collaborations and 
associations as a means to be involved in advocacy. VOA believes that there is strength 
in numbers and participation in these interest groups is in their best interest. VOA has 
had success impacting public policy through the rule-making and administrative process 
by working with organized provider groups and associations. The benefits o f working 
w ith other organizations is primarily in terms o f information, networking, the cross 
pollination o f ideas and the opportunities to impact public policy at the state level.
When considering participation in alliances, collaborations and associations, 
VOA considers the credibility and reputation of the group, the relevance o f the 
organizations to address a concern of VOA, the effectiveness o f the organization and the 
potential positive outcomes of participation. The benefits to VOA for participation are 
information, access, clout and credibility.
When considering how the political and programmatic environment has changed 
affecting VOA in the last ten years, the response was competition. More competition for 
government funds, private funds, and qualified staff. One of the most significant
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changes is the increased rigidity in state contracts for allowable services and the 
increased emphasis on accountability. In addition, the skepticism about the non-profit 
sector has increased. There seems to be an emerging perception that non-profits are 
becoming more self-serving than community serving. The community perception by 
funders is more negative and suspicious. Therefore, the reputable non-profit 
organizations are being negatively affected by a few reports of mismanagement in the 
sector.
In terms o f  challenges facing the non-profit sector, the constant need to search for 
and find money for programming seems to be the biggest threat. The programmatic 
mission of VOA has changed in order to seek and get additional funding. VOA is 
concerned that it order to remain viable, they will have to be responsive to funding 
opportunities. An operational concern is competition for qualified staff, recruitment and 
management. In terms o f policy, VOA is concerned about the implications resulting 
from welfare reform in terms of a potential increase in needs for services.
When considering the organizational changes in the next five years, VOA 
intends to do more housing development. In terms o f programmatic emphasis, VOA 
will focus more on promoting self-sufficiency and independence o f their client groups. 
From an organizational perspective, VOA realizes that they will have to continue to 
diversify services to seek funding. One of the long term considerations is reviewing how 
the “chase for money” fits into their mission. VOA is concerned about the on-going 
need to provide basic human services of food, shelter and clothing in an increasingly 
complex environment that values new and sophisticated programming.
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Organizational Summary: Kingsley House, New Orleans
C. Michael Moreau, Executive Director of Kingsley House was interviewed on 
September 14, 1999. Founded in 1896 to serve the Irish Channel neighborhood of New 
Orleans, Kingsley House is one of the oldest settlement houses in the country, and the 
oldest in the south. Kingsley House was incorporated in 1903. The mission o f Kingsley 
House is to increase the capacity of individuals of all ages, their families and 
communities to reach their full capacity and improve the quality of their lives.
Kingsley House provides services at the original program site, 1600 Constance 
Street in New Orleans and also in eight surrounding parishes. The original mission and 
focus for Kingsley House to serve a neighborhood has been maintained even as the 
demographics in the area have changed over the generations. Most of the programs are 
targeted to promoting self-sufficiency. Kingsley House provides services in child care, 
youth programs, job training, adult day care, recreation programs, case management and 
family preservation. The organization is organized around five program areas and has 
94 full time staff.
The thirty-four member board meets nearly monthly or about 10 times a year and 
provides policy oversight and direction, long range planning, and fiscal oversight. The 
board has been responsible for providing the vision and direction for the growth of the 
organization. The original mission from 1896 is “to make clear the way o f right living.” 
Kingsley House embodies the vision o f  the settlement house movement to live and work 
with the poor and develop solutions together. The Executive Director, Mike Moreau 
embodies the social work legacy of the program. When Kingsley House was founded,
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the neighborhood was populated by immigrants from Ireland, Italy and Germany. The 
original programs of child care, education and skill training are still maintained though 
in different forms. Over the last hundred years, the basic philosophy has not changed 
since Kingsley House has maintained an client asset based focus.
The program has diversified over the years to reflect the changing social 
conditions. At this time, the neighborhood has become predominantly African- 
American, yet the needs for child care and skill training remain to help people to become 
self-sufficient. Approximately 80% of the clients are African-American, 18% are white 
and smaller percentage are Asian and Hispanic. Kingsley House serves nearly 5000 
people per year: 1/3 from the neighborhood, 1/3 from New Orleans and 1/3 from the 
outlying parishes.
The Kingsley House annual budget is S3.2 million which is generated through 
18 different funding streams and contracts. As a United Way agency, Kingsley House 
receives 5500,000 or about 16% o f its budget from the United Way. Government 
sources and contracts from Department of Health and Hospitals, Elderly Affairs, 
Department o f Social Services and HUD account for 60% of the budget. Kingsley 
House has also successfully cultivated individual, foundation and corporate donors.
Over the last five years, the percentage of the Kingsley House budget from 
government funds has increased even as it attempts to diversify its funding base.
Kingsley House has diversified their funding in the last twenty years and are working to 
be less dependent on government funding. Kingsley House has made the conscious 
decision at the board level to strategically evaluate options for programming and funding
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and not to chase money. Receiving government funding affects their organizational 
decision-making because there is a constant tension between community needs and 
government funding. Kingsley House tries to keep a consumer driven focus.
Kingsley House is more likely to be involved with advocacy because of state and 
federal funding. Kingsley House works with the Louisiana Association of Non-profit 
Organizations, Agenda for Children and other local collaborations such as the St.
Thomas Irish Channel Consortium, the New Orleans Coalition for Family 
Empowerment and the Council of United Ways. Kingsley House is affiliated with the 
Child Welfare League of America which works to influence policy on the national level.
The executive staff of Kingsley House and some board members are involved in 
advocacy activities. They educate state and federal elected officials about their 
programs. Generally, they maintain good working relationships with the state agencies 
which they work and contract with. By working in alliances, associations and 
collaborations, Kingsley House benefits from sharing information and resources, 
avoiding duplication of services, maximizing resources and maintaining networking 
relationships. Kingsley House participates in alliances, collaborations and associations 
because it realizes the value from a practical standpoint as well as the increased 
expectation from funders which encourage collaboration.
Changes in state and national policy have also affected the operations of 
Kingsley House. Welfare reform and devolution have affected funding sources and 
demand for services. In addition, changes in local United Way policies have expanded 
opportunities for fundraising. The challenges facing the non-profit sector which
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Kingsley House sees directly are issues of working in an urban setting with an increasing 
polarization of the population. In addition to the stresses o f changes in service delivery, 
the pressures of government contracting and the limited resources, Kingsley House is 
aware of the need to meet its mission.
In the next five years, Kingsley House hopes to continue to grow its programs, 
renovate the physical plant, improve the use o f technology, maintain consumer driven 
programs and continue to be a force for positive change in the neighborhood. Kingsley 
House seems truly committed to maintaining its mission rather than diversifying in 
pursuit of funding. The Kingsley House promotional literature describes the 
organization:
Kingsley House prides itself on being community-based, family focused 
and person centered. Kingsley House is about people— what they can do, 
not what they cannot do. It is about building on the strengths of families 
and individuals rather than “treating” their weaknesses. It is about 
overcoming problems, exploring possibilities, setting goals, and finding 
practical ways to achieve those goals.
TYPE II. NEW FUNDING DRIVEN ORGANIZATIONS
2) Non-profit social service agency was founded within the last twenty years in response 
to the availability of government funding. Typically, these organizations were created 
to access government funding and do not have a history as a non-profit. These 
responsive agencies generally are governed by a small board and led by a professional. 
Organization Summary: Community Support Programs, Shreveport 
The executive director o f the Community Support Programs, Mrs. Margaret 
Gaffney Shemwell, MSW, was interviewed on September 18, 1999. Community 
Support Programs, Inc. (CSP) was created in March 1990 in response to a community
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need for new service providers. Mrs. Shemwell had previously served as a state 
Department o f Health and Hospitals employee and as a division director for Volunteers 
O f America of North Louisiana. CSP mission statement is:
Community Support Programs, Inc. exists to serve the client/family and to 
enhance each person’s opportunity to live successfully in the community. Through the 
provision of advocacy, direct service and indirect service, housing and coordination with 
other social service providers, Community Support Programs, Inc. offers unique and 
innovative programs.
CSP has grown from a budget of SI 70,000 in 1990 to SI.982 million in 1999. 
CSP operates fourteen distinct programs and has a staff o f nearly one hundred. CSP is 
directed by a ten member board of directors representing interested community 
members, family members and consumers of social services. The professional staff is 
very active in advocacy. The board meets quarterly and provides policy oversight and 
fiscal oversight. The board is not active in policy/advocacy related matters. The 
executive director has tremendous autonomy to lead the organization, identify new 
programmatic opportunities and to be involved in advocacy.
CSP was initially established to provide services to adults and children diagnosed 
with chronic mental illness and the early programs reflect this mission. Over the last ten 
years, CSP has diversified in search of funding and in order to better meet the 
community needs. A brief review of the programmatic development of the organization 
will demonstrate the growth pattern.
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In 1990, CSP contracted with the Department of Health and Hospitals, Office of 
Mental Health (OMH) to establish Crossroads, a forty-five day shelter for homeless 
mentally ill adults. In addition, a 24-hour crisis line was established. Then CSP added 
another contract with OMH to provide Crisis Management and security for mental health 
programs by working with off-duty police. In 1991-1996, CSP contracted with DHH for 
Medicaid Case Management services. CSP currently maintains a contract with OMH for 
case management for mentally ill clients.
In 1991, Project Life started as a housing and services support program for 
mentally ill people discharged from state institutions. In 1992, TRANSITIONS, a 
transitional housing and services program funded by HUD was started. In 1993-1995, 
CSP expanded to provide Mental Health Rehabilitation Services. In 1993, OMH 
contracted with CSP to develop permanent housing opportunities for the mentally ill. In 
1996, Project REACH (Recovery, Empowerment, Affirmation, Challenge and Hope) 
was funded by HUD to operate as a housing and services program serving mentally ill 
and substance abusing homeless people.
Until 1996, CSP exclusively served persons diagnosed with severe and persistent 
mental illness. At that time, CSP decided to diversify in terms o f programs, clientele and 
funding in the belief that a holistic community approach would be more appropriate for 
the organization. In 1996, CSP received a contract from the Department of Social 
Services, Office of Community Services to establish the PORTALS program, a resource 
center for foster and adoptive parents. Project EMPOWER was established in 1996 and 
funded by the Governor’s Office of Urban Affairs to service the citizens in state House
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of Representatives district 4. In addition. CSP has started the Victim Information 
Notification Everyday (VINE) System and the Jail Access Information Line (JAIL) in 
conjunction with Caddo Parish law enforcement agencies to provide notification of court 
dates to attorneys, law enforcement agencies and victims.
CSP also operates an Employee Assistance Program (EAP). In 1997, CSP added 
the BRIDGES program to work with the unserved chronically mentally ill. The 
PORTICO Family Resource Center was funded by OCS and the Families in Need of 
Services (FINS) Program to provide services to families. HEARTHSTONE is a 
housing program for lowr income families similar to Habitat for Humanity in that 
participants are required to participate with sweat equity. CSP is committed to 
diversifying its program and funding base. CSP is a certified Community Housing 
Development Organization (CHDO) and develops housing and services.
Once again, it is important to note that CSP has grown from a budget of
SI70,000 in 1990 to SI.982 million in 1999. CSP operates fourteen distinct programs 
and has a staff o f nearly one hundred. CSP is primarily funded through government 
contracts and self-generated funds from fees: 35% of the budget is from HUD, 18% is 
from the Office o f Community Services, 25% is from the Office of Mental Health, 9% is 
from the City o f Shreveport, 7% is from Office of Urban Affairs, 6% is from fees and 
less that 1% is from donations or other citizen support. Over 90% of CSP budget is from 
government sources.
The staff leadership o f CSP has been very involved with advocacy at the 
department and legislative levels. The staff is very active in Baton Rouge working with
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department officials to maintain existing funding and identify new sources. The receipt 
of government funding is directly related to the advocacy behavior o f the staff. It is 
primarily the director who is involved in advocacy activities at the state and local level. 
The board is involved as necessary in approving resolutions for contracts and signing 
correspondence advocating a position.
CSP is involved in several coalitions, collaborations and associations. The 
director served on the board of the Shreveport-Bossier Service Connection. CSP is a 
member of the Shreveport Chamber o f Commerce, the Better Business Bureau, the 
Louisiana Association of Non-profit Organizations, the Louisiana Community Housing 
Development Organizations Association, the Louisiana Mental Health Alliance. The 
primary reasons for participating in alliances is to gain information and access. CSP 
participates in associations with groups which have similar missions. CSP believes that 
there is strength in numbers and they want to be on the cutting edge o f information. The 
benefits of participating in alliance activities are the networking, problem solving, access 
to information regarding new services and funding, and relationships. The factors 
affecting participation are the reputation o f the organization and the perceived benefits to 
the organization.
The director of CSP acknowledged that the environment has changed in the last 
ten years. CSP was created in response to available government funding. Competition 
for funding has increased, as has accountability from government regulators. The 
continuation o f contracts is no longer readily anticipated due to increased competition. 
Concern about devolution has caused some organizations to become more sophisticated
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to compete for funding. In terms of challenges facing the non-profit sector, the director 
demonstrated concern about cutbacks in government funding. There is an increased 
need to be more entrepreneurial and innovative in program development and funding. 
There is an increased need to diversify funding or further diversify programs to retain 
funding base.
In the next five years, CSP plans to continue to expand its scope and mission to 
provide services for individuals and families. CSP has been very successful in 
developing programs in response to community and government funding needs. CSP 
will probably expand to provide services throughout north Louisiana. CSP hopes to 
continue to train its staff and consider other fees for service enterprises such as property 
management and other services. In addition, CSP may evaluate the its at housing 
development and focus more energy on skill development in this area.
Organization Summary: UNITY for the Homeless (UNITY), New Orleans
Ms. Margaret ‘Teg” Reese, Executive Director of UNITY was interviewed on 
September 29, 1999. UNITY was incorporated as a 501(c)(3) non-profit organization in 
1992. The mission o f UNITY for the Homeless is to increase the community’s 
organized capacity to resolve the issues of homelessness through open, inclusive and 
coordinated decision-making, collaborative efforts and funding. Its goals are to assist 
homeless persons to become self-sufficient and regain self-esteem, to engage in planning 
and policy evaluation efforts to maximize the use of existing resources, to allow for a 
systemic approach for tapping significant new funds and encouraging collaborative 
efforts, and to advocate for policy changes affecting homelessness.
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UNITY was founded with the intention of coordinating services for the homeless 
in New Orleans. One of the key components to the successful implementation of 
UNITY was the acquisition of federal funds. UNITY is a relatively new organization 
with a board of community leaders, funders, and service providers. UNITY is not a 
United Way agency. UNITY has a 16 member board of directors which meets monthly. 
UNITY serves as a conduit for federal funds and serves a coordinating role for 
community service providers. UNITY has developed a sophisticated continuum of care 
model which has been replicated across the country. UNITY provides no direct services 
to homeless clients; it serves the 70 non-profit organizations which are part o f  the 
continuum of care. These services include identifying funding sources, preparing grant 
applications, providing technical assistance and training, monitoring and evaluating the 
organizations, training for direct and management staff; and planning for new and 
enhanced services. UNITY has 8.5 full-time staff people to accomplish these functions. 
The board’s role is to provide policy direction, oversight, community relations, 
fundraising and advocacy. The board delegates the management o f the organization to 
the Executive Director. The board is involved in some external public policy and 
community awareness activities.
In 1992 when UNITY was formed as the result of a lengthy and complex public 
planning process, eleven strategic directions were articulated. The strategic directives 
are as follows: Provide outreach for persons experiencing homelessness; secure 
increased financial support for homeless concerns; link supportive services to shelter and 
housing; increase employment, training and job development activities; build a system
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of services with multiple points o f entry; establish UNITY for the Homeless to provide 
on-going leadership and coordination; nurture strong, capable and stable programs; focus 
existing facilities and programs to match the needs of the population; develop longer 
term transitional programs; provide a range of affordable permanent housing options; 
focus efforts on prevention, advocacy and community awareness.
As o f 1999, nine of these strategic objectives have been completed. The UNITY 
board is considering another strategic planning process to identify the appropriate next 
steps for the organization. In the last seven years, UNITY has been phenomenally 
successful in creating a city-wide system of care that has received many national awards. 
The mission o f UNITY may be changing to focus more on the development of 
transitional and permanent housing to meet the needs o f the homeless people moving 
through the system.
UNITY is funded through the 5% administrative portion of the HUD grants 
received for the service providers continuum. In addition, UNITY receives other funds 
from the city, HUD, the Veteran’s Administration and other sources. UNITY began the 
planning process in 1992 with eight corporate and foundation partners who each pledged
S25,000 for three years to develop and implement the plan. UNITY has evolved into a 
multi-million dollar organization which serves as a funnel for federal funds for local 
service providers. UNITY is the applicant to HUD and then re-grants to the participating 
agencies. UNITY is then responsible for the monitoring and evaluation of the projects.
Since UNITY is almost completely funded by government funds, UNITY is very 
aware of the regulations affecting homelessness and concerned about maintaining
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funding. In seven years, UNITY has received nearly S3 5 million dollars for homeless 
services in New Orleans. In 1999, the budget for UNITY is nearly S6.2 million dollars 
o f which S5.7 million is passed to sub-grantees. Even though UNITY is nearly 100% 
funded by federal funds, UNITY is involved with advocacy policies for improving the 
homelessness and policies which will benefit the service providers. UNITY has 
provided advocacy training for its continuum of care partnering organizations and is 
encouraging advocacy activities. UNITY is involved in advocacy at the local, state and 
national levels. The UNITY staff, board and community supporters are involved in 
advocacy. UNITY is seeking additional federal funding for a new project and has 
launched a letter campaign to Louisiana Senators Breaux and Landrieu.
UNITY is well aware of the need to have relationships with providers, public 
officials and the public. UNITY participates in many collaborations and associations 
including: the National Alliance to End Homelessness, the Louisiana Association of 
Non-profit Organizations (LANO), the HUD/HHS Collaboration, the New Orleans 
Substance Abuse Coalition, and the Children’s Services Collaborative. The reasons that 
the UNITY director participates in these alliances is to network with other providers, 
gain information and insights on trends and issues, promote collaboration, and encourage 
opportunities to work together. UNITY evaluates the efficacy o f working in alliances 
based on the credibility of the other partners, the nature o f the collaboration and the 
opportunities for UNITY. The core benefits are sharing resources, creating relationships 
and linkages, community credibility, funding and public support.
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UNITY is very mindful of the need to be aware and involved with changes in 
public policy since most o f their funding is from federal sources. The contextual factors 
which have affected UNITY are the changes in policy in Washington in the last ten years 
promoting a continuum o f care and model the coordination of service provision. UNITY 
was formed as a result of these policy initiatives and actively tries to stay one step ahead 
of the funding sources. UNITY is very aware o f its need to adjust to the government’s 
plans to deal with homelessness. This desire to be aware and responsive is what is 
driving the board to consider focusing time and resources on the development of 
permanent housing.
UNITY sees the challenges facing non-profits as the need to be able to do more 
with less and foresees the trend to encourage mergers and acquisitions in the non-profit 
sector in order to be responsive to community needs and respond to reduced funding.
The new emphasis on effectiveness, efficiency and quality is forcing non-profits to 
professionalize and reevaluate their methods of doing business. Non-profits need to 
leam from the private sector and determine what mergers may look like in the non-profit 
sector. Non-profits need to leam how to respond more adroitly to policy and funding 
changes, while being true to their core missions. More external factors are affecting non­
profits, which need to leam how to develop operating principles that will maintain their 
missions.
As UNITY looks to the next five years, the need for stable funding will remain a 
priority. In addition, UNITY will continue to look for and identify new funding and 
programmatic opportunities particularly in the area of housing development for special
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populations and families. UNITY may also consider spinning off or creating
subsidiaries for new funding for services and housing. UNITY will continue to strive to
be more sophisticated and more businesslike in its operations. UNITY will focus more
on advocacy and policy work. In terms of internal issues, UNITY must prepare for staff
transitions at the executive level. UNITY wants to be entrepreneurial and consider
developing new business and funding opportunities.
UNITY’S success is due to the vision and dedication of the original planning
committee which invested in the development o f  a new model for service delivery. The
competent staff and board have provided the leadership to make UNITY a national
model for service delivery planning and implementation. UNITY combines an
entrepreneurial spirit with federal funding and bureaucratic limitations.
TYPE 131. COMMUNITY BASED
3) The third type o f agency is one founded in response to an unmet neighborhood or
community need. These groups tend to be staffed by committed volunteers
and those with a strong commitment to a particular issue or area (1993, 39).
Organization Summary': Urban Restoration Enhancement Corporation (UREC), 
Baton Rouge
Ms. Ronnie Edwards, Executive Director o f UREC was interviewed on October 
13, 1999 in Baton Rouge. UREC was founded in 1992 to serve the needs of citizens in a 
particular neighborhood in East Baton Rouge Parish. UREC was created to serve as a 
community development corporation to provide affordable housing, education and 
training and economic and social development to help individuals improve their lives.
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The organization fulfills this mission through direct service, partnerships, collaborations, 
technical assistance and capacity building activities. The programs include a  Security 
Dads program, first time home buyers training, Saturday academy, summer youth 
programs, the development of affordable housing and other program development 
activities. UREC operates nine programs with 7 full-time employees and 3 Vista 
volunteers. It has developed high community visibility and has the support o f  key local 
legislators, particularly in the African American community.
The board of UREC is made up o f twelve community leaders who bring 
expertise in business, management and development to the organization. The board is 
primarily involved in governance and policy. The Executive Director would like to 
engage the board more in fundraising. The board meets quarterly and has two active 
committees: finance/executive and personnel/programs. The board provides the 
guidance as UREC continues to identify new opportunities.
UREC began as a community based initiative to make mini-grants in the 
community. UREC now focuses on projects and housing. The Urban Meadows housing 
project shifted the focus of the organization to serve as a property owner and manager. 
UREC is a certified housing development organization (CHDO) and is working with 
HUD and the city to develop affordable housing. The UREC budget is approximately 
S500,000. Nearly 75% of their funding comes from state, federal and local government 
sources. Approximately, 20% is in self-generated fees from the Urban Meadows 
housing project and the remaining 5% is from foundations, corporations and other
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earned income. The principal source of state funds is from the Governor’s Office of 
Urban .Affairs.
The organization relies on government funding and is involved in advocacy to 
retain those funds. For the types of programs provided by UREC. the local, state and 
federal government are good sources for funding. UREC seeks funding to further its 
mission. Sometimes, money drives the mission. However, government funding has 
strict accountability expectations and compliance monitoring. UREC is committed to 
excellent and accountable services.
In addition to advocacy for funding, UREC is also interested in advocacy 
because of their community development mission and in efforts to provide services for 
their clients. UREC staff and board members have been active in advocacy, have 
testified before legislative hearings regarding policy matters and funding opportunities to 
help stabilize the organization. UREC is sophisticated in terms o f advocacy since one of 
its founders is state representative Sharon Weston-Broome.
In addition to advocacy, UREC sees the benefit of participating in coalitions, 
collaborations and associations. UREC is a member of the Volunteer Baton Rouge! 
Non-profit Resource Center, the Louisiana Association of Non-profit Organizations, 
(LANO), the Plank Road Merchants Association, the Chamber o f Commerce in two 
parishes, the Louisiana Association of Community Economic Development (LACED) 
and several national groups such as the National Congress on Community Economic 
Development, the National Center for Non-profit Boards and the Alliance for the 
Homeless. Many UREC board members also serve on other boards. UREC sees the
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value of collaborations to work with organizations with similar missions, to attain 
strength in numbers, to be on the cutting edge o f the industry, to participate in services 
and training, networking with other CDC’s and other non-profits to receive access to 
information and funding. UREC evaluates collaborations on the basis of the credibility 
of the organizations, their commitment to excellence and the determination that the fees 
are reasonable for the benefits received.
UREC is an exemplary organization that is well managed by both staff and 
board. UREC is a model for a community-based CDC that has been successful and 
effective in identifying opportunities for programming and funding. When asked how 
the environment has changed in the last ten years, the director expressed an increase in 
appreciation of accountability from funders, government, boards and volunteers. UREC 
is concerned about being competitive locally and nationally for funding.
UREC appreciates the challenges facing the non-profit sector and understands 
the need to be more entrepreneurial, more innovative in generating earned income and 
responsible for diversifying income streams. The organization is also mindful of the 
need to follow business trends and evaluate opportunities for collaborations and mergers 
with other organizations to share administrative and overhead charges.
UREC is fairly sophisticated in their planning for the future and is considering 
more specialized structured divisions that may actually spin-off, and is interested in 
building an umbrella organization which might help to start up a for-profit business. 
UREC is committed to building its staff and board by strengthening its organizational 
infrastructure. The organization also wants to expand the board to include residents and
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engage those served in advocacy and planning. UREC has high expectations for 
professional development and is seeking Certified Development Financial Institution 
(CDFI) status from the U.S. Department of the Treasury and state CHDO certification.
SUMMARY OF CASE STUDIES 
The case studies provided additional insight and information into the operations 
of five organizations. This information is helpful and confirms the general premise of 
the study that funding affects organizational behavior. The findings from the case 
studies link to the findings from the empirical study. When reviewing the case studies, 
the same variables emerge in terms of organizational characteristics, contextual factors, 
funding sources, participation in collaborations, alliances and program diversification.
The case studies were completed following a survey that addressed the issues 
represented by the empirical findings from the survey. The organizations interviewed 
represent some of the same inconsistencies as reported in the data. The sizes of the 
boards o f these organizations range from under ten to nearly forty. The staff size ranges 
from under ten to nearly four hundred. In addition, new organizations with less than ten 
years of experience and older organizations with over hundred years of experience are 
evaluated. Every effort was made in the selection of organizations to represent the 
organizations in the sample, as well as to follow the typology of Smith and Lipsky.
The similarities between the organizations is encouraging because many o f the 
same issues emerge such as concern about devolution, duplication of services and 
competition for resources. All the organizations mentioned that external factors affected 
their decision-making in different ways. Government policy changes have a greater
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effect on those organizations which rely on government funding. The organizations 
were generally knowledgeable about public policy and concerned about the issues that 
affected their organizations and their clients.
Public funding is a critical issue addressed in the case studies. The Community 
Support Program was created in response to the availability of public funds; it is 
particularly concerned with competition for resources and is very aggressive in seeking 
government funding. In addition, UNITY was created to seek government funds and its 
success has helped sustain other non-profit organizations which it supports as a pass 
through agency for federal funds. Even though VOA and Kingsley House are United 
Way agencies, they rely on government funding for the majority of their budgets as well. 
Each of the organizations rely on government funds for a significant portion o f their 
revenue and demonstrated the organizational behavior predicted by the model.
The organizations are involved with advocacy activities at the state and national 
level. UNITY and Kingsley House state that advocacy played an important part in fund 
development. These organizations are active at the national and state level. VOA and 
Community Support Programs are both active at the state level in following legislation 
and meeting with legislators. VOA is working through its national office on advocacy 
issues at the national level. UREC is the only community based organization in the case 
studies and it is more likely to receive local and state funds and to be involved with grass 
roots advocacy.
These case studies support the hypotheses that funding affects organizational 
behavior. All of the organizations included in the case studies, accept government funds,
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participate in advocacy and alliance behavior and have diversified programs. When 
evaluating the organizational behavior of these five organizations, each reported that 
advocacy was an important function, since they received government funding. These 
anecdotal accounts support the hypothesis that funding is a determining factor in 
organizational behavior.
In addition, UNITY, the Community Support Programs, and Urban Restoration 
Enhancement Corporation and Volunteers of America specifically addressed the concern 
that funding encouraged them to diversify their programs. The director at Kingsley 
House stated that the board made the conscious decision not to add new programs in 
pursuit of funding, but he acknowledged the tension regarding sustaining the 
organization’s mission and the need to identify new funding sources.
All the organizations are involved with alliance activities. Most are active at the 
local and state level, but UNITY and Kingsley House are members o f national groups as 
well. The reasons listed for participation in alliances, coalitions and associations are 
consistent with the literature review. These groups are active in alliance activities to stay 
informed about public policy, to seek funding and to network with other organizations. 
Alliance activities are important for the staff to stay connected with other organizations 
providing similar services and informed about public policy and services. Some of the 
same variations are seen in the case studies with the different organizations involved at 
the state, national and local levels in coalitions, alliances and associations.
The findings in the case studies support the research design and findings in the 
empirical analysis. The consistent discussion of the need to collaboration and participate
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in associations and alliances is directly related to the theory and the study results. The 
discussion of the organizational characteristics and contextual factors in the case studies 
are also consistent with the study results. Several organizations specifically mentioned 
devolution and other policies affecting their decision making.
The case studies enhance the findings from the empirical analysis and lend 
credence to the theory and hypotheses developed in the study. The organizations 
reviewed in the case studies shed new light on the diversity of organizational behavior 
and the factors which affect advocacy, alliance behavior and program diversification.
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS
The study o f non-profit organizations and their relationship with government will 
continue to be an important topic for political scientists to address in the decades to 
come. As the fundamental debate about the role of government continues, the pressure 
to provide essential services through alternative means will escalate. The debate about 
privatization and the increased tension and competition between the three sectors— 
government, non-profit and for-profit—will affect the political conversation and the 
service delivery dynamic.
This dissertation only begins to address the complexity o f the three sector 
relationship in service delivery. This research focused solely on the interdependence of 
non-profits and government. The literature review set the scene for the analytical 
discussion of the impact o f government funding on organizational behavior. The 
enhanced interest in nongovernmental service delivery can be an opportunity for the 
non-profit sector. However, the competition with for-profit entities may continue to 
drive changes in the sector.
Peter Goldberg suggests that the increased reliance on government funds may be 
transforming some non-profit organizations into quasi-govemmental entities who do not 
have the same ethos as traditional community based and community funded non-profit 
organizations. He also suggests that the reliance on government funding is weakening 
the bonds between the non-profit service sector and the foundation community. As large 
social service agencies rely less on foundation funds for their operating budgets and 
more on government, the linkages within the non-profit sector are threatened.
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At the same time as national non-profit infrastructure groups, such as the 
INDEPENDENT SECTOR, are working to create a unified identity, that they may in 
fact be segmenting themselves on the basis of funding sources and service strategies.
The small community based organizations that rely on a traditional model for 
community philanthropy and the large national non-profit organizations providing health 
and hospital care or prison services may not have much in common, other than a 
common tax status.
In the last few years, much has been written about defining the non-profit sector. 
Although a common definition and identity for the sector is desired, funding sources and 
the changing expectations of the public seem to be demanding at the same time that non­
profits become more “like business”—accountable, professional, and run by the bottom 
line. One of the concerns voiced by Salamon, Weisbrod and others is that as non-profits 
become more like business or government, they are less like the ideal of non-profits as a 
venue for connecting citizens and building a civil society.
Determining the common elements of the non-profit sector is challenging as the 
demands on the sector for increased services take precedence over the traditional myth of 
community volunteers responding to a local need. The current debate about the blurring 
of the lines between the government, profit and non-profit sectors has called into 
question the very nature of some non-profit organizations.
In Pennsylvania and other states, state legislatures are revisiting the definitions of 
non-profit organizations in an effort to determine which organizations are eligible for tax 
exemptions and other perks. These distinctions are being made based on services
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provided, funding sources and community accountability. The emphasis on the 
traditional model o f a non-profit as a “public charity” is re-enforcing the notion that there 
are “good” non-profits which are community based and “sham” non-profits which are 
only created to shield for-profit enterprises and quasi-govemmental entities created as 
“agents o f the state.”
In Louisiana, the Bureau o f Governmental Research, a New Orleans based non­
profit “good government” organization, has completed a series o f research projects on 
non-profit organizations in Orleans Parish to determine the number of non-profit 
property owners in the parish and the implications for forgone property taxes on funding 
of services in the city. The Bureau o f  Governmental Research has done extensive 
analysis comparing the Louisiana Non-profit Code, the Louisiana Constitution and the 
IRS regulations to parse just what types o f  organizations should be eligible to receive 
property tax exemptions.
The Bureau o f Governmental Research reports are the first efforts at segmenting 
the non-profit sector in Louisiana. This national trend of determining the “good non­
profit” organizations which deserve to retain the benefits o f  the IRS regulations and the 
exemptions from property taxes does not bode well for efforts at promoting and unifying 
the non-profit sector.
A national debate seems to be emerging about the value o f non-profit 
organizations and their distinctive role in our society as a means o f service delivery and 
as a means o f connecting citizens and community. Salamon, Weisbrod, Powell,
Clemens and others suggest that the non-profit sector provides a critical linkage between
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the public and private sectors as a venue for promoting public good and the development 
of civil society. However, there is a more pessimistic view that non-profit organizations 
are being used to supplant the traditional role of government in service delivery for 
essential community services, welfare, health care, transportation, job training and other 
services.
The government has been accused o f “dumping” its responsibilities onto contract 
agencies to provide public services without sufficient resources or public accountability. 
The emphasis on contracting out of services by government is creating a new dynamic of 
competition between the traditional non-profit service providers and for-profit service 
providers that are responding to new market/service opportunities. Historically, the role 
of government, the market and the non-profit sector were clearer. The blurring o f the 
lines between the sectors and the changing expectations about state responsibility for 
service delivery may have dramatic implications for the non-profit sector.
Government funding is transforming some non-profit organizations into “agents 
of the state” and not community service providers who are advocates for their clients. 
Some are concerned that the total reliance o f some organizations on government funding 
may be changing the organizational behavior of the organizations and affecting the 
nature of the non-profit sector.
This research evaluated the effect o f government funding on non-profit 
organizational behavior. The basic premise was that non-profits that contract or receive 
government funds are more inclined to participate in advocacy and alliance behavior.
This study is based on a data set generated by a mail survey in 1997 and five case studies
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completed in 1999. The quantitative analysis evaluated the relationships between 
organizational characteristics, contextual factors, funding, alliance behavior, advocacy 
behavior and program diversification.
The Gray and Lowery theory o f interest group behavior is sufficiently complex 
to merit the complete attention o f a dissertation to develop the theory and hypotheses 
directly responsive to this literature. By attempting to satisfy the broad expectations of 
the interest group literature and the narrow interests of Gray and Lowery, the study was 
able to sketch the outline of additional issues to be addressed regarding the connections 
between alliance and advocacy behavior. The specification of the questions and data for 
review of the interest group and alliance behavior could be more effectively addressed in 
a follow-up study.
In order to address effectively the original concepts identified in the literature 
review, a complex survey was developed. In an effort to match the concepts of 
organizational behavior, advocacy behavior and alliance behavior with survey 
questions, the resulting data set was quite expansive. The goal was to devise a more 
elegant and streamlined method for testing the hypotheses. The survey generated a 
wealth of information that could be appropriately analyzed. The analysis that is 
reported reflects these efforts at streamlining the model. The variables describing the 
organization were also reviewed in an effort to determine the most appropriate and 
significant variables to be included in the model. The survey included information 
about full and part-time staff, contractors and volunteers. In the final model, only full
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time staff were reported, even though some of the literature referred to the implications 
on the use of volunteers.
The survey included a battery of questions regarding the mission of the 
organization and the response to environmental concerns. Given the overwhelming 
volume of variables generated from the survey, the first level task was deciphering 
which variables to include in the model and the analysis. After many iterations of 
analysis including a longer list of variables describing the environment for non-profit 
organizations, several variables emerged as significant. Fortunately, these variables 
were consistent with the findings from the literature review which focused on 
privatization, devolution, and competition for resources. Therefore, these variables 
were included in the final model.
The efforts at limiting the size of the model also led to the elimination o f other 
variables such as region o f the state, type o f services provided, the training needs of the 
organization, and the organizational priorities for the next year. In addition, the 
classification of the types of services provided by the organization was eliminated as 
not completely relevant. A series of questions which generated information about the 
organization’s viability, external and internal threats and the mission of the organization 
were eliminated from the models in an effort to continue to pare down the number of 
variables included.
In an effort to determine only the essential variables to be included, each major 
component o f the basic model was reviewed: organizational characteristics, funding, 
advocacy behavior, alliance behavior and program diversity. As mentioned, the
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organizational characteristics were limited to those that most consistently emerged in 
the early iterations o f the analysis. The funding variables were reviewed in several 
different scenarios and combinations. The final variables were contract, the aggregate 
o f state, federal and local funding, and the new dichotomous variables created to 
indicate the existence o f state, federal and local money. These variables were intended 
to reflect best the primary areas of the study and to help determine the impact of 
funding at different levels of government.
As originally conceptualized, the funding variables indicating percentage of 
funding when aggregated gave muddled results. The range of the values in the dis­
aggregated variables based on percentage o f funding were not very illuminating. The 
new dichotomous variables seemed to work better. The variable CONTRACT emerged 
as an important means of conceptualizing the relationship o f non-profits and 
government funding. The follow-up questions to contracting with particular 
departments were not as useful and were eliminated.
The potential list of advocacy variables was quite extensive and comprehensive 
for every conceivable type of advocacy activity o f  a non-profit organization. The 
decision to include only the aggregate variable (ADVOACT) and the aggregates for 
grass roots advocacy, for visiting and meeting with elected officials and for tracking 
legislation was intended to generate more useful results. The extensive preliminary 
analysis o f the longer list of variables led to the emergence o f these advocacy variables 
as representative for significance o f  the types o f  advocacy activities.
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The conceptualization o f the interest group literature on the alliance behavior of 
non-profit organizations caused the most concern in completing the study. The survey 
included questions specifically about joining the Louisiana Association of Non-profit 
Organizations. These questions may have been more appropriate for a basic interest 
group analysis, by asking if the respondent would join the association, which reasons 
were the most important for joining and the helpfulness of the services for the 
association.
The interest group literature referred to was more directly on point with the 
discussion of why a group joins another group. Given the complexity o f the questions 
and the number of variables included in this series, other options for discerning the 
information about interest group behavior and non-profits were evaluated. After much 
review of the options available, it was determined that a more generic approach to 
alliance behavior was appropriate for the analysis. The literature review introduced a 
broad range of topics, theories and constructs for interest group behavior.
The intent was to translate the expectations about interest group behavior into the 
model of non-profit organizational behavior. One of the concerns was the attempt to 
introduce too many concepts into the analysis and to not sufficiently address any of the 
primary issues. For the purposes o f the basic model and the analysis, the question about 
membership or affiliation with any associations, coalitions or collaborations was 
selected.
In addition to specifying the alliance behavior with these variables, the reasons 
for joining alliances and coalitions were evaluated. One question addressed the reasons
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for non-profit organizations to join a coalition, association or collaboration. This 
question listed an array of reasons for non-profits to join with other groups. These 
reasons were recoded into new variables PURPOSIVE, MATERIAL and SOLIDARY 
to reflect the interest group literature reviewed. These new variables are close 
approximations to the concepts identified in the literature review.
The measure o f program diversification was specified in the question regarding 
the number of separate programs, divisions or organizational units operated by the 
organization. This question best fit the concept of program diversification, but a better 
measure probably could have been devised. As in the discussion of interest groups, 
there are some concerns about the specification of the variables reflecting the true 
concepts of the model.
Conceptualization of the issues and the operationalization of the variables to be 
included in the model were cumbersome. The basic model that was tested in various 
forms in this analysis is representative of the best efforts at transforming a complex 
survey and a complex model into an understandable research project.
The findings from the quantitative analysis in Chapter 4 addressed the model, the 
analysis and the concerns regarding the data. The findings are not as succinct and clear 
as desired. The analysis generally supports the hypotheses that the government funding 
affects non-profit organizational is need for further analysis on some of the remaining 
issues such as the relationships between advocacy and alliance behavior as demonstrated 
by the different signs o f the coefficients on the alliance variables in the same model.
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However, given the limitations, the findings o f this study are of interest to the basic 
discussion of non-profit organizational behavior.
The findings were generally encouraging that the theory developed as a result o f 
the literature review was reasonable. When reviewing the analysis o f the dependent 
variable CONTRACT, the race of the CEO is consistently negative and significant. 
Board size and the number o f full time staff are consistently positive and significant.
The age of the organization is negative and significant. The variables meeting with 
elected officials (VISIT AD), the importance o f devolution (DEVOLUTION) and state 
alliance behavior (STATECOLL) are also positive and significant. These findings are 
consistent with the primary hypothesis that the dependent variable contracting is affected 
by the organizational characteristics o f board and staff size, the contextual factor 
(DEVOLUTION), advocacy behavior as measured by (VISITAD) and alliance behavior 
as indicated by (STATECOLL).
When reviewing the dependent variable for federal money (FEDMON), 
organizational age (ORGAGE) is negative and significant. The contextual factor 
competition for resources is fierce (COMPFIERCE) is positive and significant across all 
the models. In terms of advocacy, the aggregate measure (ADVOACT) and meeting 
with elected officials (VISITAD) are both positive and significant. Participation in state 
level collaborations as measured (STATECOLL) is positive and significant. These 
findings are consistent with the hypothesis that federal funding is affected by advocacy 
and alliance behavior.
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When reviewing the dependent variable state money (STATEMON), the size of 
the staff (STAFFFULL) is negative and significant. National affiliation (NATIONAL) 
is negative and significant. O f the contextual factors, DEVOLUTION is positive and 
significant across all models. O f the advocacy behavior variables, tracking legislation 
(TRACKAD) and the aggregate advocacy variable (ADVOACT) are positive and 
significant. Of the alliance behavior variables, (STATECOLL) is positive and 
significant and national alliance behavior (NATCOLL) is negative and significant. The 
measure of program diversity (SEPPROGS) is positive and significant.
These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that state level funding is 
affected by the contextual factor DEVOLUTION, advocacy behavior and alliance 
behavior at the state level. In addition, organizational size as measured by the number of 
staff is not as significant as the diversity of programs.
When reviewing the dependent variable, the aggregated advocacy variable 
(ADVOACT), board size (BOARDSIZE) is positive and significant across most 
models. The funding variables CONTRACT and state money (STATEMON) are all 
positive and significant. Participation in national level coalitions, (NATCOLL) is 
positive and significant in all the weighted models. The measure of program diversity, 
(SEPPROGS), is positive and significant across all the models. These findings are 
consistent with the hypothesis that advocacy is affected by funding, alliance behavior 
and program diversity.
The basic premise is that government funding affects non-profit organizational 
behavior. The results of the one hundred plus regression and logistic analyses basically
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support the hypotheses and substantiate this premise. In terms of the specific research 
questions and hypotheses, the results are not as clear and convincing as one would like 
to report. Given the complexity o f the model, this is not surprising. As reported with 
each series of models o f the dependent variables, pieces of each hypothesis are 
addressed. What is interesting and merits further analysis is the subtle changes within 
and across models o f the sign and significance of some variables.
The results from the analysis are not as persuasive as was desired. Some of the 
concerns about the data and analysis are based on the limited sample size and the 
subsequent limitations on degrees of freedom in the analysis. By focusing on 
contracting as a threshold variable, a large number of cases were lost.
Given that non-profit organizations are a significant means o f service delivery 
in the United States, they are an appropriate organizational entity to study. Non-profit 
organizations are becoming more sophisticated and professional and diversifying their 
funding sources. The behavior o f non-profit organizations is affected by the 
organizational characteristics and contextual factors as well as by government funding. 
The existence o f government funding affects the organizational behavior of non-profit 
organizations. The behavior of organizations is affected in three primary ways: in terms 
of advocacy activities, alliance behavior and organizational complexity as measured by 
program diversification. In addition to the empirical analysis, the theory was evaluated 
by the use o f case studies.
In Chapter 5, the case studies affirmed the basic model. The connection between 
funding and advocacy was clearly articulated by each group. In addition, each group’s
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participation in alliances, coalitions and collaborations was as predicted. The results of 
the case studies supported these findings.
It is appropriate to note at this juncture the study of the changing nature o f non­
profit organizations is gaining importance in the academic field of political science, as 
well as in the practitioner community. At this time, a task force in the Louisiana 
legislature is studying the state’s contracting practices with non-profits. As the state 
wrestles with funding limitations, non-profit organizations are being compelled to make 
their case to state government. It is no longer sufficient for non-profits to assume that 
the public is aware of their value; the next effort is how to distinguish the non-profit 
sector from the for-profit sector. If  non-profit organizations are relying on government 
funding and fees for services, if they are more sophisticated in their financial 
management, more proactive in their advocacy and more effective in their interest 
groups,—what distinguishes non-profit organizations from for-profit businesses?
The success of government contracting and the increasing sophistication o f the 
non-profit organization sector, may in fact be the forces that lead to the demise or 
significant restructuring of the sector. The debate within the academic community and 
the governmental sector is starting to focus on the value and role o f non-profits, but in 
conflicting ways. The efforts in Congress and at the state level to evaluate the tax 
exempt status of non-profits as they look for revenue sources may jeopardize the non­
profit sector. The question becomes, why should non-profit organizations receive tax 
exemptions and other special rights?
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At this time, the non-profit sector is trying to distinguish itself from the for-profit 
sector, by retaining the community based values while balancing the professional 
expectations. As for-profit entities become more aware o f the billions of dollars 
contracted to non-profit organizations for community services, the competition will 
increase for those dollars. As Ryan (1999) mentioned, the private market has recognized 
the dollar value o f services contracted out by government. With large private 
companies, such as Lockheed Martin, competing to run the welfare departments of some 
states, community based non-profit organizations are at a distinct disadvantage in a 
competitive marketplace. Furthermore, as social services such as welfare become 
managed on the basis o f market economy rather than social need, the entire care 
structures of society may undergo significant transformation.
The fUture viability o f non-profits may be threatened by this new emerging 
market of government contracted out services and the increased competition to be the 
vendors for those services. This competition is internal to the non-profit sector and 
external from the for-profit sector.
This study evaluated the effect o f government funding on non-profit 
organizational behavior in Louisiana. The study was timely in responding to a larger 
conversation about the role o f non-profits, the value o f non-profits and the significance 
of the government-non-profit relationship. Further research is necessary in this field to 
evaluate the changing dynamics in the three sectors. The next step for research might be 
to replicate this study with two co-horts: one o f non-profit contractors and one with for- 
profit contractors to determine similarities and differences in organizational behavior.
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The dynamics of the impact o f  government funding is an appropriate next step for
analysis.
In addition to evaluating the government contractor relationship with non-profits, 
it may be necessary to develop a strategy to articulate the distinctiveness and value of the 
non-profit sector in the 21st century. This research project has added to the conversation 
about the relationship between non-profits and government. Despite its shortcomings, 
the non-profit sector provides valuable services to people in need regardless of how 
those services are funded. Hopefully, the public will not lose sight o f  the intrinsic values 
of association, voluntarism, and community responsibility embodied in the non-profit 
sector.
At the national level, the debate is heating up about the value, role and 
significance of non-profits. As academicians and practitioners attempt to justify the 
intrinsic value of non-profit organizations as intermediary organizations that promote the 
public good, build civil society and provide venues for civic engagement, the for-profit 
competitors challenge tax exemptions and compete for government funding.
The significance of the non-profit sector as a major force in civil society is the 
emerging issue in the field. Drucker suggests that non-profits will be even more 
important organizational entities in the millennium as people seek connections to one 
another. Rifkin suggests that the third sector will have an even more vital role as a 
means of building community and providing opportunities for expressions o f citizenship 
through volunteering (Rifkin, 1997, 101). The belief that the non-profit sector is driven 
by small contributions and volunteers is still important to the American ethos.
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The reality may be that the financial pressures and the emphasis on contracting 
and fees for services will lead to a restructuring o f the non-profit sector. The 
stratification of the non-profit sector may follow' a business model and create national, 
statewide, and regional non-profit service providers that are predominantly funded by 
government and fees for services. These larger entities may draw the attention o f for- 
profit competition and Congress. On the other hand, as mentioned earlier and has been 
demonstrated in the medical service delivery sector, the emergence of a market 
determined social service sector may have serious implications for the quality of those 
services being provided. The smaller community based non-profit and faith based 
organizations may then be free to continue to live up to the expectations that the non­
profit sector is volunteer driven community organizations connecting individuals with 
opportunities to promote the public good, build civil society and enhance the quality of 
life in the United States.
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APPENDIX A. SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
L o u is i a n a  A s s o c ia t io n  o f  N o n p ro f i t  O r g a n iz a t io n s  (LAMP)
i h a ve  th e  C h ie f E xecu tive  Officer, E xecutive D irector o r B oard  Chair com plete th is  survey.
Your Name Phone #
Title Fax M
* o f  Yearx you h ave  worked ia nonprofit sector: E-M ail
* or Y ears in cu rren t position: Zip
Organization * of Board M em bers:
Address Did you file  an IRS Form  990 in 1996?
City Y ear Incorporated:
Parish IT not incorporated , year  organized?
United W ay A gen cy: Y es _____  Wo Federal Z a p  lover LD. N um ber
About Organizational Needs and Interests
Check haw useful each of the faUawiag trainings sr  services would he to your
A b o u t Y o u r  O rg a n iz a tio n
There are many difTcrtal types of organisations with 
di/Tcmir interest* and needs for services.












3. N um ber o f  staff:
Wr*9 mmm*wr «|Mr:
x  Stratceic sr lenn-ianec planmnr I a. Full-time
b. Procram manaeemcnt i i b. Pan-urne
c. Procran evaluation/outcomes I 1 1 1 c. Seasonal/Contract
<L Financial manaeemcnt/accoununt i ■ - ! " " !  i d. Freouent Volunteers 1
c. Personnel manaaemem/Labor law ) 1 1 <1. Total revenue in most recent fiscal v ear
t*. Employee benc&u/penstons 1 ! i - a. SO -S ! $0,000 t
s. Fundraiiifin/deveieecncnt/crcnis J i i i b. S I50.001 -S500.000 i
h. Marfceunt or public relations ! 1 I c. S500.001 - S I million
t. Board development/recruitment ) i '* i d. S I million to S 3 million
i Volunteer manaeesnent/vaxfunc i i i i c. 5 2 million to 54 mllioa
L Local tssues/risJc oanacement ) t i It. over S4 million
t. Board tovemaacc/traminc/rolcs ! ! ! i .  Please estimate the percentage of your total
operating revenues from each source: %m. Management/leadership | ! i !
n. Computer tcshnolotv/traiiunc 1 ! ! la.  Memberships 1
o Bulletin boards/Wcbsitcs/lnternct 1 ! 1 b Direct individual <ootnbattons/e*cxus
9- Grant wruute workshops I 1 : c. Earned lucoanc/Fces. Services. Products
u. Government contract manatcment ! 1 i d. Federal Government Grants and contracts
r. Joh/emolovmew lisuncs 1 1 ! c. Statt Government Grants and contracts
s. Ethics accountability I 1 1 i. Local Government Grants and contracts







.N«t | NM | >»C 
r*r> | iiicfw j Swr* 
mtfid 1 M all |
%. Corporate Grants, contracts, contributions
x  Balaev surveys 1 f b. Foundation trams, eamracis
b. Statewide Director* o'. Nansrotits i. Combined Fundmema/Utuied Wav
c  Eceneauc Impact Said* of Sector 1 i ! Interest. Invesuneat income
d. Coasultant Direcurv i i U. Other. |
c. Training a o i  Conference into. 6. What is the scocranhic area served?
i. Lecal services/CPA clcarinibouxc i i a. National
e. Conferences- State/Local i i b. Multi-state
h. 100* infornuiioo Fax back service i i =. State
i. Foundation Dtrectorv ! 1 d. Multi-oafish
i. O an crlv  newjlcuer/oubUc oelicv I 1 e. Sinek-oirish
fc. Grants resource Ustuix/sources i i C Munictoal
L Internet Services/WEB site i 1 c. Nciihborhood
m- Issue Bnefmes in vour community i 1 h. Other
Pleats return  Surrey to ihe Council f a r  A  Better Louisiana. P. 0 . t e c  SJ 01. Baton R o u tt. LA ~0I2J~tJ0l or Fax to (SOU) JJS-9S70. 
Thankyou  fo r  com pleting this surrey. W e appreciate your assistance at planning te help meet youe meeds fo r  training, infermesion and 
advocacy. P lease return this survey as y e a r  earliest convenience. l/.ieu  dm-e fuestions. please call Melissa Flournoy on (504) U4-122S.
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Please check the usefulness o f the produ cts o r  serv ices which m ay he Please ch e ck  th e  ca teg o ries  w h ich  apply.
n m v id e d  hv T A N f) Y our respon ses wfl! d e term in e  th«. services.













Sect 13. Y our O rgan ization 's  Service Delivery 
Areas
a.
WcI l 5. Acme. sem en . nursutc homes, councils on acrnc 1
b Loot distarrr telephone rates 1 b. Arts, culture, humanities, museum t
c Software Ic . Civic, community, social, fraternal, neighborhood f
d Computer /hardware/Internet i <1 Children. Dav Care. Youth. Education i
e. Health/dcstal insurance c. Civil rights, social action, advocacy, public policy |
f. Disability insurance 1 S L Community improvement, ccooomic development |
I DircctonfOOjcm insurance 1 ! g- Developmental d isobiliiin  mental retardation
h. Property/ casual tv tasvance 1 h. Employment. jobs, vmaiionnl training
t. Special event insurance \ - u Environmeu. wildlife, whan forestry
i. Automobile insurance I I t food, aucnaon. agriculoec
tL Payroll service i 1 k. Hospital, health, care, support, comm unity
1. Aceououat sem cc I i L Housing, shelter, homeless
m. Reuremcm/pcaason plans 1 a . Human/Social tenners general
0. Unemployment benefits i n. Legal services or criminal justice program
0. Discounts on office supplies 0 Mental health, crisis intervention
P- Mailing list management P- Philanthropy, voluntecrism
q. General liability insurance q. Grant making foundation
r. Travel, airfares. hotels, cars . r. Public policv
u OlTicc equipment/furniture t Protective sem ce. foster o r e . court advocaev
L Printuu/eopvrag (. Recreation, leisure, spans, parks, zoos |
It. Publications/books tt. Familv services, domestic violence j
j s. Does vottr accti (n tflif lf in outcome mcarufement-’ T Refieious. churches, ordcrvcommuaiiies 1
i . Yes W Rehabilitative services 1
b No Residential services I
c. Not sure Science and teehnoleev 1
Does vour or*af>i»uoa have access to the Internet? Sacral sciences 1
s_ Yes aa. Substance abuse (drue and alcohon !
b. No bb Women's issues or health
iu. What are the major obstacles to your organization*! use of teehno!>*£*. u . How many separate programs, divisions or
(he Internee e-mail? Check all that anolv. > a it in in iio f l i l  a m u d m  vour o tn n in t id a  have?
Computers/hard ware/software 0 to 3 programs 1
b. Fundiae not available tor techno lo o 0. d to S programs i
c. Tramins not available w. more than 9 maarate proerams or divisions !
d SiafTcoocems about technology IS. What %  o f  your organization's activity is devoted to each 
of ehese areas?
e. Other a. Direct Smviecs |




a. Yes. enhancing Trrhniral eapaetty ts a top pnonty C. Research 1
b. Yes. as funds became available d Education |
c. Yes. but not this year s. Public ReiaiieBs/CoauBuaity Exposure
d If usefulness to our mission could be demonstrated l i  Is your orgaaizacion affiliated with a aatieaal
•m n iz a tio n ?  E xsm p ic  YWCA o r  Bovs sod Girls Club?
c. Ho. technology is not a phoney a. Y es I -1 b. No I
L Not sore 17. Which services are offered bv the eatseaaf ortanizattoo?
I d  What are your orgaaizacinn’i  top priorities in IW 7-IW ! ? Rank Order a. Annual Corugcnccs and Training
a. Program Evaluation and Outcome Measurement a. Newsletter*. Publications. Resources
b. Fuad Development or fundinc stabilization a. Cost Savines Discounts on Products and Services
c. Procram alaanuifi. assessment and strategic planmnc Information. Research and Public Policv Updates
d. StalTDeveieement and Trauunc 1 i National and resional craifiine seminars
c Board and Volunteer Recruitment and Traminc z. Internet Services. List Serves and other resources
I Collaboraunc and coordination with other nonprofits Materials for use at local level for orozrammtnc 1
2. Protram Ooerattoa 2- Fundraxsme sssistance 1 |
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Sometimes, the very  e x isten ce  o f an organization is challenged . w h eth er  by internal o r  external factors. T h ese  qu estion s are 
farp*rrd to a s tr "  th e  en v iron m en t and determ ine vour o r rx .iix a tica ’s needs for serv ices to be p rov ided  bv L A N O .
18. Describe the current environment for accomplishing 23. How important are the followmg reasons for your organization tojom a 
coalition. association or collaboration?
•fw on jly  ep ee . >  jotnewtal afree . 2=s«oew t!» <tauree. 
ta rrnvif<« d iffer^  don’t know
s*very uppercase. 3=*ctnewfcat ifltpuiuuc. 2*001 very snporueL l*t*ot 
unoottaaL 0* don’t laiow
a. Funding is readily available (or the program Gram 
local onvate sources
x. To access costs savings and bene tits such as discounts on 
insurance, cemeuters or sueoties
b. Funding is readily available Grom government 
sources
b. To gain dvect services, framing and Btanagcmcat assistance 
such as ccrtiereaces tad seminars
c. Funding is diflicuil to secure for the operation of 
(he pnwrams
c. To roeeive advocacy and public policy information and national 
updates, alerts and summaries af national events
i l  The eomsumiey is very receptive and supportive of j c. To participate and receive information and research ort the 
impact o f the aonorofit n e w
t  There is stiff cctnpetiuon for limiied resources e. To participate m graacwhting seam an and (earning about 
tundias options fcr mv ortaniBttoti
£ Organizations need to together acre  j f  To participate in a popular and emerging initiative to strengthen 
'die itotioreisi sector
j. We occd 10 maintain all costing programs j s. To respond to externa) threats to the nonprofit sector more 
etTeetivdv
h. We need to encourage collaboration and mergers of 
omfliMtifldf in reduce duplication
z. To galvsni2e support and interest on* the significance o f  the types 
o f  services provided bv mv ortannation




To meet and actuorfc with other nonprofit leaden interested tn 
similar issues. io share experiences and gain insights, 
professional contacts, career advancement and leadership 
opportunities
j. There is a aeed to develop volunteers and board 
members
To receive up to date and umely advocacy iafennauoa on 
legislative activities, issues, and policies at the state level
L Competition for resources is tierce between my f 
organization and others with similar services and i 
values. 1
t  To receive publications and resources on die sector, information 
''  cr. trends, issues, services and solutions
I My organization faces stuT competition tor 1 
resources from other organizations that oppose our 
values, procrams and services. 1
To participate in tbruas with grammakers to c:-cuss issues, 
tirtdint. earns, pnonum
19. Do you think the overall environment for accomplishing 
vour mission is better or worse chan five wars ago?
Is your orgsmzatian affiliated er a member o f any associations, 
coalitions or collaborations? (fves. check all that aonlv.
3. Better ! «. Neighborhood I c. National 1
b. About the same ! z Lc-ral community ) tl International j
c. Worse 1 Rexona) 1 g. Specific Issue Group
d. Not sure I i  S d ‘a>«ioe ! h. Other
20. In the pasc five years, bar your organization experienced 
a problem major enough to threaten its cofittascd existence?
IS. \N ha: are the major barriers to joining a itaie-widc association of 
e*.nnfvific organizations?
x  Yes 1 i b. No i «. L m te d  fuadtne fordoes
2L Identify importance o f issues which could threaten your 
organization's existence.
4«»ery important. somewhat important. 2*not very important. 
1 «not important. 0*don’t know
Ccr-icm aooui overrcprcten cation o f one type of organization 
Eximpie: children, agog. arts, homeless
(menial threats External T T v e ili  i L t i l te d  disc to participate
2. Inadequate fa d in g a. Competition tor 
fttndirtx reaourccx
i  C irccrn over advocacy activities
b. Board Conflirt b. Governmental and 
reeniatorv chances
x Stzze groups do not further the organization's oussiofi
c. SttfTTuroover c. Cotnpentias for clieru Questions about the a issieo  o f the aseciation
ll,
Mcmbenhio
d. Lade of community 
motion
L N c subsaotive barriers to parudpttion
22. Wiihia A t  m a t  firm v ta n .  woald ymm expect that vaur 
•>taaixatiaa win face a u n o u f  challenge ts iu  cxinxace?
- -  C h e a  the range o f sendees potentially available (o your organization, 
bvw likely ts it that your organization would consider joining the Louisians 
Association ofNonnrofit Or*3A***tiA«s?
1. Vtr; 1 J .  i t .  I | 3. Not 1 I 4. Don i i 
Likctv | mtttt tihetv 1 1 wrv Uketv 1 1 Knw. 1
•«> | | 2- Siwnr vdot j 3. Not very 1 i s.Don’tKaow 1
—*srsr J 1 likejv j rjfrw. j j j
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j G overnm ental decisions affect nonprofit orgaxuzz lion s  funding and operation. M ore nonprofits are receiv ing local, state ana 
n orafit advocacv and the public p o lio  cn a lien ees  facing the noan ron t sector.
27. A re you fam iliar w ith state aa d  federal 
fM uiariofif rr^nrdifi# nonprofit a d v o e a f iv ? ____
IS. How important is it far your organization to he accountable to these (roups ?
i  VcTV familiar f x  A little laaiiiar M e r y u a m o J w i
b. Socnewhat feauliar 4  Not familiar x  Clients.'
customers
| c. Media x  Public
28. Do you ifciek nonprefit organizations should be 
r activities?
b. Government j d. FuxulcV supporters j X Stal£rVolunteer3 [
1 i




red in th e  last 
State Local
b. Agree 4  Disagree x  Phone calls, taacs. letters to .twvwi otljcials 1
IV. Does your organ 
nractiee o f prohibit!
iza ti
n f a
on have a  policy or  
d vocacv activities?
b. Personal visits with ciected atCdais. community 
leaders 1
3. Yes 1 x  Media lavalvemcnt-ediianals f
b. No i d. Traduce of Iceitlanmncstunaay at hearings 1
c. Not w e  1 x  AtirndtryCanducit-t mcetut(s or bnetinfs i
30. In conducting your lobbying /advocacy activity 
with tbc state legislature, bow often do you consult, 
communicate, or cooperate with other organization* 
sharing your goals and also engaged in lobbying tbe 
trace ie*iilarure?
:'. Organusif grassroots efforts. mailints
i
a. Always j 4  Rarely 37. Approximately bow many times dues yuur ariaoizatiaii contact elected public 
ofticials at tne local, state or federal level?
b Ollen | c. Never x  Once a a ash er more | | x  Several tunes a year | | x  Never 1
c. Sometimes 1 L Don't Know b. Once a month to scrral J. During Use legis-lauve j 
itmcs a OiaT-er session only ;
f. Not 
sure
3 1. In conducting your lobbying /advocacy activity 
with the state legislature, bow often do you find your 
self in direct competition with other organizations 
onnosed to vnur fxmtioa?
38. Who 10 ;-uw-r organization has worked to influence public policies eu the local, 
state or federal level?
a. Alwavs | d. Rareiv 1 a E-teccr.e/CEO | c_ Board member | x  Volunteer i
b. Oden e  Never 1 b Board Caair | | 4  Other sta ll | f. Lntobvtst 1
c. Sometimes | t  Don't Know | 39. Do you contract »itb government agencies? I a. Yes i i b. No 1
37. Other than newt] 
information about the 
the nonnrofit sector?
taper csircn|C . do you receive 
legislature's actiaas affecting
JO. Huw oa>c your cootractinc practices 
changed? Do you » o r .  jr  contract with 
government agencies
In (he Last Five 
Years
Work Contract
Plans for S um 
Five Years 
Work C a u n e
a. Alwavs | 4  Rarelr ! a. More i 1
b. Ollcn | c. Never i b Less i i
c. Sometimes 1 L Don't Knew ! C Same i 1
33. Would additional information about the 
activities o f the Louisiana Legislature and activities 
in state and national tevenifteftc be bdoful?
41. With .o ieh  ttatc ccpartmcnts Have you worked or contracted?
Work Contract
a. Always | 4. Rareiv a. Health and H asorxis'tSU M C
b. Ollcn 1 x  Never b. Social acr.acs:
c  Sometimes | C Don't Know x  Conecaats. f-ablic iai'etv. Probation. Parole
3d. How important are these barriers to your 
organization becoming more Involved in public policy 
and advocacy?
4  Enviroe=mtx. Qux_~.VNaejral Resources/ 
Agrieuicr*
mwqwwwl I w n  wm m n. 0*0—1 l i w
x  Educatrax-BExx/Sc-jol Boerds/Tlmvcniuea
_
a. Lack o f inibraatioo about appropriate 
activity
C Govcrner i Otnzc/E^crty/Women's/Rorsl/ 
UrbatvLnerac-.-Ch- -ten's Cabinet
b. Coocem by bosd  members g. Econotx: Deveiopoest
c. Limitations o f staff u s e b. Labon’i  rria'ene Drrdepmeat
d. Diverse constituents and tack o f  consensus t. Lx Govrrror/C jlttc: Recreation and Tourism
e. Limited resourccs-focus on programs |  j. Attonw General
C Lack o f information on issues J '4 Secretar- at S'J^e
l  Other | 1. Other
1
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LA.NO is concerned about ad vocacy  i n  J  public
42. W hat are y ou r oixaai23K ion's p u b lic  policy  
u d  inform ation tra in iac seed s?
45. How im p ortant are these challenges facing the nonprofit sec to r  m toe 
nert 3 - 5  vears?
i. One jane summand of issues *•—nrimonmm. i^mmr tiir untrumm 2-ae* wry anpenam. 1 mtet important. 0« Don i Kao*
b. Media ftiauons/taticsBf peuus/cditohals j
1
a. AGCBustahtiirr. Mainum Public Credibility and Trust of nonprofit j 
ortamzations !
c. Nonprofit acceimtabUity/etlucs/sondards b. Threats to tax exemption o f charicable deduction, 
elimination o f proooiv tax esoeouon
d. Legal services c. Federal regulations on advocacy; contact with public officials. First 
Amendment issues
e. Research, detailed policy analysis d  Public Appreciation: Explauung economic impact o f sector, educating 
the oublic about the rale and value of nonorofits
i Representation at the Legislature e. Homan Resource C onsm m r lack o f stalTand volimteers. concerns 
about salarrs and benefits
g. Nonprofit lobbying regulations and training tl Increased expectations for sem ce delivery: as result o f welfare retorm. 
oolictts.ctc
h. Website/list ser* Update on Policy g. Managed Care: Capitation issues, access to services, integrated service 
networks
u Lccislauve Fax Alerts h. Resource Competition: funding /contracts
Newsletter/information (mail) i. Changing legal requirements: Reporting at state and federal levels, 
financial dtitlosure
43. In the next five yean, bow m uch  time will your 
board and staff sound on advocacy?
Devolution. Block Cants and Federal Funding Cuts
a. More time k. Personnel and Liability Issues |
b. About the same amount o f ume L Taxes on Unrelated Business Income
c. Less time ol Increasing private dollars contributed to nonprofits
J d. Win hire stall for policy and advocacy a. Expanding tanncrships and collaborations with aoaprotits
44. How important is it for your organisation to 
advocate for the oesnlc. services and causes to these?
o. Expanding nonprofit partnerships with business and industry
•
4=very important. 3*somcwaat important. 2*noc very 
important. l*noc tmponanL O O o n t Know
p Developing scthods ter evaluating impact o f nonprofit programs
a. To governing bodies such as local, state or 
federal elected officials
44L Please take a moment and lets us know your comments. What other services do 
vou ncc«f? What ts the nrimarv benefit o f ioiam f an association?
b. Through the courts i
c. To the public at large to promote better 
understanding o f your program, services or
iiu m
d. To diems and customers
e. With the media i
tl With tunding sources j
About the Chief Executive Officer 4*4. Arc you? | Under 30 1 30-10 40.30 $0*60 | 60>
47. Do you consider yourself to be: 50. What is yoor education level: Chock highest levol completed.
na. Afacaa Aawnrae/Blarlr K its school { Collexe [ M a aert Doctorate
b. Atuo American 51. Do you bcltiat ca aay profctttoaal ar ta o a a iw u ?
c. CauQitaoZWluie s. Yes I b. No
Laia Atnencan/Hitaamc/Aanncap hdian S2. Dot t t o r t  of a .eth er aooprefU orvam m iun?
e. htulii-ndal b. No
C Other 53. Pit) you attemi a aancnai coa fexo te  ia the last year?
A re y o u . . . Yes IbT No
S4. Do you iiiie s  the tcrricet of so  u m a i i w  wauld be helpful to you
1 r
Male
b. Female a. Ve 
beleiul
I b. Somewhat c. Helpfijt d. Hot very
! heiofiil bdofitl
Please return this survey to the Council fo r  A Better Louisiana. P.O. Box 4308, Baton Rouge. LA 70821-4308. 
Fax to (504) 338-9470. Thank you fo r  completing this survey. We appreciate your assistance in planning to help 
meet your needs fo r  training, information and advocacy. Please return this survey at your earliest convenience in the 
enclosed envelope I f  you have questions, please call .'rfelisss Flournoy on (504) 344-2225.
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APPENDIX B. CASE STUDY QUESTIONNAIRE
ORGANIZATIONAL SURVEY: CASE STUDIES







9 OF BOARD MEMBERS
YEAR INCORPORATED
ORGANIZATIONAL INFORMATION
WHAT IS THE MISSION OF YOUR ORGANIZATION?
WHAT SERVICES DO YOU PROVIDE?
PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
9 OF PROGRAMS 
9 OF STAFF
WHAT IS THE ROLE OF YOUR BOARD IN YOUR ORGANIZATION? OVERSIGHT, POLICY MAKING, 
OPERATIONS
HAS YOUR MISSION CHANGED SINCE THE BEGINNING OF YOUR ORGANIZATION? HOW HAS IT 
CHANGED? WHAT FACTORS, ISSUES, OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES AFFECTED YOUR 
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ORGANIZATIONAL SURVEY: CASE STUDIES
THE EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT FUNDING ON NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR
HOW IS YOUR ORGANIZATION FUNDED? HAS THE FUNDING MIX OF YOUR ORGANIZAION 
CHANGED OVER THE LAST TWENTY YEARS? IN THE LAST TEN YEARS?
IF YOU RECEIVE GOVERNMENT FUNDING, WHAT PERCENTAGE OF YOUR BUDGET IS FROM 
GOVERNMENT SOURCES? DO YOU CONTRACT WITH STATE GOVERNMENT? FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT? GRANTS?
DOES RECEIVE GOVERNMENT FUNDING AFFECT YOUR ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION-MAKING? 
ARE YOU MORE OR LESS LIKELY TO BE INVOLVED WITH ADVOCACY ACTIVITIES?
ADVOCACY: _____
IS YOUR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED WITH ADVOCACY ACT!VHIES? IF SO, PLEASE EXPLAIN.
DO YOU ADVOCATE FOR SUSTAINING OR ADDITIONAL FUNDING?
WHO IN YOUR ORGANIZATION IS INVOLVED WTTH ADVOCACY ACTIVITIES?
WHAT IS THE BOARD’S INVOLVEMENT WITH ADVOCACY?
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ORGANIZATIONAL SURVEY: CASE STUDIES
THE EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT FUNDING ON NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR
ALLIANCE BEHAVIOR
IS YOUR ORGANIZATION A MEMBER OF ANY COALITIONS, COLLABORATIONS, ASSOCIATIONS?
WHAT ARE THE PRIMARY REASONS FOR PARTICIPATING IN ALLIANCES?
WHAT ARE THE BENEFITS FOR YOUR ORGANIZATION PARTICIPATING/WORKING WITH OTHER 
ORGANIZATIONS?
WHAT FACTORS INFLUENCE YOUR DECISIONS TO PARTICIPATE IN ALLIANCES, 
COLLABORATIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS?
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ORGANIZATIONAL SURVEY: CASE STUDIES
THE EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT FUNDING ON NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR





WHAT ARE THE CHALLENGES FACING THE NONPROFIT SECTOR?
WHAT CHANGES DO YOU ANTICIPATE IN YOUR ORGANIZATION IN THE NEXT FIVE YEARS? 
PROGRAMS, FUNDING, SERVICES
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APPENDIX C. INFORM ATION ON LOUISIANA NONPROFITS
$ and Sense: Profile of 
Louisiana Nonprofits
Louisiana Association of Nonprofit Organizations
More than  
Talking— DATA 
For Nonprofits
Credibility and Leadership— 
Foundations Support LANO
tlw Cooped far a  Batter Li nirio n  
(CABU- C O L m iiiO H — iQ lw O  
from the FmbM nm for the HMAmO, 
Ike Frost I
Council of Msnprwtlt Aassd ntisnf . 
(NCNA). Foodmgfor 1998 is provided 
by the IdandMg partners as weB as the 
Greater New Ortoaos Fooodatioa. me 
Batoo Roage A na Fenndattoa and me 
CeaMoaity Foundation of Shrevepert- 
Bessier.
Vision and Services
This aew usorirtina is o e f o r t f  a 
soaker of cBorts to help noaprstits
:± -JlaxE xianptiam  'lor. IIOBjirotlh -
Statewide Network and 
Regional Partners
HRST STEPS FOR RESEARCH
Toe 30 This report L o fs h o ti
The Lead Partner reginail strategy is 
helping to deve lop a  strong network or 
leaders con owned to excellence.
trying to captwre Ike 
sedor in the state. For additional
(504) 3434ANO (5266).
is the R nt step in 
of the oowpndtt 
copies or if yea have 
Ftowmoy at LANO at
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2 S a n d  S en se :  Profile of L o u is ia n a  Nonprofits
"  f l O N P I M M f S H M a f : :
Nonprofit organinhons Fora tbe civic infrastructure of tbe United States. Generallg, we refer to 
tfie public and private sector, U t mcreasmglg tbe responsibilitg for tbe provisian of services is 
(ailing into tbe realm of tbe (bird sector— tbe vohmtarg sector, tbe nonprofit sectr, or sometimes 
called tbe independent o d o r.
(NcrfnOt Atmnac. 1996-1917. nOtpmKMnc Secret).
What is the nonprofit sector?
The nonprofit seaor is the backbone a f conrrm inides, m ating a safety net o fsocia l services as i*eff as the fabric a f 
civic and cutturaL O f c. In m ost aw— iniriiT, the sta ff and volunteers o f nonprofit organizations are unsung heroes 
providing essential corrareurity SB ticB  such as food barks and h am titss sh d ta s or providing eductnianfrom  ehiid 
care saviaes to  u n ivasties on topics from  th e arts to  AIDS
What is a nonprofit organization?
A nonprofit  organiueum is  a legally bu xeyn ated  en tity. Nonprofit organisations include bu t are not Bnaud to such 
groups as: churches, neighborhood centers, art galleries, synphonies, zoos, and recreation fnogram sfar 
disadvantaged children. Nonprof it orgm ruaions represent a vast array o f resources in corrormauties making Bves 
better, safer or more enjoyable. Nonpro fit argantztxians ora te a structure fo r society—to  debver esseraial community 
services, create voiuntee- opportunities and provide Bfe enhancing options.
I GENERAL INFORMATION AND PRINCIPLES OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR
*• ' I
1
1. Nonprofit organizations are incorporated legal entities at the state level who may choose to lie for designation from 
the IRS as a tax-exempt anchor tax rtetlnrlitite organization. There ate twenty-five IRS designations for tax-exempt 
organizations. The designated organizations receive exemption from federal income taxes and local property taxes.
2. Orty the 501 (c) 3 organizations are deemed charitable organizations which are created to serve a public benefit 
and teoeive the eadraprwgege of accepting tax-rtwrtiicttiie contributions from indwriduals and corporations. These 
organizations must meet the RS standards of refigkxs, charitable. educational, scientific, and Sterery purposes.
Aten in r i» » W r  —  n t g j n i r — in w c  H w H n f l  fnr p i «A*Wy f tw ta d n g  n a tio n a l re imwiuriniul « p n r t s  n n m p a M H n n g  n r
working to prevent cniety to cNdran and animats.
3. Nonprofit organizations are typicaBy private organizations, not a part of or bontioMed by government.
4. Nonprofit organizations are aefrgoveming. controlled by a voluntary independent board of directors.
5. M n n p m U t w i j n i n A i n n t  tin net w ie  p n r p n w »  n f  m a t i n g  a prrOt- a n y  p t r i l K  n r  menmnx m w m s must be
■pkwred back* into the operation of the organization and not dshibuied to board members or officers. This practice 
different rates the w  inr finm pnvate business.
6 .  t J o n p f f l r i t  n r q a w o a t i n w c  j~ n K # »  « m >  m w n i n q f t i l  r t a g m a  n f  v n U u O a iy  p a r t i r i y W n w  eiHtnr i V n m i M i e w l  h y  a
voluntary board of directors or the erdensive use of vofcrteers for program development and implementation.
i 7. Nonprofit organizations esast for the public benefit serving some puttie purpose end contributing to die pufafic good.
U S a n e  /V n M B a k N ta q p r a e S a o a r .a p W ic e to ia r e w F a a n te a n C v S v .
~  T h e i e a r e m o r p  t i o n p f o f i t s  t h ^
J—.......... ------------  . -------- . . .  . - ................ ............. ........
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5 $ and  S e n s e :  Profile of Lou is iana  Nonprof i ts
At thfc time many factors are raising concerns about nonprofit organizations and tbe changing 
dynamics of tbe sector and are affecting tbe intensity of die discussion about nonprofit 
organizations:
♦ tbe heightened interest in nonprofit organizations from Congress,
4 tbe growth in die number of organizations and tbe expansion in services provided,
4 the increase in government fimdmg at tbe state and federal levels,
4 Devolution: federal policy changes of block granting funds to states fix' certain services.
Tocqueville was prescient in his understanding—
A governmen t could take th e p lace o f som e o f th e largest associations in A m erica, and som e particu lar sta les a f 
the Union have already attem pted tkaL. B ut yvkat p o litica l pow er could ever carry on th e vast m ultitude o f Lesser
undertakings which associations daily enable A m erican dozen s to  control?  The m ore governm ent takes
the place o f associations, the m are w ill individuals lose the idea a f form ing associations and need th e 
governm ent to  come to  their help. That is a viciou s circle  o f cause and effect. (T ocqueville, p . 517)
Government Funding Of The Nonprofit Sector
In the United States in 1997, after several decades of tbe expansion of the role of government in the 
provision of services, tbe nonprofit sector is emerging as an engine of government service due to the 
increase and espansion of government contracting at the local, state, and federal level This shift to the 
nonprofit sector has created new linkages, relationships and obligations between the public and 
nonprofit sectora.
















1992 S509 Bn 1.03 million 6.5% 9.7 million 5.5 million
1977 $111
Billion
739.000 4.8% 4.9% 5.5 million 3.2 million
Tabic 1. 2 P ercfta ft Share of Total Aaaaal Fuads by Soorce of Revene*
Source 1*77 1982 1*87 1992 1*97
PrivWe contributions 26.3 21.8 22.9 18.4 NA
Private sector payments 37.5 38.7 40.8 39.1 NA
Government sector payments 2BJ6 28.1 274 313 NA
Other revenue 9.6 11.4 8.4 11.2 NA
Total % 100 100 100 100
'Accordng lathe Independent SacBr. mereheebeeneemendour growth in thenonprafft Meter. This gmdhieineaBUBd in tenns of 8ie reamer of 
ncurporBed nonprofit ertnes. the nuntier of peifliBff in the eeiacr end the peroereege o< nnicnat income genomed in the seder. The tibie outtnes 
the rational changes horn 1977- 1SBZ. (ManproOMrnenec. p. 2)
2AoontWigio»etmpvov<Seeern— w»catnr»ap>agpi»ii»wne toff hoc decades. ThepowetieaBtiuabletotidoni 
iwyi teinipiwiang export tor nmcae end Moacoia.odJcaldiyaW.pnipais  of support in houeHB.jm>oomg and dheroodol matin. pregams. Fieri 
tg77te 19M, We gmniiei me at t» inrtaaenrtfe e B r » » je ^ n  6011—11977end 1SB2 end anieeenlflB7enai90Z.
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All O rgs. 
5 0 1  c  3
S o re : IKS DATA. 4 * a  of KJ7B.
Dole IBS m d s oaig Am  w ^ n i l  < $25,000 i
NoiproRf’Orpi>"»Hoi Fpw d hi A j m k  (ITO-IVV/i
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
1997
#  of O rfs. 1,489 1,541 1,934 1,727 1714 1,637
#  oF
Basiaesses
10,067 10,947 11,328 11,082 11,531 11,151
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9 S an d  S e n s e :  P rof i le  of Louis iana  N o n p ro f i t s
Figure 3.19.1: Number of Reporting Public Charities 
in Louisiana by County, circa 1992
Figure 3.19.2: Number of Reporting Public Charities 
per 10,000 Residents in Louisiana by County, circa 1992
S o v c c s :  U S .  C m u s  B w cau  E x a m a a s  o( <nt P e s u a a a n  e( C a tf iw s . n v n d  n a iw n K  S ctmcb O i q a m a n s e u v i c s  M u a r r a *  ( E C e
1993. ane Pawn T m n g n  Fit. 1M3 (n u n s  n c e o ie n n s ie w e ie ir  year) u  W hom  By NGGS. Sae oepanani *  lor aaaat.
Neta: R aeem g gtcae a ianaaa ra u o a  an y en a m w a  TUT seat leeen a e (Mae « S  Fom  990) ana w e  reoM aa «  as «o. The •oaonwg w e  
nauaaq: ta n g n  ory n u i ia i i .  ount in n a n n n oceM c atgaraaaBns. ane a ^ m a a n  ■ « c ut l » e  aareaaie. Oiqanaaaons net leeia iae n  
raoon aenjoa la^ o ttf congraeaaona ape J y m w m  w ei e s s  aian S2S .000 *1  greaa raegctt.
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501 C 3 7,074 $8,882,161,706 $6,475,092,175
Not 501 C 3 7,204 $2,348,746,084 $1058,916,769
TOTAL 1 4 ,2 7 8 511030,907,790 $7,734,008,944
Saenz: IRS, Fom 990s fur 19% as Jo m Im U  h n  IIS aekalc. lafanaaliaa anlg aa those 
orgzadaHoas with over $25,000 of Fiaaaoal activity.
Financial Size oF NonproFfr Organizations
j Asset/Income Size CODE Assets—All 
Orgs.
Assets 







0 0 9,729 4,531 9,628 4,504
1-59,999 1 587 300 279 121
$10,000-$24099 2 442 234 61 40
$25,000-$99,999 3 1,052 554 1,621 750
$100,000-$499,999 4 1,278 640 1,629 903
$500,000-$999,999 5 393 223 475 313.
$1,000,000-54,999,999 6 572 401 45 339
$5,000,000-$9,999,999 7 101 88 47 39
$10,000,000-
$49,000,000
8 83 71 56 42
$50,000,000 to greater 9 41 32 28 23
Total # of Organizations 14,278 7,074 14,278 7,074
Soane: IIS, h n  990s (or I996 as doem\awiei ( m  IIS achiile. lafm atioa oalg oa
those offaadaftoas with oner $25,000 of FmaaaaJ adn it) arc iq w c J  to file IRS Fora 990.
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United













Baton Rouge $9,800,000 $46,539,502 $20,648,509 44.4%
M orehouse $125,000
St. John $300,000
New Orleans $18,401,011 $92,049,948 $41,50,097 44.8%
Acadiana $2,400,320 $24,496,752 $14,821,377 60.5%
Bogalousa $280,000 $937,640 $656,345 70.0%
Central LA $1,700,000 $6,791,927 $3,586,483 52.8%
Iberia $285,852 $16,583,314 $13,205173 79.6%
Northeast $2,880,000 $7,802^91 $4,889,631 62.7%
Northwest $3,100,000 $37,179,056 $13,775,284 37.1%
South LA $1,800,000 $3,180,205 $1,716,924 54%
Southwest $3,099,807 $16,626,744 $7,688,369 46.2%
SL Charles $726,310 $13,282,824 $1,232,055 9.3%
SL Landry $100,000 $1,382^68 $1,246,759 90.2%
TOTAL $44,998,300 $266,852,471 $124,717,006 46.7%
Source: 1997 Unhid Way Report
State Government Funding for Moiijprofits
Data Source: LA Division of Administration, Office o f Contractual Review
4pprow d Contracts in CfUS wMh Noaproltt Organfaadions a s of N u w d w 7 .1 9 9 7 .
1,085 active coon acts on Ons d d e wdh organizations with inrtiratinn at nonprofit  t t t e  in the
AGPS Vendor Table VEN2.
1,085 Contracts = $309,825,304.95
Types of Contracts Covered:
SOGSocnri Senium  
PBOfroifJsion il Services 
CON-Consadting Services 
PBt-Personal Services 
COP Cooperative Endeavor Agreements 
AGY-interagency Agreements 
GOV-hrterduvet wnemal Agreements
Note: The staff of DOA has voiced some 
concerns that this hst nay not be exhaustive, 
in lhat some codmg errors may be present in 
system. This dam is valid lor ttmse 
organizations correctly coded as at 
November 7 ,1 9 9 7 .
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1 2 $ and  S en se :  Profile of Louisiana N o n p ro f i t s
Department of Labor dtoa is tracked by Standard hiduvtnil CUgification Codes (SIC). The 
fallowing table include totals for each SIC code for 1996. GeaenBy speaking, most nonprafito wfll 
be incf uded in b e  M m n (  o b p r in :
SIC CODE Descrgdion Totol Wages Avenge
WUters
No. of Fines
60 Federal and State Credit Unions
67 Educational and Rdncious Trusts
79 Amusement and Recreation: 
Entertainment, membership, 
sports and recreation dubs
671382 ,917 3 8 3 6 0 1 3 0 5
80
medical facilities
5362 ,028 ,653 2013 5 8 7,470
82 Educational Services: Colleges 
and Universities, elementary and 
secondary schools
83 Social Services: Individual and 
famfly services, chid care services
601.805,796 41,096 2,707
84 Museums, art galleries, botanical 
and zoological gardens
20,798,719 1 3 5 0 45
86 Membership Organizations: 
Civic, social, professional and 
religious associations
105,638313 6 3 0 2 902
94 Administration of Homan 
Resources: social and manpower 
programs
Snare; 1996 laoMana Ewplopaem art Wages, prepared by Ibeheaeanfc art S H U a D M a n n f tbe 
DepartMdaT Labor
Note:
Tins TABU includes aB w oitan  in lliese caaeiones, not only ihose in Ihe BoaprafU sector.-LINO is 
working widi die (nuistana Department of Labor to aocurmely document toe number aTcaaployees 
and wages paid in fhe nonprofit sector. Dnploye.i t  wBh fewer Bum 4  eagdtqees are e w lnded from 
wage and employment figures.
COMPUTE AM) ACCURATE DATA for aouprolIts ocdyin each SK: code has iMMrequeaded fromttie 
liesaarcii and ttr td ir t  Dhtoion of.fiie Louisiana Departmes* ofLabor. D to w B b e  wrnBBWi Irtiat 
DOtlfiy toarcb 1 5 ,1 9 9 8 .
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13 S and  S e n s e :  Profile of  L o u is ian a  Nonprofits
Scenarios fo r Sales Tax Exemptions For Nonprofits
At the present tim e, there are 29 statmmBy defined r tir r tax exeagilions or exclusions that 
benefit nonprofit organ ration s. These exeanptious range from w w nplinBS on admission tickets 
to purchases a t Ducks Unlimited events. In many states, nonprofit organizations are exempt 
from ail sales taxes. In I n im iun . a  more "piecemeal" approach has been used.
With the general health of the stale’s  economy, many tpecial interest* may be looking to the 
legislature for sales tax exemptions. Many nonprofit organizations are meeting  critical 
commanity needs . In many r ises , these organizations are funded by stale and federal hmds 
and are providhig eseintial sendees  which would otherwise  be provided by government. A 
sales tax exemption for these "public charities" may be an appropriate strategy. In order to 
reasonably limit the financial tetegilir—ioiaa of a  sales tax exemptions, it n il  be necessary to 
dearly define those organization* which meet ihe criteria o f "public charities."
In other scenarios, the United Ways of Louisiana may pursue legislation to provide sales tax 
exemptions only for United Way agencies as a  first step to trying to get rales tax exemption s for 
ail nonprofits, in addition, the Catholic Schools amy also be interested in a  taler tax 
exemption. A raler tax exemption is one meant of helping to offset the operating cost of 
organizations.
Example of United Way Sales Tax Exemption: Based on United Way internal projections. United 
Way organizations pay approximately .38% of their budgets in sa les taxes.
Sales Tax Calculation: 8266 ,000 ,000  x 38%  = approximately $1 m llion dollars.
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Tab le  D.l  Logist ic Regress ion Mode l s  Es t ima t ing  the Effect of  F u n d in g  on Organ iza t io na l  Behav io r  of  Nonprof i t  Orga n iz a t i on s
D ep en den t  Var iable:  C O N T R A C T  Mode ls  1 -  8
UnwefghrTd Weighted Unweighted Weighted Unweighted W e ig h te d Ifnwefghied W e ig h te d "
Model t Model 2 Model) Model 4 ModelS Model 6 Model 7 Model 1




-1.999) 1.0627 •1061J .5129 1.1242. •I,3125 .7102 •1.4119 .7977 )4|0 •U ) 6) .9)7) •1)195 7411
United Way .)S44 .6)31 .2147 .2762 .3433 6)91 2512 .34)1 .2279 4271 • 0391 .0761 .2)98 .4460 .0434 0592
Board siie .0160 .7129 .0362 1.7761* .0166 .1951 05)1 1.929)** .0)79 .1)79 .0609 1.9017** .019) .9794 .0625 2.1011**
SufTTull .051) 1.3716 .1166 2.2570** .0671 1.7423* .1221 2)221*** .0650 1.1472* .1219 2 3912*** •0711 1.9693** .1271 2.4906***
Revenue .1016 .4461 .1391 5251 .192) .7142 .2170 1.00)7 .0411 .2119 .0419 .1197 .1014 .49)6 .14)) .6118
National ..))]) .3133 .0964 .1411 •5117 1 0596 • 2699 4521 -.4097 .7299 -.1403 2134 • 6)19 1.1709 • 4386 7921
Educto -.1441 .3)17 ■ 2162 .622) • 1095 .2694 • >222 7125 • 2170 .7144 • 1611 .1610 • 2116 .5665 • 3064 7960




.00975 .7023 ■0)70 1 1641* ■ 01)1 91)6 • 04)2 2.1929*** •01)5 .9971 -.0)10 1.9027** •0164 1 2475 •0456 2 3JJO***
Devolution .1224 1.6494* 2922 1.2741 .3)92 1.7479* 3451 1 5514 >407 1.7761* 1774 1 6637* .3690 1 9469** 4408 20)**
Duplies .001)7 0000 ■ 2040 .191) .0607 1003 • 0144 .3734 •0)71 .1942 •3269 1 5129 0164 0849 • 7001 .9402
Comp fierce .191) 10060 12)) .5166 .1616 14 .1262 6294 2254 1.25)0 2)50 1 2095 0256 1 1)92 2)72 1 2)65






































































































J741 11)0)1 4) Ct










I’rob  <  0 .0 1 , 
l’io b  < 0 .0 5 , 
I’ro b  < 0 .1 0 ,
tw o-la ile rl lest 
tw o -ta ile d  lest 








































Table D.2 M ultivaria te  M odels E stim ating  the E ffect o f F und ing  on Advocacy B ehavior o f N onprofit O rganizations
D ependent V ariable: S T A T E FE D L O C  M odels 1 -  8
UmeeltHtd tlnwfl|bled_____________WelfMed__________  Uaeeei(httd  Weifhled UewiUMid________  Weltliled
MedeiT Model 1 ___________  Modtl I___________Model 4___________  Model 5 Modtl 4 Model 1 Model I
\ ......... 1 KOft b 1 KOfl b 1 score b t icotc --------5 1 score b------- t score ' ’ V ......... 11 core ■ s  ■■■ I store
intercept U.99J607 .663 17.327110 .7̂ 9 9.671217 .421 9.149302 406 17.796276 .801 22.104197 .961 10526775 .467 10 559905 —
Orgarittartoaal
ChinrtiHiiiri
United Way 2.647313 .402 1.161)06 .1)) 3.021996 429 1.341764 .144 .73901) .116 • 1.117696 •126 1.13)607 .161 • 692064 • 074
Hoard site •4369)3 -2.198** -.473274 •2.341*** -.421150 •2.01)** • 367469 -2.055** •472649 •2.3I9** •.3)2101 •2.73I*** - 4)8055 •2.094** •416911 •2 21)
Sufm.ll -.021750 -.1)95 • 02)142 •1.714* -.014977 •920 -015475 •1.066 • 019062 • 1.257 -021790 -1.651* • 01220 -.769 -.014926 • 1 079
Revenue -.130194 -.079 -1.242454 -.791 ..047)296 • 229 • 1.615966 • 656 • 47446) • 25) -1.60499) -.956 -1.007248 • 419 •1.9772)7 • 1 056
National ■179061 • 122 7.709199 1.001 6.51)672 -113 1.119410 .144 779602 • 110 5)04460 .699 •6.762622 9)6 • 996060 -.132
Edurco ..31)555 -.112 0)41)6 .007 -.526142 -.100 • 669136 -.1)9 •1.9906)1 -.396 -1.797261 •375 •1 607942 -.316 •1.515517 •319
Raccceo 6.04SII7 ..sit •1.0)269) • 094 •).704139 -.309 •1.57)145 -.14) •6.651172 -562 •40(79)) -.360 •2.9)9966 25) •2.991121 2 10
OiI»»e .024752 .141 • 029952 •16) -.106199 -.619 • 206277 • 1.060 026910 16) -.020732 -.114 • 114070 -662 •200116 1.026
Corileatval
Fedora
Devolution 6.4019)6 2.430*** 6614)31 2.419*** 7.732776 2.616*** 7 976099 2662*** 6661406 2.596*** 71)1690 2.6)2*** 8.13)266 1092*** 1 5)2066 ) 1)7***
Dtiflira •2J3)III . 91) -5191694 1.954** •2J0094) • 6 )6 •4.750910 • 1.666* • 3.057403 •1.196 6)561(7 .2.429*** -3.200826 •1.175 •5 665416 •2 107**










Advocacl 2)412)6 2.692*** 1.66)668 2.077** 7.126619 2J22** 1.500106 1 616*
Vliitad 9.97314) 2.40)*** 9)55)97 3.199** 9.4)3707 3.112** 7 090151 1 6)3*
Trtcbad .027504 .007 JJ02S4 .057 •1.095167 • 230 • 34)6)2 • 012
Orutad •.242)61 -050 -> 60)925 •761 .216706 .045 •) 291)63 • 670
Coalillon/Altlaece
Hehavtor
C.ulition 2.019072 .936 3.100329 1.339 2 49214) IDS 3.307261 1.460
Slate collaboration 2)167047 3.190'** 27.116696 ).J)7*** 22.13977) 3.101*** 25.069970 ))l)***
National coll. •14.754755 •1.141* -12.572227 •1.31) • 16.6)1471 •2.12)** •13.621991 •I 646*




Separata •6,117492 •121) -5.401640 • 1000 •).73I626 -.721 -617216 114 •5 774226 •1.075 -4,011269 756 •1.212018 6)6 -.0)6046 ■ 007
Program!
R square .3244 ,3607 2309 2664 1192 ‘ )492 2459 2646
Adj. R square 2052 .2479 .1345 .1779 21)4 2461 144) .1885
dfdegicea of 120 120 119 119 119 119 116 111
fverdom
K 2.722 3.191 2.136 2 609 3016 3.4)4 472 2 936
Prob (F) .0001 0001 .0109 0019 0004 0001 0056 0006
'** P r o b  < 0 .0 1 ,  tw o - ta i le d  t e s t
** P r o b  < 0 .0 5 ,  tw o - ta i le d  t e s t


















T ab le  U.3 Logistic Regression Models Estimating the Effect of Funding on Organizational Behavior of Nonprofit Organizations 
Dependent Variable: FEDMON Models 1 -  8
Ontttl|hltd WtT|iir3 Un>ttl|Mtd Wti|hltd Daat l|bttd WtJ|liltd Uoi>t]|hlcd Wtlfbltd
Modtl I Modtl I Modtl3 Kfidti d Modtl 5 Modtl i  Modtll ' Modtl t
b " t Kort I KOf* b 1 fcote b t ico re fc ...... t Kore 1 acots I t tcore b tacore
Inlnccpi ■4.1740 2.2617** •3.9677 1.9779** •4.5)45 2.3690*** •3o)7i 2.6110*** • 37197 2.0972** •2.9206 1.3474 4.1)97 2,4194*** •4.131) 2 4)?5***
Orgaaliatioaal
CbaraclcHatict
United Way .9724 1.9)16** 1.0116 1.5336 .9630 1.9736** 1.027) 1.3394 .9512 1.9290** 1.0545 1.373) .9109 1.9996** .93)7 1.4740
Hoard t in 0)12 1.324) • 0617 1.7051* -.0279 1.20)0 •0490 1.379) • 0)09 1.2147 • 0719 1.9572* • 026) 1.1749 • 0306 1.6)74*
StaflfUH -002)7 1.211) • 00271 1J02S • 00164 .1)46 •0011) 6540 • 00172 .9459 • 00192 1 073$ • 00096 56)6 • 000066 427)
Revenue • 0409 .3194 >1991 1.47)1 • 0175 .6131 • 7261 1.4630 • 0372 4291 • 179) 1.3137 • 1072 .7)10 • 220) 1.39)5
National .1152 .)44l .JM7 .9)36 • 1)91 .27)9 .1)20 2)07 .0921 .1752 .4599 .7724 >.7)17 .4617 •0126 0774
I’riucro .707$ 1.7119* .6309 1.3220 .731$ 1.9)35** .1091 2.0672** 5404 1.3)11 .3326 .9026 .599) 1.5497 .5370 1.33)2
Raccceo ..304$ 39)6 •0101 .0141 • 0959 1211 .1414 .2176 • 00166 .0100 .159) .2209 2042 2762 .3267 476)
Orgage -.0194 1.24)1 • 0171 .964$ • 0264 1.11)1* • 0106 1.7407* • 0119 1.2954 • 019) 1.0113 • 0267 1.9119** • 0299 1.7111*
ConUatuat
Patlon
Devolution .2007 1.024) .2309 1.0114 2124 1.4639 )493 1.56)2 .2502 1.296) 2507 1.14)2 .3200 1.6943* .3699 17171*
Dnplici .00407 .02 • 1604 .7612 • 0)01 .1575 •1341 .6590 •0499 .7649 -.1719 .9661 •0790 .4227 -.16)2 .1499









Ailvocacl .1923 2.7052*** .1246 1.7206* .1646 2 3419*** .1126 1.6961*
Vitilad .7)01 2.3920*** .6091 1.9092* .7)94 2.4909*** 6)75 2,1516**
Tracked •.194$ 1.007) • J599 1.2031 > 3211 1.1175 • 3572 1 2510
Graitad .$741 1.44)4* 3S0I 1.4424 .461) I.3IS3 .3704 9723
CoaUllanfAlllauM
Behavior
Coalition .1)31 .9933 3107 1 166)* .14)4 .9605 .1743 1.7)75
Stale collaboration .•$24 1.3529 1.1229 1.1239* .7464 1.3906 .9499 1.4629
Natioeal coll. ♦ 9177 16017* ••016 1.1742 • 1 0720 1.7104* • 9054 1.1327




Separata • 2692 .6909 • 1732 .4034 • 232) 6)31 •0621 1311 2)2) .6)93 .14)1 .34)9 • 2050 5912 • 03)5 1407
Programs
•  ofObaervaHona 122 172 121 121 121 121 120 120
PvcudoR1 .2401 2166 2155 2501 2231 .270) 1975 2)24
• lltOg L 142.444 163 236 161.464 (6)679 160.72) 164.514 139 761 16) 147
Model Cfcl-Squara 31.697 49007 3) 2)9 40 334 35 791 44113 29 321 36J34
•** Prob < 0 ,01 , two-tailedlest
• •  Prob < 0.05, two-lailed test


















T ab le  1).4 Logistic Regression Models E stim ating the Effect of Fund ing  on O rganizational Behavior of N onprofit O rgan iza tions
D ependent V ariable: STA TEM O N  M odels 1 - 8
Uimtlihlid Wcl|klld Uancl|liteiJ W«l|tat(d Weighted iin*»ri|hUd We]|kl’ed
Model I MoSoTa Model! Model 4 Models Model4 Model7 Model t
b 1 score b t score b 1 score b 1 icoie .... b ........ 1 soon b 1 score b 1 score b 1 score
Intercept -40672 i. 1367** -iloaf 1.1)89* •3.6405 2.114$** ■Ul02 19719** ■3.124) i.049i** ’" E M t MW** •31292 2.141)** -4.0)76 2 231**
Orfialiidoail
CkirMdHillti
United Way .2350 5029 .4621 69)0 .1041 .6151 .4)76 .6129 .1309 .2965 .2713 JI30 JI3I 4)50 .3152 5094
Board site .0115 1 0)43 • 0357 1 2777 • 0251 1.15)6 • 0)40 1 2594 • 0219 1.196) • 0)49 1.5137 • 0221 1.2011 •0)01 1.4044
surmin -00510 1.7316* • 00792 1 9166** • 004)9 1.5961 • 00741 1 7615 • 00474 1.19)1* •00676 2.1794** • 00)96 1.61570 • 00619 1.14)1*
Revenua .1151 1.7072* .2391 1.7191* .2010 1.3424 .1791 1.1162 .2)66 1.41)3 III) 1-2)30 .1471 1.0151 .0919 .7111
National •1.0959 1.9027* •9437 1.4513 •1.3143 2.400)*** •1.1166 2.0151** •1.0944 1.16)1* •9)19 1.4)95 .3)12 2.4141*** •1.2250 2.1002**
F-doceo .1305 .3097 .2773 .6592 .0676 .1712 .1)01 .3404 0166 .209) .404) 1.000) .0466 .1204 .2970 .1065
Racecco • 9911 1.2141 •1.0)73 1.3)25 -.6261 .1062 • 3746 7990 •1.011) 1.3621 • 1.1160 1.35597 • 6170 9106 • 74)4 1.0661
Orfi|« .00514 .3964** • 00472 4)19 • 00269 2112 •0161 10171 .00622 .4936 • 00)11 .2491 • 00264 2161 • 0161 1 0413
Cenleifual
Kk Im i
Devolution .5179 22594** .4101 1.9711** .3466 2.4925** .4117 2 1029** .4621 213)3* 4431 1.9190** .522) 1.4797*** .467) 2 1252**
OupHcA .0417 2119 •0145 .069) .0)1) .1511 .0106 .05 • 0)20 .1622 • 1471 .7111 •0)74 .1176 • 1042 3103










Advoeact .1369 2 2024** 2117 2.II09*** 1264 1 1617* .1370 2 2791**
Vliltad .5034 1.649) JII9 t.2265 .3194 1.1650 1910 .6662
Tracked .1413 4110 .5600 1.17)3* .0647 29)9 .4)10 1.6499*
Oiuiad • 2963 723) • 51)5 1.22)1 .22)6 .5121 • 5944 1)176
('oatMlo«/AOU«ta
Hdiivior
Coalition .0320 .33)6 1)121 3199 01)4 3401
Slate collaboiatioa 1.4116 2 3141*** 15721 2.50I)*** 1.1406 2 2995** 13)36 2.4922*** .1113 7372
National coll. •1.5719 2.3104*** •20464 2.I514*** • 1.3929 2.4426*** •LI129 2.971)***




.Separata .7161 1.9401** .1912 1.1623* III) 7.1149** .9)70 2 7400** .7199 1.9993*** 7726 167)1* .1019 2.1977** 1014 I.9I97**
Protean*
» of Observations i n 121 121 (21 111 111 120 120
Pseudo H1 .2191 J256 .1447 .2730 .2166 J144 .2423 .2616
.ll.o | 1. 144.374 149.644 143J4J 161091 141.5)9 141.947 161J U 147.4)1
Model CM- 
Square
49.627 51.697 39.105 4544) 41.442 51.107 3IJ77 44.060
P r o b  <  0 .0 1 , tw o -ta ile d  te s t
•*  P ro b  <  0 .0 5 , Iw o -U iled  te s t 

















Table D.5 Logistic Regression M odels E stim ating the Effect of Funding on O rgan iza tional Ilehavior of N onprofit O rganizations
D ependent V ariable: LO CA LM O N  Models I -  8
Unweighted Weighted (Weighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted Uewfi|ET?d Weighted
""Model T~~" Model 1 Modtl 3_______  -  Modtl 5________________Model? Modtl? Mod«J ft'
b t icort b t acore b t acore b t *COIt t score " T  ■ " t score b t autre ■ r t score
Intercept" •d.ttif 7.4ift4*** *1.3977 1 16)1 •5.7640 2.421ft*** ■fM  2 T59)4*1 ^1266 2.5686*** •).72iO 1,̂ 607* * •5 169) 219TP** -5 0451 ~ Y ltW *
(li(u (u ilia it
Characleriidct
United Way .240) .4717 .2067 11)4 .7522 .3111 24117 3*97 3201 .646) .3012 4331 2781 3710 .3)37 51)2
Board tire •0257 9951 •0212 1.2090 •0169 .7696 •0110 .9056 -.0230 .9857 • 0)4) 1.074) -.0(78 .84)1 -.024) 1.1432
Stafllbll •00724 1.6)2) • 00696 1.7)21* • 006)4 1.5070 • 0061) 1.500ft • 00757 1.3)76 -.00686 1.3925 • 00627 1.4)94 •00)98 1.4945
Revenue .1619 1.1790 .15)4 1.2515 .21)0 1.4906 .1756 1)720 .1160 8098 .0910 .7697 .1736 1.1242 .120) .9560
National .071) .1419 .4116 .6771 -.1905 .160) • 0216 0510 .1406 2511 .4272 1 0142 -.1025 .1962 .08)5 .1490
luluceo .2722 6776 .4119 1.0499 .3221 1)444 .6)46 1.6840* .3490 .8789 .6012 1.5)0) .5982 1.5)90 .793) 2.1016**
Raccceo •94)9 .9173 •5222 .6)29 • 34)4 .6147 • 1945 .2)54 • 8895 .9612 • 2974 3674 • 64)1 .7446 .1)13 .1738
O u t* l« .0115 .9)7) .00474 .3140 .00917 .9410 .000194 0763 .012) .9985 .00885 3515 .00917 .78)1 .000)1 02
CoaKilttil
Ractora
Devolution .21)0 1.2642 .1)4) .5174 .1)01 1.52 2327 1.0666 24)1 1.1)09 .0)22 .1466 2699 1.301) .168) .1052
D uplica 0)01 2644 •1926 .9)9) .1051 55)0 •0145 .4) .0)81 .2010 • 2129 1.0418 09)2 4791 •121) .6169










Advocact 1012 1.3077 1376 2.1)39** 01)1 12190 .1)19 1.9)4)
Vitiud -.16)7 5)08 • 2576 .7649 -.0717 2)91 • 1410 .4560
Trachad 2691 .9230 J608 1.2)70 .2927 I 014ft 3)11 1.177ft
O ruled 2126 .5276 .2164 5111 -.1469 .3962 • 09V9 2)90
Coalltlon/ANIaMO
Behavior
Coalition •147) 9089 0499 )I50 1611 9925 0)11 24)9**
Slate cotlaboration • 2719 .3016 3661 .6015 • 3)10 6114 5410 .8769
National coll. •1764 1.446ft •1.0495 1.6129* • 1696 1.4249 •1.2134 1.7748




Sf|iaral« .64)0 1.6627* .3)47 .n i6 .4157 1.3299 2990 .76)7 41)4 1i r n • 009)0 0224 3667 1 0226 .0113 2076
Program! t
i  of Obacrvadoae 122 122 121 121 121 121 120 120
fieuda R1 .1)7) .1)70 .1053 I2J5 .14)0 .1711 1112 .1)91
I U |  1. 136.100 13107) 1)5 55) 137.242 135.53) 1)7111 1)4 960 1)7 047
Model CM* 19.447 23.731 14 272 17 056 20.115 26 214 15013 19.18)
Squire
P ro b  <  0 .0 1 , tw o -U ile d  te st 
** P ro b  <  0 .0 5 , tw o - ta ile d  te st 
•  P ro b  <  0 .1 0 , tw o - ta ile d  te s t





















T a b le  D .6
1
Multivariate Models Estimating the Effect of Funding on Advocacy Behavior of Nonprofit Organizations 
Dependent Variable: ADVOCAT Models 1 - 6
U n w e ig h te d W e ig h te d U n w e ig h te d W e ig h te d U n w e ig h te d W e ig h te d
M o d t l  1 M o d e l 2 M o d e l ] M o d e l 4 M o d e l 5 M o d e l 6
CD » 1 KOIC D t score b 1 score b t score b 1 score b t score
O
O Intercept .174961 .073 -1.40(1642 -.587 ■I.l53i94 -473 -2.318034 -1.018 - 9 7 0 id i •394 rS79026 -.<34
■O O rgan isa tiona l
-5 C h a ra c ltr la tlc s
c q ' United Way -.683054 -.952 -.646681 -.687 -.364398 -.311 -435066 -.438 -.375471 -.504 -.478212 -.476O ’l-H Ilnard it ie 043335 2.050** .055324 2.814*** .049595 2.216** .055613 2.787* ** .031634 1.389 .035900 1.769*
0 Stimuli .0026(4 1.397 .002836 1.995** .002408 1.434 002306 1.623* .000746 .411 .000794 .513
<3 Revenue .357363 1.753* .236243 1.414 .403383 2.014** .319211 t.787* .322101 1.322 .223030 1.199
CD National -.012437 -.016 .32(127 .647 -.176803 -.227 .321247 .393 -.155593 -.193 .457902 .548—s
Itduceo -.395766 •7 2 0 -.4369(8 -860 -.177273 -.323 -266685 -.517 -.109807 -.190 •377200 -.705
T1 Itacccco -.187440 -.149 -.641238 -.566 -224203 -.179 -.879888 -.773 -.184316 -.137 -.920350 -.753
C O r*i«e -.009181 -.505 -016238 -.844 -.011208 -623 -.013618 -.697 -.008968 -.478- -.008357 -.408
O ’ C o n tcatoa l Factor*
CD Devolution .226817 .813 .326301 1.166 323276 1.122 .513919 1.731* .331102 1.143 .443441 1.540
-5 Duplica JOOOI6 1.081 .322475 1.139 .360835 1 293 .360381 1.235 JI0 5 3 S 1.085 297260 1.030
CD-Q Com p fierce -.319646 -1.234 .135493 .309 -.352787 -1.380 .059004 .223 - 337044 •1.319 .034916 .199
-5
O F und ing  V ariable*
Q . Contract 2.077** 2.467076 3.036*** 2.103399 2.606***
C
O SUtefeUloc .028069 2.692*** .021566
5 W Fcdmon 1.711587 2093** .758229 .876
Slate mon 1.559626 1.789* 2.334344 2.685***
- 0 l.ocaltnun -.066946 -.074 .116623 .118-5





Q . ( t r a i l  ad
Coalltlon/A lllance
l-H llchav lar
O Coalitionc State collaboration -.704244 -863 •1.685673 -2.037** -645859 -.792 -1.354283 -1.601 -.552260 -673 -1.303768 -1.551
■0 National coll. 1.459208 1 653* 2.037180 2.291** 1.323400 1.509 1.678821 1.896* 1.027866 1.123 1.477014 1.624*
CD lasue coll. -483031 •591 -.215208 -242 -436121 -.536 •082825 -.093 • 530209 -.612 •217273 -2 3 7
3 Seppgtuga 1.291790 2427*** 1.229249 2.221** 1.547024 2.984*** 1.467769 2.657*** 1.562333 2.903* *• 1.49497? 2.626***
c/)' R iq u a re 3539 .4021 .1436 .3777 .3298 .3560
c/j A djusted R iq u a re 2399 .2966 .2416 .2811 .2204 2509
0
0 d f—degree* o f 120 120 119 119 114 114
freedom
K 3.104 3.811 3.369 3.908 3.014 3 386
P ro b  (V) .0002 .0001 0001 0001 0004 .0001
***  P to b  <  0 .0 1 , tw o - ta ile d  le s t
• * l'tob <0.05, two-tailed test

















T ahlc  D.7 M ultivaria te  M odels Estim ating the  Effect of Funding on Advocacy Behavior o f N onprofit O rganb.ations
D ependent V ariab le: V ISIT  AD M odels 1 - 6
U n w e ig h te d  W e ig h te d  U n w e ig h te d  W e ig h te d  U n w e ig h te d  'W e ig h t e d
M o d e l 1 M o d e l 2  M o d e l 3 M o d e l 4  M o d e l s  M o d e l T
b 1 sco re b 1 sco re b I scurc b i sco re " ' b ' ...... I sco re b I sco re
In Icrccpt -.2(19501 -.334 -.091694 -.145 -.179481 -.288 - 252267 -.398 .100980 .165 007844 .012
O rgan lea lional
C h aracter! illce
United Way -.167283 -.899 -.178227 -.703 -.143050 -.799 -.149097 -.618 -224649 -1.231 - 222584 -9 2 9
llnaid  lire .006)4) 1.106 .006556 1.269 .011361 2020** 012302 2.407** 009962 1.763 011823 2 )4 5
.Slatmill .000453 .990 .000513 1.300 .0008)9 1.97.9** .000874 2.399*** 000824 1.917 .000865 2.369*
Revenue .049481 .930 .0)3335 .704 .077052 1.496 064014 1.398 069505 1.3)4 .0646)0 1.391
National - 18428) -.919 -.222047 -1.048 - 206654 •1.049 -.262274 -1.258 -.151860 -.760 -.165684 -.793
1’iliiceo -.146903 -1.012 -.247855 •1.819* -.178)12 -1.270 -.232826 -1.760* -.226758 -1.613* -.260056 •1.992* i
Racereo • 02)089 -.068 -.274941 -8 8 4 -.111804 • 348 -343241 -1.179 -.134137 -4 1 6 - 330972 -1.136
(linage -.004367 -.928 -.004022 -.773 -.004614 •1.004 -005216 •1.042 -.003389 -.730 -004990 •I.O il
C onte ittaal F acto r!
Devolulion .079867 1.098 .138697 1.891* • .083750 1.138 .147362 1.936* .071348 1.001 .111107 1.546
Duplica .0440)6 .614 .013050 .178 .058129 .818 .031551 .430 .042112 .596 005751 .081
Cortqi fierce .009754 .143 .106809 1.522 .003471 033 .101930 1.504 .017059 .258 .121139 1.772
Funding V ariable!
Contract .759852 3.743*** .625472 3.045***
Stale fedloc .007767 2.949*** .006625 2.503***
Fcdnnn .505660 2.435*** .446945 2.021*
Sla lemon .448785 2 020* .624)59 2.778***
larcalnmn -.321952 •1.40) -472216 -1.868*




C ln iu d
Coalition/A lliance Behavior
Coalition
Slate collaboration - 307204 •1.487 -.601193 -2.803*** -.293973 •1.410 607116 -2.802*** -.330128 -1 588 -.681824 -3.212***
National coll. .197875 862 .357014 1.544 226140 1.012 385988 1.703* .242587 1.080 .442007 1.940*




S ep ara ta  P ro g n a sa .533758 3.956*** .492076 3.401 **• .521393 3.942*** .482)00 3.411*** .469197 3.456** .423173 2.981***
ftiq u a re .3108 .3458 1(559 .4613 .3785 .4237
Ad). I t iq u a re .280/ 2982 .2684 .3092 2698 .3230
df-degreea o f  freedom 115 115 120 120 121 121
F 3.805 4.034 3.731 4.357 3.484 4 207
P rob (F) .0001 .0001 .0001 0001 .0001 .0001
*** Prob < 0.01, two-tailed tost
** Prob < 0.05, two-talled test


















T able  D.8 M ultivaria te  M odels E stim ating  the Effect o f F und ing  on Advocacy B ehavior o f N onprofit O rganizations
D ependent V ariable: TRACKAD M odels 1 -  6
U n w e ig h te d  W e i g h t e d ______________U n w e ig h te d _______ W e ig h te d  U n w e ig h te d  W e ig h te d
M o d e l i M o d e l 2 M o d e l 3 M o d e l 4 M o d e l 5 M o d e l 6
b I1 sco re b 1 sco re b  1 score b 1 sco re b 1 sco re b I sco re
Intercept -.674372 -1.650 -1.059119 •1.578 -.429016 674 -.905 i 1 i •1.342 -.389544 - 4 l4 -.482 j 32 -1.533
O rg an lra llo aa l C haracteristics
United Way -.126436 -.650 -.173733 •647 -.177581 -.960 • 204418 -.796 - 184964 -.987 -202895 -.808
Ito n d  li r e .007930 1.337 .007430 1.358 .010181 1.743* .010704 1.968** .009748 1.679* .010557 1.999**
S tim u li .000437 .966 .000341 .815 .000648 1.497 .000527 1.360 .000712 1.613* .000662 1.731*
Revenue 009917 .181 -.019817 -395 .023292 .443 -.000211 -004 .013320 .233 -022089 -.454
National .033929 .173 .171303 .763 .054864 273 .153771 .693 .093229 .464 .232055 1.061
Kduceo .116691 1.241 .16295) 1.129 .130778 .913 .135329 .961 .127103 .880 .149890 1.096
Kacecco -.219364 -.624 -.307067 -.931 -.309597 -.943 -.414349 -1.337 -.26)13) -.794 -.2668)9 -.173
Or gage -.003601 -.780 -001996 -.362 -.003708 -.791 -.003219 -.605 -.00)604 -.755 -.002827 -.547
C oitlealM il P a ila r*
Devolution .022633 .300 .037205 .736 .012159 .162 .047116 .562 01944) .266 .0)9149 .320
Duplica OS735I .771 .052752 .680 .053397 .736 .057034 .732 .041885 .577 .044193 .39)
C ontp lieirc -.017126 -.243 .082517 1.110 -.013582 •233 .087190 1.209 -.007117 -.105 .115859 1.618*
F u n d in g  V ariable*
Con Intel .425642 2.024** .450808 2.071**
Statcfnilnc .004265 1.394 003767 1.3)7
l-'ednani .086615 .406 -.093993 -.406
Slalcmon .3046)5 1.335 .642490 2.730***
1 ncalinun .026996 .115 -021311 • 081





( 'oallllon /A lllanc*  B ehavlar
Coalition
Slate collaboration - 247792 •1.157 • 362995 •1.399 -.252206 -1.183 -366279 -1.589 -2 3 3 )1 3 •1.092 -403997 -1.818*
National coll. .220649 .927 .390856 1.595 242471 1.063 .378295 1.369 .272772 1.18) .500250 2.097**




S ep a ra ta  r ro g ra m a .232239 1.660* .217743 1.420 .218957 1.622* 211224 1 404 .162970 1.168 .1)0094 .875
H iq u a re 1818 2460 .1711 2)63 .1710 .2894
A d |. R iq u a re 0495 .1241 .0443 .1188 034) .1632
d f  degrees a t  treedam 115 115 120 120 121 121
P 1.375 2.018 1.348 2012 1.239 2.330
Prolr (P) .1701 .0188 .1832 0187 245) .0041
*** Prob < Q.01, two-talled tost
** Prob < 0.05, two-talled tost

















I able D.9 M ultivaria te  Models Estim ating the EfTcct o f F unding on Advocacy B ehavior of N onprofit O rganizations
D ependent V ariable: GRASS AD M odels 1 -  6
 ____________________ U nw eighted_____________ W eighted  U nw eighted  W eigh l7d U nw eigh ted  W eigh ted
Model 1_________ Model 2    Model 3 Model 4 M odels Model 6
b ............. 1 sco re — T  " t score b 1 score b 1 sco re b t sco re b 1 sco re
lulciccpl -.087732 -.193 -.037615 -.083 -.348398 -.719 -.287897 -.581 -.266691 -.567 -.281385 -591
O rg an lia llo n a t
C haracteristics
United Way .060019 .439 .081228 .447 .050379 .358 061649 .327 .002572 .018 .023822 .121
lloaid  s ite .008042 1.909” .009909 2677*” .008404 1.889* 009351 2.340** 008634 1.990** .010690 2.722*”
SlaftfUII .000147 .437 .000200 .707 .000613 1.863* 000620 2.175** 000391 1.791* .000598 2 100”
Kcvcimc .036934 .945 .040188 1.184 .048391 1213 .046313 1.294 .053132 1.329 .061318 1.694*
National -.083067 -377 .111405 .733 -.106150 -.693 .104278 .639 -.118682 -.774 .084619 .320
liduccu .003907 .037 -.048928 -.501 .064999 .596 .017870 .173 .032324 .301 .005875 .058
Racecco J75B 10 1.308 .366051 1.641* .376698 1 509 .364431 1.601 .334744 1.433 .327861 1.445
O igago -.000904 -.262 -.002650 -.711 -.003225 •903 -.005838 •1.492 •002130 -.603 -.005159 -1.341
C o o le ilu a l R a d o n
Devolution .076919 1.439 .032746 .623 .069997 1.224 .024973 .420 .069998 I J 7 9 .019909 .336
Duplica .031761 .982 .098071 1.868* .070207 1.271 .116291 2.029** .064192 1.184 .119617 2.156”
C onqiflene -.124267 -2.484” * -.090801 -1.806* -099316 -1.951** -067453 -1.273 - 113731 -2.237** • 093693 -1.759*
F u ad la g  V ariables
(.'on tnci .181177 1.215 .035555 .377
S latcralloc .001680 .821 000188 .091
f 'cdnun .344113 2.139” .349005 2.026”
Slalemun •080193 -.470 •072169 -4 1 2
l.ocalm on -.005559 -.032 -081136 -.412








Stale collaboration .011333 .075 -070003 -.456 -036288 -.224 -.101200 •597 -.033640 -.211 -.136124 -823
National coll. .146921 .871 .231616 1.397 .198375 1.142 .249589 1.409 .213538 1 239 .260310 1.467




S ep a ra te  P r e g n m i .026632 269 -.023500 -2 4 6 .035430 .539 .009833 .089 063013 .605 .022353 .202
K iq u a re .2113 .2335 .2009 2i7& 2348 .2515
AU|. I t iq u a re .0954 .1096 .0780 .0975 .1010 .1207
d t-d c g rce i a t  f re c d a n 115 115 120 120 121 121
F 1.758 1.885 1.634 1.810 1.756 1.923
P ro li (FI 0480 .0306 0726 0392 0413 0216
*** Prob < 0.01, two-tailed tost
“  Prob < 0.05, two-tailed test

















Table D.10 M ultivaria te  M odels E stim ating  the Effect of F unding  on Advocacy B ehavior of N onprofit O rganizations
D ependent V ariable: C O A LITIO N  M odels 1 -  6
U nweighted W eighted Unweighted W eighted U nweighted W eighted
M odri 1 M odel 2 M odel 3 M odel 4 M odel 3 Model 6
T> I jcore B I score B ( score B I score E I K ore B ( icore
Intercept -1.440743 • 939 -2.990011 -2.094** - 893402 -633 •2 543321 -i.85 l* • 1.070415 -.760 -2.40605) -1.792*
O rg a n lu l lo n o l
C h arac te ristic s
United Way .6129)6 2.010** .606746 1.422 .631030 2.033** .609672 1.541 .612263 1.861* .511375 1.288
Doord li re .010326 .740 .020790 1.672* .012069 .894 .022*45 1.911** .01236) .942 .024831 2.129**
sunruii -.0001370 -.172 .000141 .214 -000119 -.160 .000215 .350 •000150 - 19* .000262 .423
Revenue .41)36) 4.6)7*** .393244 S.284*** .411313 4.862*** .397529 5.708*** 420172 4*74*** .411100 5.73)***
Nollonel .000340 .001 -.0976*0 -277 .031123 .148 -.09997* -.29) .096700 26* -.07252* -.212
I’duceu .2622) 1.0)1 .039219 2 6 ) .213227 .894 .014037 066 .208*37 832 -065130 -.30)
Racecen -.699774 -1.121 -1.0771)1 •2,116** -.717368 -1.371 • I . 101559 -2.343** -.7703*0 -.1.3)7 -1.123)39 •2.409***
O tg ige .000712 .012 -.00/042 -o r /2 -.000040*30 -0 0 5 -.006136 -.720 .001834 .224 -.004610 -.541
C o n te i lu t l  F actera
Devolution .0*3978 .646 .166299 1.290 033073 .248 .111929 .140 074591 .578 .126170 1.01*
Duplica .23)770 1.926** .247*93 1.97*** .230661 1.967** .268074 2.1*9** .242644 1.897** -237901 1.9*1**
Com plicrce -.320730 • 2611*** -.317322 -2.739*** • 316118 •2.760*** -.331490 -3.027*** -.313214 -2.670*** -.339*33 •.3226***
Fund ing  V orloblea
Contract .0)0617 .012 .0304*6 .141 .003766
Slitefcdloc 1 256 .006676 1.561
I-’cdrtBin .400197 1.076 .665100 1.844**
Slalenarn .311430 .8)4 .206)72 .559
localm on -.4315)9 -1.103 • 087642 -.213
A dvocacy V a e ta b la
Advocact
ViniLad .043163 .211 -.113914 -.600 022364 108 -.15178) -.793 -.043931 -.215 -.207091 •1.108
Tracked .0114)7 .394 .109291 3*6 .048301 .240 .098760 .546 .10)122 .512 .130544 .707
(Irau ad -.132236 -.603 .091091 .372 -.173680 -.741 .075405 334 • 200891 -8 4 3 .045707 .20)






I’utpoilve .039190 .464 -.0230*2 -304 090739 1.103 .020961 .254 .071771 .168 .022583 .282
M aterial .021408 .404 .049664 912 -.006340 -.133 .024442 .484 .001203 .025 .02225) .446
Solidary .046640 360 .174734 2.310** .022390 281 .153773 2.083** .02*07* .354 .166184 2 J0 8 * *
S ep a ra te  P ro g ram s .073449 .296 .402662 1.69** .083394 .360 378766 1.666* 079653 .327 .364802 1.394
R iq u a r e 1)14 .45*6 3576 .4666 3739 .4930
A d |. R iq u a re .214) .3444 2292 3599 .2340 .3797
df-degreca o f  freedom 109 109 114 114 115 115
F 2 366 4.013 2.784 4.373 2 67) 4 352
F ro li (F) .0013 .0001 .0006 .0001 .0006 .0001
*•* Prob < 0.01, two-(ailed lest
• •  Prob < 0.05, two-tailed test

















T able D .l 1 L ogistic  Regression M odels E stim ating  the Effect of Funding on O rganizational Behavior of N onprofit O rgan iza tions
D ependen t V ariable: ST A T E C O L L  M odels 1 -  6
U nw eighted W eighted U nweighted W eighted U nweighted W eighted
M odel I M o d d l M e d d  3 M odel 4 M odel S M e d d  4
b t score t> t score b 1 score b t score b 1 score b ■ 1 score
Intercept -i.< ti i4 .7267 -4.5893 I.9 i94** -1.6234 .7229 4.5049 1.7431* -2.32<S7 ] .6387 -5.3233 2.0729**
O rganiza tional
C haracteristics
United Way .2258 .43)2 .2298 .3262 .3303 .6339 .3675 .4339 .4611 .8337 .3029 .3395
Doaid lire -.00420 .1963 .0113 .3499 .00586 2674 .0211 1.0237 .00330 .1606 .0263 1.2361
stimuli .0041) .6678 .00222 .6441 .00382 .7248 .00469 .7309 .00334 .6567 .00421 .7225
Revenue .2818 1.3008 .2784 1.8199* .3342 1.8446* .3615 2.2250** .3367 1.8203* .4162 2.3383***
National -.02378 .430) -.6447 1.1492 -.3883 1.0309 -.7354 1.2066 -.334) .3875 -.3916 .6319
Pducco -.3467 .9621 -3283 1.38 -.2823 .7439 -.8066 1.8757* -.1907 .4904 -.6652 1.5504
Racecrn -1.1302 1.3028 -1.7791 2.14)8** -1.7000 1.8824** •2.6222 2.9442*** •1.6273 1.8400* -2.3269 2.933***
Orgage -.0208 1.6389* -.023) 1.6167* -.0229 1.6934* -.0239 1.53)6 -0204 13239 -0231 1.4934
C en les tn a l F a c la n
Devolution .1026 .3271 .1187 .33 .0130 .0624 • 1285 .5067 .1460 .7191 .082) 3618
Duplica .2297 1.2718 .2193 1.4770 .3322 1.7482* .4307 2.0177** .3131 1.3673 .2611 1 2154
Coinpficice -.0390 .2244 0231 .13266 -0781 .4438 -.0368 .1929 .000219 .0000 -.0171 .0)34
F unding V arlabtea
Conltacl .9068 1.6733* 1.0029 1.7239*
Slalcrcdloc .0260 3.0276*** .0363 3.3259***
Fedrtain .6894 1.1397 I J I 7 2 1.8123*
State mon 1.7934 2.6592*** 2.1654 2.8424***




Viiitad -.3196 9307 -8296 2.4104*** -.3321 .9751 -1.1308 2.5138*** -.4146 1.1008 -1.2204 2.8347***
Truckad -.3338 1.0448 • 0680 .2214 -.3761 1.1449 -.0819 .2102 • 3026 .9264 •0673 .1339







Purposive .0441 .3356 .1339 .9539 .1203 8345 .3416 2.0190** .0781 .5449 .2806 1.7361*
Material -.0183 2)83 .0320 .3931 •0 9 0 ) 1.0723 •0161 1712 ■0501 .3002 .0203 .2076
Solidary .0191 .130) -0108 .0824 .0448 3527 • 0)02 .2109 0191 .1493 •0108 0701
Separa te .7137 1.8740* 1.3201 3.0744*** .8240 2.0392** 1.4541 2.9)92*** (314 1.5304 1.2626 2.3S98***
Program s
1 o t O b itr r a lle n a I I I I I I 116 U 6 117 l l f
Pseudo R 1 .2161 .2874 .2697 .3434 2747 .3303
-2 l a t f l . 130.610 161.384 136612 164.917 158.407 167 544
M odel C h i-S quare 30.601 .44764 42.830 61.216 44.311 59823
**• Prob < 0.01, two-tailed test
** Prob < 0.05, two-tailed test

















‘l'ablc D.12 Logistic Regression M odels E stim ating  the Effect of Funding  on O rganizational B ehavior o f N onprofit O rgan iza tions






M o d tl 1
Unweighted
M o d e l]
W eighted
M o d tl 4
U nweighted
M o iid S
W eigh ted"




















S u ic ttu n





In rk a d
O usted










P to g ra a it________
b I score b t score 6 1 score T t score T 1 score E t ICOTC
-.2 3241 .1)21 -2.4780 .8823 -.6869 .2385 -1.2954 .4645 •2 .1538" .7223 -1.(128# .5732
.4116 .1479 .3807 .3032 .3969 .7171 .3204 .4534 .4491 8021 .2479 3419
-00511 .2214 .00357 .2128 -0163 .5967 -.00240 0911 -00877 .3111 .00351 .1338
.00204 .1414 .0170 .5365 .00317 .1729 .0147 5154 .00558 .2045 .0286 .9203
.9666 3.0338*** .8111 2.7622*** .9590 2.7971*** .7456 2.6417*** 1.0061 2.7091*** .7425 2.6260***
1.0943 1.7631* 1.4241 2.1700** 1.2580 2.0739** 1 5756 2.4464*** 1.2460 1.9409*** 1.3422 1.9697**
-.160) .3712 -.4043 1.0488 -.3638 8636 • 4827 1.2650 -.2278 .3228 -.4803 1.18)7
-4.1219 2.S663*** -5.0607 2J0IO *** -3.9765 2.4338*** -5.0499 2.5626*** -4.0013 2.3761*** -5.1769 2.5318***
.0147 1.0419 .00238 .1493 .0124 .8666 .00368 2317 .0108 .7267 -.00234 .1411
-.0721 .3291 -.2094 .9044 -.1776 .7714 -.3186 1.2616 -0634 .2798 -.1518 .6199
.3136 1.4469 .0646 .2927 .2729 1.2748 .0748 .3401 .2857 12970 0722 .3209
-.4462 2.0142** -.3842 2.6147*** -.3490 1.6857* -5350 2.4504 -.3281 1-5345 -.5404 2J856***
-.1096 .1797 -2231 .3686
-.00552 .6596 .000649 .0762
-.3308 .7373 .3107 4004
-3954 .3869 -.887) 1.1913
-.2745 .3961 -3203 .3129
.3325 .9090 .200) .5373 .4051 1.0775 2668 .7198 .3474 .92)3 .0803 .2112
.0194 2322 .2476 .68 .1397 3561 .1941 .5347 .1807 .438) .5066 1.1857
-1392 .3334 .1903 .3663 -.1192 .2377 .1147 .2207 -.1142 .22 .0479 0911
I  o f  O b ir rv a t le a i 
F tru d u K 1 
-2 l.o| I.
M odel C h l^ t ja a ra
.2573 1.5910 .1435 .9033 .3248 1.8755* .2392 1.3700 .2622 1.5803 .1546 .8841
-.1006 .9535 01190 .1118 -.1228 1.13 -.0227 .213B -.0889 .8196 -.0149 .1)53
.00418 0283 .1324 .8784 -.0694 .4567 .0540 .3556 •0443 2982 .1038 .6826
.0790 .1764 .0294 .0583 .0633 .1411 -.0104 .02 .1635 3476 .2018 .3891
i l l I I I 116 t r s '  "  1*7 117........
.3094 .3400 .3216 .3425 3265 3320
145.103 138.136 151.867 161.749 153 884 164.634
49.7)3 57.173 34.991 60.419 56.713 63.369
Prob < 0.01, 





















T able I). 13 Logistic Regression M odels E stim ating the Effect of F und ing  on O rgan izational Behavior of N onprofit O rganizations
Dependent V ariable: ISSU EC O LL M odels 1 - 6
Unweighted W eighted U nweighted W eighted U nw eighted W eighted
M o d d i M o d d  2 M o d tl) M odel 4 M o d e l) M odel i
b t score b 1 score b 1 score b t score b I score b t score
Intercept -9.3514 3.0678*” •14.2423 3.6051 • • • -7.0921 2.8158*” •11.6119 3.3600*” •6.9738 2.7067” * •10.8688 3.0088*”
O rg in U a tlsa a l
C haracteristic*
Uniteil Way .3739 .6537 .3290 .3936 .4531 .8320 .05852 7239 .3386 .5948 .1727 .1982
Ooard site .0373 2 2 3 6 9 ” .0885 2.7487*** .0438 1.9091” .0737 2.6236” * .050) 2.0938” .0863 2.8132*”
Sliltrull -.000)2 .1670 .000064 .0316 .000586 .5309 .00107 .9264 .000714 .6)39 00124 .9740
Revenue .3542 1.6570* .5707 1.9865** .4098 2.0693” .6604 2 .5 4 0 9 " * 4487 2.1109” .6763 2.2051”
National -.M SI 1.0374 -1.0705 1.4)69 -.5454 .9249 •9445 1.2833 -.8213 12791 •1.3750 1.6489*
lldoceo 1.3353 2.8308” * 1.7334 3.15” * 1.3226 3.0410*** 1.7015 3.2686*” 1.2308 2.72)7*** 1.3149 2.3928” *
Kacccco .1610 .1568 .2283 .2339 -.0679 .0678 0214 .0245 -.1077 .106) -.3226 .3251
O tgage -.00262 .1735 -.0200 .8802 -.0178 1.2135 -.0443 2.0515” -0201 1.2367 -.0417 1.7947*
C o n tta tu a l F ac to rs
Devolution .4930 1.8485* .9630 2 2 9 )9 ” .4646 1.7648* .9190 2.2476” .5006 1.8511* 1.0294 2.1835”
Duplica .2712 1.2943 .5531 22211” .2422 1.2047 .5092 2 .1 1 4 1 " 26)8 1.2287 .560) 1.9880”
Cm rpflerce -.4840 2.0780” -.7906 2.8442*** -.2453 1.2588 -5514 2 .3 ) 7 3 " * -3362 1.6258* -.7383 2.8095” *
F und ing  V ariab les
Cnntiacl .7659 1.1472 .8935 1.1942
Slatefcilloc -00069 .0906 .00045 0539
I’c d n u n .4490 .7266 1.4647 1.8672*
Slalcmon -8705 1.3014 -1.5859 1 8268*




Visited .1337 .3)24 2 9 1 3 .6820 .3845 1.0854 5244 1.3785 .4193 1.1544 .5715 1.3641
1'iachad .3171 1.0976 .3473 .9442 .16)5 .5078 .1576 .4665 .1920 .5668 .4094 1.0175
Grassad -2.0623 3.1359*” • 1.9061 2.6075” * -1.5170 2 .9 2 7 8 * " •1.4569 2.5084*** -1.5859 2.9999*** -1.8155 2.7939
C oalition/A lliance





I’uiposive -.0735 .4999 -.3052 1.456) .0173 .125) • 1588 8120 • 0299 .2025 • 2287 1.0598
M aterial .1096 1.1403 .1361 1.0450 0235 2804 0252 .2161 0229 .2604 -0 )1 8 .3634
Solidary -.0718 .4587 .12960 .6843 -.1361 .9548 0516 .2948 -.0973 6686 .1986 .9880
Separata Programs .1604 .3722 4219 .8262 .0386 .0964 2999 6318 .1214 27)7 .4322 .7542
4 o f  O bse rva tlon i III 111 116 ‘ 116 117 117
Pacudo H‘ .2673 .3571 .2344 .3334 .2554 3726
Z la tg  t . 136.777 145.035 143.695 150.309 144.435 151.456
M odel C h l-S quarc 40.300 61.648 35.523 58.026 40.129 69.475
• • •  Prob < 0.01, two-tailed test
** Prob < 0.05, two-tailed teat


















T ab le  D.14 M ultivaria te  M odels E stim ating  the Effect o f Funding on O rganizational Behavior of N onprofit O rganizations
D ependent V ariab le: S E P P llO G S  Models 1 - 6  (continued on 6.15b)
U nweighted W eighted U nweighted W eighted U nweighted W eighted
Model 1 M e d d  2 M odel 3 M odel 4 M o d els M odel 6
b l score b t score b t score b t score b 1 score b I score
Inlcicept .954454 2.256” 1.057885 2.585” * .946277 2.225*” 1.033162 2.521*” .863276 2.069” .943292 2 J 2 8 ”
O rg an lin tlono l
C harac te ristic s
United Way .169561 1.310 .149020 .892 .101288 .799 .068921 .431 .115015 .907 .075649 .469
Hoard sire -.0030JO -.745 -.003404 -.971 -.004689 •1.151 -005434 -1.565 -003380 -.844 -004824 -1.377
SUfTTnll .000667 2.133” .000581 2.278” .000610 2.053” .000568 2.336” .000740 2.499*” .000642 2.615*”
Revenue -.026467 -.710 -.031685 -1.009 -.031887 -879 -040034 • 1.313 -04J499 -1.197 -047123 •I 486
National .389607 2 8 8 1 ” .476272 3.558*** .416736 3.145*” 500979 J .795*” .441680 3.332*** .504704 3.786***
lltluceo .015963 .154 -.022679 -.242 .034019 .339 -.003498 -.061 .036048 .559 .007282 079
Kacccco .026350 .110 .129636 .617 .046212 .202 .127482 .643 .107012 .472 .155601 .781
Oigage .002241 .682 .004151 1.427 .002207 .687 .004967 1 302 .001182 .367 .003010 1.317
C on leatua l F acto rs
Devolution .012730 1.632* .058956 1.210 .079890 1.558 059300 1.165 .051488 1.038 .045678 .942
Duplica -.058555 -1.173 -.053599 -1.098 -.070221 •1.421 -0 6 J7 I7 -1.301 • 064427 -1.321 -.056778 - I .171
Cutnpfierec -.020948 -.427 -.030074 -.626 -020069 -.432 •023241 -.505 -.010244 -.218 -.012134 -253
F und ing  V ariable*
Contract -.204429 -1.367 -.166200 -1.180
Slalefedloc -.002300 -1.213 -001795 • 1.000
I'ednmn • 210678 -1.412 -.141106 -.913
Stalenw n .207388 1.326 .142693 .899
Isrcalm on .156033 .974 .017041 .099
A dvocacy V ariable*
Advocact
Vitilad .285219 3.622*” .246552 3J274*” .279205 3.604*** .245361 3.249*** .255952 J.29B*” .227109 2.994***
Tracked -.028691 -.352 -.012471 -.168 -.037017 -.458 -.028537 -.390 -.057760 -.719 -.030443 -.670




Slate collaboration .288894 2.022” .458991 3.301*” .315750 2 201” 478003 3.399*” .247372 1.723* .416940 2.913*”
National coll. .036213 .225 -.069975 -.452 .034242 .218 -.077264 -.507 .095393 608 -027534 -.176




S ep a ra ta  F ragrant*
R tq u a ra .3770 .6234 .3880 .4412 .4086 .4480
Ad). R  squoro .2614 J I 6 4 .2800 .3426 .2915 3387
dl-degrec* o f  freedom 115 115 120 120 121 121
F 3.261 3.957 3.592 4.474 3.489 4 0 9 9
P rob  (F ) .0001 0001 .0001 0001 .0001 .0001
*** Prob < 0 .0 1 , two-tailed test
** Prob < 0 .0 5 , two-tailed test

















T able D.1S ; M ultivaria te  M odels E stim ating  the Effect o f  Funding  on O rgan iza tional B ehavior of N onprofit O rganizations
D ependent V ariable: SEPPK O G S M odels 7 -  12 (con tinuation  from  6.15a)
lln n c lg h tcd  W eighted  U nw eighted W eigbicd U nweighted W eighted
~ M o d r i7  M odel I  M o d 3 9  M od tl 10 M o W l !  M o d e i i l
b t score ' b l  score b 1 score b t score — s t score b t score
Intercept 1.64336ft 2.417*** 1.196459 2.9I5*** 1.060757 2.453*** 1.197106 2.902*** .975715 2.304 1.117469 1.777***
O rg an lia tian a l
C haracter! rtlc i
United Way .137461 1.028 .110391 641 .074643 .573 .038384 .234 .091138 .701 .048495 .294
llnaiil s i n -.003(37 -.934 -.004993 •1.427 -.003106 •1.231 •006268 • 1.782* -.003663 -.901 -.005569 •1.581
StarTTull .000791 2.488*** .0006(4 2.660*** 000711 2.394*** .000645 2.689*** .000838 2.828*** .000699 2.870***
Kcvcnue -.033663 -.876 -.040504 -1.270 -.036426 -.978 -044598 -1.439 -045193 •1.216 -.046699 •1.477
National .317519 2.775*** . .416617 3.034*** .408733 3.006*** .439742 3 271*** .435607 3.208*** .457408 3.372***
I’ducco -.027474 -.264 -.06(037 -.741 -.016599 -.166 •060694 -.683 .006360 .064 -.046533 -.523
Kacccco .007721 .032 .060200 .2(7 .020)18 .089 063724 .325 094777 .416 .104227 .526
Otgage .001(79 .556 .004962 1.427 .002070 .631 .003223 1.564 .001112 .338 .0051(5 1.553
(.'o a tca taa l F ac to rs
Devolution .090425 1.730* .074120 1.500 .091581 1.739* 074988 1.438 .063287 1.260 .039129 1.210
Duplica -.073964 -1.441 -.0(2924 -1.690* -.0(3857 •1.697* ■ 090067 • 1.833* •076493 -1.533 • 081237 • 1.683*
Coinp fierce .009711 .197 .005733 .121 .004288 .091 003871 .085 .010223 .217 .010943 .235
F u n d in | V ariable*
Contract -.144092 -.931 -.121747 -.833
Stateredloc -.002102 •1.075 •001382 -.758
Ixdm on •1 (2 2 (5 •1.216 -.092573 -611
Slatcinon .248320 1.570 .173123 1.098
localm on .091333 .362 -.0(5395 -.496
Advocacy V ariable*







■State collaboration 230926 1.717* .403606 2.873*** .299132 2.045** .430031 3038*** .222439 1.322 .370053 2 590***
National coll. .019(84 .120 -.0(7542 -355 .000913 .006 • 096060 -6 1 9 .072413 .448 •047495 -.298




S ep a ra te  P ro g ram a
K sq u are .3323 .3879 '  '  .J52J .4134 .3739 .4233
Adj. R square .2233 .2(80 .2517 .3223 .2633 3218
df-degree* • (  freedom 114 114 119 119 120 120
F 3.048 3.(81 3.501 4.537 3.38) 4 16)
P rob (K ) .0004 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001
*** Prob < 0 .0 1 , tw o-tailed test
*• Prob < 0 .05 , tw o-tailed test

















T able D.16 M ultivaria te  Models E stim ating  the Effect of Fund ing  on O rgan izational B ehavior of N onprofit O rganizations
D ependent V ariable: SE PPR O G S M odels 1 - 6  (continued on 6.16b)
Unvt r l |h l t i j  W eighted U im c lgh ltd  \V «l|b l«d  U n rre l |h tfJ  W eighted
M odd  I M o d tl 2 M odd  3 M o d tl 4 M odd  5 M odd  (t
b 1 score b t score b t score b t icorc ...... t .......... 1 score b " " t score
Intercept 1.634681 2.466*** 1.087784 2.708*** .992707 2.363** 1.019504 2.562*** .904405 2.194** .928240 2.356**
O rgan isa tional
C haractcrlstlca
United Way .190271 1.406 .139248 .786 .129948 981 .077892 .459 .141325 1.074 .076329 .451
Dnaul site -.002364 -.582 -.002346 -.662 -.003447 -8 4 6 -003298 -.945 -.002269 -5 7 0 -.002600 -.749
StafTTull .000769 2.424*** .000740 1800*** .000739 2.464*** .000790 3.189*** .000840 2.826*** .000837 3.368***
Revenue -.013734 -.343 -.031689 -.898 -.018023 -.462 •033640 -.981 -.031362 ,8 0 5 -.038130 •1.082
National .393066 2.875*** .425243 3.073*** .414594 3.112*** .435306 3.220*** .462302 1.484*** .466895 3.426***
llducto .000430 .004 -.046776 -.499 .023366 .255 -019427 -.216 .047424 .477 -.003642 ,0 4 0
Racecco -.016149 -071 .100537 .473 -.013770 -.061 069488 .347 .037769 .169 .093116 .467
Oegage .001149 .340 .003164 833 .000875 .265 .002818 .786 .000140 042 .003076 162
( ,'o n tc itu a l Pactore
Devolution .099175 1.951* .080469 1.620* .093487 1.803* .073881 1.414 .066436 I J 3 8 .064498 1.308
Duplica -.050268 -.965 -.044276 -.846 -.058336 -1.130 •044889 -.857 -036321 •1.112 -.045003 •875
Conipflcice -.024491 -.484 -016116 -.325 -.023597 -483 -012766 ,2 6 3 ,010393 -.213 ,003604 ,0 7 3
F u nd ing  V ariab lta
Cnntracl -.160658 -1.067 -.085647 -.595
State.fedlne -.001337 -721 -.000205 ,1 1 4
lednm n -.202207 -1.344 ,073861 -.470
StatCltKM 265334 1.753* .229838 1.492
1 oca lnnn .113897 .711 ,037789 ,2 1 4
Advocacy V ariab lta
Advocact
V ililad .279990 3 496*** .212633 2.767*** .277977 3.329*** .213316 2.794*** .233306 3J45*** .198621 2.604***
Tiackad -.037624 -.454 -.021332 -.276 •047532 -5 7 6 -.0.36722 -.411 -062107 -.761 -.055151 -.710
O raised -.057992 -.596 -.123212 -1.257 •033313 -.364 -079722 -893 ,003527 -0 3 9 ,053450 -593
t'o a lltloa /A ltlaaca
llcbavlor
Coalition .008038 .189 .059298 1.421 012191 .288 .057690 1.389 .013970 334 .055364 IJ 3 7
Slats co lltbotition
National coll.




S ep ara te  P rogram s
It square .3424 .3616 M l 2 .3796 3811 .3476
A dj. R square .2331 .2547 .2504 .2832 .2719 .2913
d f -d tf  r t t t  o f freedom 114 114 119 119 120 120
K 3.190 3.470 3.483 3 938 348 9 3 740
Pro ti <F) .0002 0001 0001 0001 0001 0001
*** Prob < 0 .0 1 , tw o-ialled le s i
’* Prob < 0 .0 5 , two-tailed test

















T ahlc D.17 M ultivaria te  M odels E stim ating  the Effect of Funding on O rgan izational B ehavior o f N onprofit O rganizations
D ependent V ariable: SE PPR O G S M odels 7 -  12 (continuation  from  6.16a)
UawttjjiM ' ~~ W<frbUd______________ Onwci|fck<r   Wtlgbtii_________________ Unweighted______ Wdyhltd
M odel 7 M o d d  8 M ed d  9 M o d d  10 M e d d  11 M ndcl 12
b t score b tsco re b t score h t score b t scoie b t score
Intercept 1.664756 2.511*** i .126121 2.82(*** 1.047498 T 4 5 l* * r 1  094416 T .976926 2.126** 1.023829
O rg a n iia d a ia l
C haracteristics
United Way .131021 1.0(7 .101033 358 .101146 .749 .051553 .299 .115172 .837 .052330 .304
Hoard site -OOIS47 -.690 -.003502 -.9 (9 -.003602 -.871 • 003924 -1.116 -.002333 -.378 •003171 -.909
SlaOTull .000176 2.732*** .000(11 3.060*** .000(40 2.813*** 000840 3.443*** 000936 3.150*** .000870 3.521***
Revenue -.024611 -.397 -.040(66 -1.147 -.026110 -633 -.039332 -1.137 -033105 -.8(2 -.038278 -1.091
Hatiunal .316627 2.744*** .361236 2.361*** .394(38 2.909*** .369877 2.733*** .445601 3J95*** .409969 2.998***
I'ducco -.030657 -.300 -.067335 -.742 -.013(37 -.140 -.053199 -.605 .007973 081 -039057 -.440
Kacccco -.011711 -.071 .0537(3 .234 • 01(928 -084 .030267 .153 .040868 .1(3 059309 .301
Orgage .000732 .211 .0030(4 8 I ( .000306 .151 002899 .803 -.000073112 -.022 .003167 .8(1
C en le s tu a l P a r ia n
Devolution .101120 2.097 .09(601 1.9(9** .10(071 2.063** .093063 1.794* 079(21 1.593 .0(0374 1.637*
Duplica -.0696(9 -1.304 -.073416 •1.402 •077198 •1.462 -071607 •1.369 -.0704(7 -1.361 -068057 -1.331
Congi fierce .007669 .151 .014759 .303 .003433 .070 .011362 237 .010491 .215 .015043 .312
F unding  V ariables
Conttact -.100(93 -.667 -.045369 -.315
.Slatefcdloc -.001214 -.638 -.000012344 • 007
Fcdinon -.173406 -1.153 -027847 -.1(2
Stntemon .287(33 1.873* .236921 1.538
t.ocalmon .06(606 .422 -.110570 -.628
Advocacy V ariaklcd




C oalltlan /A lllaacs
llchav lar







S ep ara ta  F ragram a
H square .1047 .3360 1201 ,166s .3611 3792
A d/. H square .2063 .2421 .2288 .2744 2503 2828
d fd c g  rccs o f frccdam 113 113 I K 118 119 119
K 3.099 3.578 3.501 4.187 3.483 3.933
I 're b  (F) .0003 .0001 0001 .0001 .0001 0001
*** Prob < 0 .0 1 , tw o-tailed test
** Prob < 0 .0 5 , tw o-tailed test

















T able D.18 M ultivaria te  Models Estim ating the Effect of Funding  on Advocacy B ehavior of N onprofit O rganizations
D ependent V ariab le: C O N SU LTG  Models 1-6
llnw righ lcd





M o d d  3
W eighted
M o d d  4
U nw dghled  
M o d d  5
W eighted




O rgan iza tiona l 

































S ep ara te  P rog ram a
R sq u are  
A d |u il*d  R iq u a r t  
i f  - d t g r t t i o f
rrccdont
P
IT o b (F )
I score D I score
*** Prob < 0.01, Iwo-uuivu ,u > 
• •  Prob < 0.05, two-tailed test 
* Prob < 0.10, two-Uilcil lest
-.49)207 -.43(5 -.627677 -.523 .761097 .672 042178 .034 .745206 .667 .113992 '  M 1
.190075 .741 .254984 .734 .249473 .974 .313141 .917 .241830 .931 .323765 .961
■.000034721 -.003 .005457 .339 -002707 •254 .003918 381 -002050 -.193 .002053 203
-.000371 -655 -000213 -.414 -000176 -.304 - 000079280 -.132 -000066612 -.113 •000022618 • 043
-.007271 -.101 •019714 -.318 •043546 -634 053333 -833 -049610 -.710 -.079803 •1.242
.355464 1.299 .283295 .939 .497594 1.741* .296815 .967 310387 1.759* 263271 877
.111010 .929 .061919 .315 -006557 -033 -.020711 -.103 -.019447 -.096 •027600 -.140
-.112965 •246 -.126104 -.297 .108114 236 .160653 .380 .138961 .304 .206170 .497
.006412 1.040 007834 1.103 .005077 801 006362 .884 .004970 .778 .005783 .820
-.175315 -1.697* -.108963 -.972 • 250949 •2.309** -.137839 -1.130 -249748 •2.381*** • 135307 -1.222
021413 .276 .071284 .705 .007751 .078 .069898 .663 .001129 O il .072184 .708
.027853 .311 -.022732 -.239 .077616 .877 .021864 232 .078386 .867 .022170 .229
.23323 .080 -.138393 -545
.002293 614 000713 .186
072323 .245 -.327039 •1.042
.226384 .725 -.157610 -.464
.077437 .249 691310 1.986**
.348831 2.137** .308741 1.856* .367261 2.196** .274291 1.385 .340029 2.019** 331011 2.045**
.507555 3.378*** .548090 3.682*** .431502 2.758*** .509458 3.330*** .431640 2.739*** .464839 2.985***
.208313 1079 .293698 1.446 268728 1.421 .361249 1.135* .275118 1.434 .311825 1.942**
-.019447 -.315 .020041 .304 .040)36 .623 .059077 .832 .043415 .673 053634 .826
.031130 1.318 .035969 .134 .02321 1 607 .019207 453 .022267 .588 .015023 .362
.010279 .168 .013161 .247 -.026179 •417 -.021447 •337 • 022608 -.362 - 009867 - 159
.922354 3.454*** .924420 3.201*** .775494 2.718*** .779769 2.322*** .767999 2.667*** .882694 , 2.860***
.049773 .161 -.083017 •258 .102257 327 .004399 .014 .157508 .496 -008977 -0 2 7
.265409 .901 .336876 1.044 .368487 1.271 .411134 1.288 351811 1 91 .393016 1 203
f  .001380 -.008 .039746 .196 -063912 -338 .017732 .086 -.095173 -.500 .001865 009
.5176 .5431 .4729 5147 .4773 5374
.3897 .4219 3412 .3933 .3331 4097
105 105 no no I I I 111
4 048 4.484 3 589 4 242 3.310 4.210
0001 
. 1,-- T------- "

















T able D.19 M ultivaria te  M odels E stim ating the Effect o f Fund ing  on Advocacy Ilcliavfor o f N onprofit O rganizations
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S ep a ra te  F ro g r im i



















M o d els
W eighted
M odel 6
H i  -m ail
t Korc
K iq u a re  
A d |u ilc d  R iq u a re  
d f  - degree! o f  freedom
V
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• I 436 
-.764 
.837
-.186401 -1.528 -.114459 -895 -.247038 -2.083** -.116106 -.874 -.242848 -2.151** -.132594 •I.too
.037885 -.339 .017300 .152 -.060808 -564 -.002000 -.018 •071100 -.734 011670 .107
.149511 I..189 .112058 1.010 .137029 1 395 .12904) 1.244 .118164 1.192 .1244)2 1.162
.222211 -.649 -.193267 -.588
.000968 .238 •002128 • 514
-.070262 -2 2 2 -.349535 -1.037
- 233764 -6 9 5 -.246680 -.669
.609508 1.827* .716970 1.923**
.253)84 1 )1 8 .070809 .378 .170670 .941 .036940 .199 .206171 1.146 I0S0IB .370
.302406 1.719* .312662 1.866* .263240 1.552 .295212 1.803* .258303 1.544 .253270 1.51)
.253536 1.124 .408576 1.791* .331861 1.623* 430294 2.144** .348257 1.698* 474632 2.254**
.1288)5 1.747* .076291 .998 .158028 2.212** 086142 1.097 .1514)3 2.146** 094270 1.237
■019992 -.440 -.008830 -.182 -.020216 -488 -.004637 -.102 -.022903 • 566 •014082 -.316
-.017202 -.239 .028476 .410 -.031001 -455 .009643 .141 -.013172 -1 9 7 .018161 271






**• Prob < 0 .01 , two-tailed lest
** Prob < 0.05, two-tailed test

















' F a b l e  D.20 Estimating Reciprocal Relationships
Dependent Variable: STATEMON-STATECOL
___________________________ SUIemon____________  Slatccol Staiemon
b I s c o re b I sco re i t
Inictvcpl -5.4060 1.5289 -6.0708 2.22968** •36307
STM ONIIAT 5.8699 2.7548***
STCOI.IIAT 1.6584
O rgan isa tional
C h aracteristics
Uniled Way .6442 .6429 .1323 .1682 .4551
Hoard sire -.0688 1.2108 .0265 1.3082 -0323
SlaOTldl -.00777 .9885 .00870 1.2748 -.00918
Revenue .4226 1.7092* .3514 2 0027 2757
National -2.8117 2J508*** .2450 .3513 -.6419
I’duccn .2923 .4496 -.5993 1.4538 .2963
Raccceo -.7110 .5931 -25548 2.7666*** ■7971
Otgage ■0307 1.5168 -0121 .7831 -.0153
C o n le itu a l F acto rs
Devolution .7767 1.7984 -.2221 .8538 .4574
Duplica .5355 1.6301* .3062 1.4667 •0145
Cuiiqinerce -.6833 2.1789** .0225 .1072 - 2323
F unding  V ariable*
Cniiuact
Slilcfcilloc
Pciltmn 1.1773 1.4573 1.1241 1.4839
Slatemon
l-ocalnun 3.8766 3.5808*** -2.7854 2.3019**
Advocacy V ariab lta
Advocact
Viiilad .8413 1.7462* -1.4650 3.0370*** .4096
I'racliad .8313 1.9928** -3812 .9519 .7693





National coll. •1.2776 1.4956 •1 8966
Issue coll. •1.6730 1.5958 .1273
1‘uiporive -.5834 2.2477*** .4537 2.376***
Material .0431 .3009 .0258 .2655
Solidary .3544 1.4594 -.1137 .7630
S ep a ra te  P rag ram a 2.0280 2.9280*** .8790 1.7617* .9090
R sq u are
A djusted  R sq u a re
d f  -degrees o( freedom
K
P ro b (F )
# o f O b tc rv a lio n i 117 117 ............  "  ii '7
Pseudo II1 4329 .3487
21.u t ;  I. 163.136 167.544 165.136
IIP 89 319 6 04 7 6 53952
Frob < 0.01, two-tailed Icil 
• •  Prob < 0.05, tw o ta ilcd  ic il 
* P rub<  0.10, two-tailed lest
Statecol
sco re  I T  |  sco re
1.7803* T I R I --------------
.9169
.6291 .5129 ,6555
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Table D.22 Estimating Reciprocal Relationships
Dependent Variable: STATEMON-SEPPROGS
SUIcmon Stpprogs Statcmon Stpprogs
to
&
b t s c o te b t s c o te b I sco re b 1 sco re
Intercept •2 )2 7 0 .7331 i .133094 J .U l* * * -3.4633 i .U o s 1.579074 2.756***
STM ON IIA T -.938918 -1.794*
SG ITRIIA T .5958 .1746
O rgan iza tiona l
C h arac te r!  Itica
United Way .1284 .1411 .102677 .608 .3692 .5149 .092467 .542
H oaid size -0527 1.1384 -.006167 •1.191 -0176 .6430 -.004266 ,8 3 2
SUdTull -.00415 .7321 .000336 1.194 -0 07 )3 1.6855* .000546 2.1 II**
Revenue .2796 .9458 -.032041 -.95) .2330 1.1946 -.047806 -1.456
N ationil -.7502 1.0412 .370795 2.515*** -.3867 .31)2 .44)690 3.095***
Gduceo .196] .3)41 -.000729 -008 .3293 .7736 -.002911 ,0 3 0
Racecco -.4612 .4207 .192523 .909 -.6617 .7776 520173 1.030
O g a g e -0192 .8709 .002383 .668 -0125 .6281 .003725 1.055
C a a taz tu a l F ac to r!
Devolution .5478 1.6725* .1368)2 2.227** .4396 1.6476* .079)21 1.496
Duplica 2293 .7767 -064194 1252 -.0540 .213) -058264 •1.126
Com pdetce -.468] 1.67)6* -.062073 -1.096 -.1776 .8502 ,0 1 0 3 4 ) ,2 1 0
F und ing  V arlablaa
C on tnc t
Slalefcdloc
Fednwn .3952 .4923 •083736 •536 -.122356 -.762
Slalcnion
Lncalnnn ]J 4 4 0 3.649*** .487575 1.732* 072357 .446
A dvacacy V aH ablea
Advocact
V liilad 1.1549 2.4212*** .348288 3.594*** 4999 .8587 .245613 3.105***
Track ad .7507 1.7431* .048178 519 .7214 2.2370 -0419)2 ,5 3 0
(in u ia d -1.5193 1.6464* -220943 -1.939** -7784 1.4177 -.118695 -1.189
Coalition/A lliance
lleh av la r
Coalition
Slate co llabontion 2.51)6 2.9896*** .762826 3.541*** 1 9498 1.6159* .470526 3 299***
National coll. -1.5669 1.7959* -.245065 -I.2B3 •1 8665 2.5908*** •051023 •321
Isiue coll. -1.58)4 1.5232 .031)21 .178 0274 04 148600 .901
Puipotive -.4605 2.0943** -.020322 -.506 .019793 .580
M aterial .0261 .2071 -.029539 •1.389 -.025706 •1.201
Solidary .2 )5 ) 1.0272 011987 327 -.025)44 ,831
S ep a ra te  P rog ram a
K iq u a re 4757 .4575
A d fu ittd  R  iq u a re .3460 3305
df—degreea a t  freedom 116 116
F 3.668 3.603
P ro b  (F) .0001 0001
H o f  O b ttrv a lla n a 117 117
T itu d o  I t1 •1311 3)16
-2 1 .0 0  1, 165.136 165.136
O F 88.677 58.0)6 .
I’rob < 0 0 5 , two-tailed Icil 

















Table D.23 Estimating Reciprocal Relationships
Dependent Variable: STATEMON-ADVOACT
S la lc m o n A d o cac t S t i t e m o n A d v o a c t
b  11 sco re b i sco re b  1 score b  I score
intercept -4.4868 1.5217 .104844 .091 -4.1282 2.0704** -.147571 "  . . t f v r
S rW O N IIA T 6.780949 2.198**
AUVOIIAT .7980 2 8324**
O rgan isa tional
C h aracteristics
Uniled W iy .0241 .01 -.461456 -468 .8740 1.1248 -.716564 -.715
■loud l i te -.0127 .8161 .071919 2.610*** -.0729 20618** .082024 2.864***
StaflTull -.00411 .9515 .001681 2.406*** -.00902 2.5411*** .002708 1.812*
Revenue .02154 1.2911 .141748 .745 .0914 .5559 .270711 1.441
National •1.5801 1.9249** .861707 .918 • I .1621 1.6853* -.011170 -.015
liducco .1278 .2649 -.600719 -1.119 .8645 1.7896* -.702787 -1.289
Racccco -1.7(587 1.7916* -.145946 -.114 -.5975 .7362 •1.291174 •1.078
O tgage -.0198 1.0915 -.006679 -.125 .000662 .04 -.017547 -.861
C o n le itu a l V a r ta n
Devolution .6574 2.2015®* .089101 212 .2141 .8171 .615174 2.012**
Duplica .0454 .1782 .115258 1070 -.2445 I.IIS 6 .212415 .780
Conqtderce -.1884 1.5687 .250245 .814 -2194 1.1208 001987 .014
F und ing  V artablea
C o n tn c t
Staleredloc
Icilnm n .4168 .6541 .660802 .731 1.082692 1.205
Slate mon
l.ucalinon 1.1275 1.7109*** -1.897671 -1 .116 1.256617 1.151








Slate collaboration 1.1297 1.5771 ■2.680061 •2.541*•• 2.2898 3.1535*** -1.260168 •1.482
N ational coll. •1.4475 1.8674* 2.559072 2.454 -3.0163 3.2918*** 1.385486 I J I 7
Issue coll. -1216 .4001 .420079 .446 .3225 .5058 -.044698 -.048
I’urposive .2816 1.5007 .571929 2.477*** .295073 1.495
Material .0419 .1760 -.109645 .915 -081140 -.685
Sulidary 2287 1.1621 -.446960 -2.055** -.161007 -.914
S e p a ra ta  r r e g r a m i 1.1806 2.5416*** .160112 .5962 .1558 2898 1.195885 2 092**
K sq u a re .4248 3952
A djusted  R square .2962 .2679
d f— degrees o f  freedom 115 115
F 1.305 3.104
P ro b  (F) .0001 .0001
(  o f  O liiervatlen s 117 117
I'scudo I t ' .3964 .12/8
•2 1 .0 0  1, 165.116 165 136
OF 76814 57.066
h u b  < 0.01, two-tailed Icil
• •  Prob < 0.05, two-tailed Icil
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Tabic I).26 Estimating Reciprocal Relationships
Dependent Variable: CONTRACT-ADVOCAT
Contract_______  Advoact Contract Advoact
b t s co re b t sco re b t sco re b I sco re
Intercept -S I  IS .3613 - I . U I I I 2 -.351 -1.0267 .4770 ■ ■ : i X M W " -335
CONI1AT 4.625884 2.447” *
ADVOIIAT - 3321 .5646
O rgan isa tio n a l
C h arac te ristic s
United W ay -.2612 .3513 -.813712 • 828 -.4183 .5009 -.437929 -.440
Hoard s its .0604 2.0229” .040273 1.303 .0873 1.781* .075521 2.693***
S tim u li .1396 2.6691” * .000626 .394 .1410 2.6718*** .002215 1.494
Revenue .0194 .0927 .089398 .493 .1246 .4602 .283885 1.698
National -.0317 .0489 .266927 .319 -0 5 1 4 .0787 .151519 .177
l-duceo -.3671 1.3107 -.167024 -312 -6 6 8 7 1.3247 -.431627 -.816
Kaceceo -1.9374 2.1607” -.042199 -034 •2 3469 1.8347 -1.428653 -1.270
O r,age -.0304 1.6403* -.005163 -.249 -0396 1.7708 -.021437 •1.064
C o n le itu a l R a t ta n
Devolution .4234 1.8228* .377436 1.166 .6758 1.3665 .715214 2.383*”
Duplica -.3246 1.4798 .403123 I J 8 2 -2 1 8 0 .8492 .216732 .814
Conqrdcrce 2036 1.0279 -.028736 -.103* .2801 1.3613 .166174 .609












tle lia rio r
Coaliliun
Stale collatw ntion .9233 1.4840 -1.705339 •2.344*” .5201 5038 -1.213213 -1 693*
National coll. • 3041 .4623 1.736665 1.969” .1256 .1323 1.130756 1.303
Issue coll. 1.0595 1.4637 -.338832 -.477 1.1615 1.601* .279382 .386
Purposive -.0283 .1884 .174633 .908 .227780 1.163
Material ■0166 .1821 -.01661 -.140 -.033489 -.276
Solidary .1226 .8904 • 289075 -1.614* -.194305 •1.084
S ep ara te  P ra g n m e • 6231 1.2629 1.314174 2.413” * -.1751 .1965 1.293088 2.317”
H aqaare .4036 .......... J t M
A djusted R  square .2903 .2546
df—degrees o t  freedom 117 117
F 3.319 3.220
P r o b (F) .0001 .0001
» o f O bservations I I I n r
Tseudo R* 3348 .3326
.2 1 .0 0  1, 138.763 158.763
IIP 55.878 55 314
••• Piub <6.61, Iwouifed let I 
*• Piob < 0.05, two'taJIcd lesl 
* Prob < 0.10, two-uiled leit
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